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The Motley of Mathematics : A study of Wittgenstein's 
Philosophy of Mathematics. 
by Paul Michael Severn 
Submitted f o r the Degree of Master of Arts at the 
U n i v e r s i t y of Durham. 
June 1990. 
I n t h i s t h e s i s I t r y to examine Wittgenstein's philosophy 
of mathematics, both against the background of e a r l y twentieth 
century foundational s t u d i e s and against the background of 
Wittgenstein's general p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n . I have t r i e d 
to e x p l a i n Wittgenstein's objections to the foundational 
programmes and to show that they are c o n s i s t e n t with and 
understandable i n terms of, Wittgenstein's general 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l outlook. 
In chapters one to four I d i s c u s s Wittgenstein's remarks 
on the mainstream foundational schools: logicism, 
i n t u i t i o n i s m , formalism and s t r i c t f i n i t i s m ; and t r y to 
e x p l a i n t hat i n addition to the t e c h n i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s 
inherent i n each, on Wittgenstein's view they are p o i n t l e s s 
endeavours, as mathematics has no need of foundations. 
In chapter f i v e I d i s c u s s proof, and elaborate upon 
va r i o u s points made i n preceding chapters. 
In chapters s i x to eight I d i s c u s s the connections 
between the philosophy of mathematics, and Wittgenstein's 
other c e n t r a l concerns (language games and forms of l i f e , 
s c e p t i c i s m and r u l e following, and philosophy of mind) drawing 
p a r a l l e l s and t r y i n g to gain a f u l l e r understanding of the 
former i n terms of the l a t t e r . 
Chapter nine concludes my d i s c u s s i o n , with an attempt to 
evaluate the s i g n i f i c a n c e of Wittgenstein's contribution; and 
to a s s e s s the p r i n c i p a l o b jections l e v e l l e d against i t . 
Whilst not wholeheartedly embracing Wittgenstein's 
p o s i t i o n , I have frequently found myself defending him, and 
I do t h i s because I think a l l too many of the c r i t i c i s m s of 
Wittgenstein derive from misunderstanding. The p r i n c i p a l 
causes of misunderstanding are: 
( i ) an over s e l e c t i v e reading of Wittgenstein and a 
f a i l u r e to understand i n d i v i d u a l remarks i n t h e i r wider 
context. 
( i i ) a f a i l u r e to appreciate Wittgenstein's d i s t i n c t i o n 
between mathematics and philosophy; leading to a muddle 
between Wittgenstein's mathematical and h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
remarks, and much u n f a i r c r i t i c i s m . 
I have p a r t i c u l a r l y t r i e d to e s t a b l i s h Wittgenstein's 
views on c e n t r a l questions, and to re f u t e c r i t i c i s m s which 
de r i v e from misunderstandings of these views. 
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P r e f a c e . 
In t h i s t h e s i s I have t r i e d to examine Wittgenstein's 
philosophy of mathematics, both against the background of 
e a r l y t w entieth century foundational s t u d i e s , and against the 
background of Wittgenstein's general p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n . 
I have t r i e d to e x p l a i n Wittgenstein's objections to the 
foundation programmes, and to show that these are co n s i s t e n t 
with; and understandable i n terms of, Wittgenstein's general 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l outlook. 
Whilst not wholeheartedly embracing Wittgenstein's 
p o s i t i o n , I have frequently found myself defending him, and 
I do t h i s because a l l too many of the c r i t i c i s m s of 
Wittgenstein d e r i v e from misunderstanding. The p r i n c i p a l 
causes of these misunderstandings are: 
( i ) An over s e l e c t i v e reading of Wittgenstein and a 
f a i l u r e to understand i n d i v i d u a l remarks i n t h e i r wider 
context. 
( i i ) A f a i l u r e to d i s t i n g u i s h between Wittgenstein's 
mathematical comments about mathematical statements, and h i s 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l comments about mathematical statements. 
Wittgenstein saw the two as e n t i r e l y separate, but c r i t i c s 
have often muddled the two: reading p h i l o s o p h i c a l comments 
as mathematical comments, and misunderstanding Wittgenstein 
as a r e s u l t . 
I have p a r t i c u l a r l y t r i e d to e s t a b l i s h c o r r e c t l y 
Wittgenstein's views on c e n t r a l questions and to refute 
c r i t i c i s m s which derive from what I b e l i e v e to be a 
misunderstanding of these views. 
In chapters one to four I d i s c u s s Wittgenstein's remarks 
on the mainstream foundational schools: logicism, 
i n t u i t i o n i s m , formalism and s t r i c t f i n i t i s m ; and t r y to 
e x p l a i n t h a t i n addition to the t e c h n i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s 
inherent i n each, on Wittgenstein's view they are p o i n t l e s s 
endeavours, as mathematics has no need of foundations. 
In chapter f i v e I d i s c u s s proof, and elaborate upon 
va r i o u s points made i n preceding chapters. 
In chapters s i x to eight I d i s c u s s the connections 
between the philosophy of mathematics and Wittgenstein's other 
c e n t r a l concerns; (language games and forms of l i f e , 
s c e p t i c i s m and r u l e following, and philosophy of mind.) 
drawing p a r a l l e l s and t r y i n g to gain a f u l l e r understanding 
of the former i n terms of the l a t t e r . 
Chapter nine concludes my d i s c u s s i o n with an attempt to 
evaluate the s i g n i f i c a n c e of Wittgenstein's contribution; and 
to a s s e s s the p r i n c i p a l objections l e v e l l e d against i t . 
B i o g r a p h i c a l Note. 
Ludwig W i t t g e n s t e i n was born i n Vienna on 26th A p r i l 
1889, o f a f a m i l y o f Jewish descent. His f a t h e r was a 
prom i n e n t i n d u s t r i a l f i g u r e and young Ludwig was educated a t 
home u n t i l he was f o u r t e e n . A f t e r t h r e e years o f school a t 
L i n z , he s t u d i e d e n g i n e e r i n g a t B e r l i n U n i v e r s i t y and i n 1908 
he r e g i s t e r e d as a r e s e a r c h s t u d e n t a t Manchester U n i v e r s i t y . 
W h i l s t d e s i g n i n g a p r o p e l l e r s h a f t , h i s i n t e r e s t s s h i f t e d 
f rom e n g i n e e r i n g t o mathematics, and t h e n t o t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
f o u n d a t i o n s o f mathematics. I n 1911 W i t t g e n s t e i n v i s i t e d 
Frege a t Jena U n i v e r s i t y and was a d v i s e d t o study under 
R u s s e l l a t Cambridge. He d i d t h i s f o r f i v e terms a t T r i n i t y 
C o l l e g e between 1912 and 1913. 
The f o l l o w i n g passage from R u s s e l l i s famous. "At t h e 
end o f h i s f i r s t t e r m a t Cambridge he came t o me and s a i d : 
" W i l l you p l e a s e t e l l me whether I am a complete i d i o t or 
n o t ? " I r e p l i e d , "My dear f e l l o w , I don't know. Why are 
you a s k i n g me?" He s a i d , "Because i f I am a complete i d i o t 
I s h a l l become an aeronaut; b u t i f n o t , I s h a l l become a 
p h i l o s o p h e r . " I t o l d him t o w r i t e me something d u r i n g t h e 
v a c a t i o n on some p h i l o s o p h i c a l s u b j e c t and I would t h e n t e l l 
him whether he was a complete i d i o t o r n o t . At t h e b e g i n n i n g 
o f t h e f o l l o w i n g t e r m he brought me t h e f u l f i l m e n t o f t h i s 
s u g g e s t i o n . A f t e r r e a d i n g o n l y one sentence, I s a i d t o him: 
"No, you must n o t become an aeronaut." " ( R u s s e l l 1957 pp26-
27) . 
A f t e r Cambridge Wittgenstein l i v e d i n i s o l a t i o n i n 
Norway, and at the outbreak of the f i r s t world war he e n l i s t e d 
as a volunteer i n the A u s t r i a n A r t i l l e r y . Throughout both 
these periods he recorded h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l thoughts i n 
notebooks, and i t was from these notes that grew the only 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l book that Wittgenstein published i n h i s 
l i f e t i m e : the T r a c t a t u s Logico Philosophicus published i n 
E n g l i s h i n 1922. 
A f t e r the war, Wittgenstein gave away the fortune he had 
i n h e r i t e d from h i s f a t h e r and gave up philosophy, b e l i e v i n g 
i t an attempt to say the unsayable, and a f t e r t r a i n i n g as a 
teacher i n Vienna he taught i n a remote A u s t r i a n v i l l a g e from 
1920 u n t i l 1926. A f t e r that he spent some time as a monastic 
gardener and considered e n t e r i n g the r e l i g i o u s l i f e . He a l s o 
a s s i s t e d i n designing a house for h i s s i s t e r i n Vienna. 
During t h i s period he became acquainted with S c h l i c k , 
Carnap and Waismann, l a t e r to form the Vienna C i r c l e ; and 
legend has i t t h a t i t was when Wittgenstein heard Brouwer 
l e c t u r e on the foundations of mathematics, that he decided to 
r e t u r n to philosophy. He returned to Cambridge i n 1929 and 
s u c c e s s f u l l y submitted h i s Tractatus as a Ph.D. t h e s i s . 
He became a r e s e a r c h fellow at T r i n i t y College, and 
became g r e a t l y involved i n both teaching and w r i t i n g . Indeed 
the e a r l y t h i r t i e s were the most p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y productive 
years of Wittgenstein's l i f e and i t i s from t h i s period that 
the w r i t i n g s on the philosophy of mathematics come. 
I n 1939 W i t t g e n s t e i n succeeded Moore as p r o f e s s o r o f 
p h i l o s o p h y a t Cambridge, b u t b e f o r e he c o u l d t a k e up h i s 
c h a i r , t h e second w o r l d war broke o u t . D u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d 
he worked as a m e d i c a l o r d e r l y a t Guy's H o s p i t a l , London; 
and i n a l a b o r a t o r y a t t h e Royal V i c t o r i a I n f i r m a r y a t 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne. 
A f t e r t h e war he r e t u r n e d t o h i s d u t i e s as a p r o f e s s o r , 
b u t he d i s l i k e d t h e f o r m a l academic r o u t i n e , and t h e 
a r t i f i c i a l i t y o f u n i v e r s i t y l i f e ; and he r e s i g n e d h i s c h a i r 
i n 1947 a f t e r o n l y two y e a r s . He d e s c r i b e d t h e l i f e as 
p r o f e s s o r o f p h i l o s o p h y as "a l i v i n g d e a t h . " (Kenny p l 2 ) 
He embarked on a s e r i e s o f t r a v e l s b o t h t o I r e l a n d where 
he f i n i s h e d t h e P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , and t o America 
where he s t a y e d w i t h Norman Malcolm a t C o r n e l l . 
D e t e r i o r a t i n g h e a l t h t o o k him back t o England and i t was 
d i s c o v e r e d t h a t he had i n c u r a b l e cancer. He spent t h e l a s t 
two years o f h i s l i f e s t a y i n g w i t h f r i e n d s i n Oxford and 
Cambridge. D u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d he managed a l a s t p i e c e o f 
work on e p i s t e m o l o g y , p u b l i s h e d posthumously as: On C e r t a i n t y 
i n 1969. 
He d i e d a t t h e home o f h i s Cambridge d o c t o r on 2 9 t h A p r i l 
1951. His l a s t words were: " T e l l them I've had a wo n d e r f u l 
l i f e . " 
B i b l i o g r a p h i c Note. 
W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s work on t h e p h i l o s o p h y of mathematics i s 
m a i n l y t o be found i n t h e L e c t u r e s on t h e F o u n d a t i o n s of 
Mathematics, t h e Remarks on t h e F o u n d a t i o n s of Mathematics and 
t h e s e c o n d p a r t of P h i l o s o p h i c a l Grammar. 
The L e c t u r e s a r e an e d i t e d v e r s i o n of n o t e s t a k e n by R.G. 
Bosanquet, Norman Malcolm, Rush Rhees and Y o r i c k Smythies a t 
W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s two h o u r l y , t w i c e weekly l e c t u r e s of t h e L e n t 
and E a s t e r terms of 1939. The f o u r s e t s of n o t e s a t Cora 
Diamond's (the e d i t o r ' s ) d i s p o s a l were both e d i t e d by t h e i r 
a u t h o r s , and complete t o d i f f e r e n t d e g r e e s . Diamond w r i t e s : 
"No s i n g l e v e r s i o n was t a k e n as t h e b a s i c t e x t . R a t h e r each 
p a s s a g e i s b a s e d on a comparison of a l l t h e a v a i l a b l e v e r s i o n s 
o f t h a t p a s s a g e . Where two or more v e r s i o n s a g r e e d i n some 
p o i n t , I n o r m a l l y took them t o be c o r r e c t i n t h a t r e s p e c t . " 
(LFM p 8 ) . 
Much of t h e t e x t p r o b a b l y i s (or i s v e r y c l o s e to) what 
W i t t g e n s t e i n a c t u a l l y s a i d , but because he d i d not w r i t e or 
c o r r e c t i t ; and b e c a u s e of t h e d i s c u r s i v e s t y l e of 
W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s l e c t u r i n g , g r e a t c a r e must be t a k e n i n 
i d e n t i f y i n g any p a r t i c u l a r p a s s a g e w i t h W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s 
d e f i n i t i v e p o s i t i o n . However, r e a d i n t h e l i g h t of t he 
Remarks and t h e I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , t h e L e c t u r e s a r e a v a l u a b l e 
and i m p o r t a n t s o u r c e . 
The Remarks a r e a s e l e c t i o n from W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s 
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m a n u s c r i p t s , found i n f i v e separate notebooks, from which t h e 
f i v e s e c t i o n s o f t h e Remarks d e r i v e . P a r t I i s t h e e a r l i e s t , 
w r i t t e n i n 1937 i t bears many s i m i l a r i t i e s t o t h e 
I n v e s t i g a t i o n s . Indeed i t was p r o b a b l y W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s 
o r i g i n a l i n t e n t i o n t o i n c o r p o r a t e h i s ideas on l o g i c and 
mathematics i n t o t h e I n v e s t i g a t i o n s . 
P a r t I I d e r i v e s from t h e p e r i o d October 1939 t o A p r i l 
1940 and i s a d i s c u s s i o n o f W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s p o s i t i o n r e l a t i v e 
t o R u s s e l l . There i s much d i s c u s s i o n o f l o g i c , d e r i v a b i l i t y 
i n mathematics and t h e n a t u r e o f p r o o f . 
P a r t I I I and P a r t IV are ta k e n from m a n u s c r i p t s o f 1942 
and 1943. Much o f these p a r t s can be seen as p r e l i m i n a r y 
s t u d i e s f o r t h e second s e c t i o n o f p a r t V; but i n p a r t IV 
W i t t g e n s t e i n d i s c u s s e s t o p i c s r e l a t i n g t o Brouwer and 
I n t u i t i o n i s m , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e law o f t h e excluded m i d d l e . 
P a r t V was w r i t t e n i n two s e c t i o n s . The f i r s t (remarks 
1-16) i n June 1941, and t h e second i n t h e s p r i n g o f 1944; but 
as t h e y occur i n t h e same notebook, i t i s pro b a b l e t h a t 
W i t t g e n s t e i n regarded them as b e l o n g i n g t o g e t h e r . The 
m a t e r i a l concerns t h e r e l a t i o n between mathematical and 
e m p i r i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s , c a l c u l a t i o n and experiment and a f r e s h 
t r e a t m e n t o f c o n s i s t e n c y i n t h e f i r s t s e c t i o n . A d i s c u s s i o n 
o f r u l e f o l l o w i n g and t h e concepts o f p r o o f and i n f e r e n c e i s 
fou n d i n t h e second. 
The e d i t o r s have numbered W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s i n d i v i d u a l 
remarks, b u t "the d i v i s i o n i n t o separate 'remarks', here 
i n d i c a t e d by a space between them, i s W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s own. 
Wi t h few e x c e p t i o n s we have n o t i n t e r f e r e d w i t h t h e i r o r d e r . 
Sometimes, however, e s p e c i a l l y a t t h e end o f P a r t I I I and o f 
P a r t IV, we have b r o u g h t t o g e t h e r remarks on t h e same t o p i c 
t h a t o c c u r r e d i n d i f f e r e n t p l a c e s i n t h e m a n u s c r i p t s . " (RFM 
p v i i i ) 
The e d i t o r s a l s o suggest t h a t a t some stage a more 
e x t e n s i v e v e r s i o n o f W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s own manuscripts may be 
p u b l i s h e d , p r o v i d i n g t h e s c h o l a r w i t h t h e m a t e r i a l o m i t t e d 
f r o m t h e Remarks, b u t t o date t h i s has not been done. 
The P h i l o s o p h i c a l Grammar i s W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s own B i g 
T y p e s c r i p t which bore t h e p a r e t h e n t i c a l remark: "My book 
might be c a l l e d P h i l o s o p h i c a l Grammar." I t was completed i n 
1933, and so p a r t o f i t i s contemporary w i t h t h e d i c t a t i o n o f 
t h e Blue Book, and i n f a c t many o f t h e ideas i n t h e Grammar 
are f u l l e r d i s c u s s i o n s o f ideas i n t h e Blue Book. Many 
passages i n t h e Grammar a l s o appear i n t h e P h i l o s o p h i c a l 
Remarks and t h e P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s . 
P a r t I I , which concerns us most, i s from t h e second p a r t 
o f t h e B i g T y p e s c r i p t and c o n s i d e r s t h e problems o f 
g e n e r a l i t y , p r o o f , i n f e r e n c e and c a r d i n a l numbers. Rush 
Rhees e d i t e d W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s manuscript which i s r e p e a t e d l y 
changed, r e - o r d e r e d and o v e r w r i t t e n i n 1969. Anthony Kenny 
f i r s t t r a n s l a t e d i t i n t o E n g l i s h i n 1974. 
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I L o g i c i s m . 
I n d i s c u s s i n g W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s p h i l o s o p h y i t i s customary 
t o d i s t i n g u i s h between an e a r l y p e r i o d (1912-1920) and a l a t e r 
p e r i o d (1930s and 1940s) ; but t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s not 
a p p r o p r i a t e f o r t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f mathematics as W i t t g e n s t e i n 
d i d almost a l l h i s work i n t h i s area d u r i n g t h e l a t e r p e r i o d . 
Having s a i d t h i s however, t h e r e are remarks about l o g i c i s m 
i n b o t h t h e e a r l y and t h e l a t e r w r i t i n g s ; and these are o f 
such a d i f f e r e n t c h a r a c t e r , care must be t a k e n t o separate t h e 
two. 
F i r s t l y t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f l o g i c i s m i n t h e T r a c t a t u s w i l l 
be examined, b u t i n o r d e r t o understand t h i s i t i s necessary 
t o go back t o Frege and t h e o r i g i n s o f l o g i c i s m . Frege's 
work was m o t i v a t e d by t h e inadequate accounts o f t h e 
f o u n d a t i o n s o f mathematics t h a t e x i s t e d i n t h e l a t e n i n e t e e n t h 
c e n t u r y . He was p a r t i c u l a r l y h o s t i l e t o w a r d psychologism: 
t h e view t h a t t h e n a t u r e o f concepts such as t r u t h , v a l i d i t y 
even knowledge were mental and s u b j e c t i v e and he sought t o set 
a r i t h m e t i c on a mind-independent f o u n d a t i o n . 
Frege p a r t i c u l a r l y r e j e c t e d J.S M i l l ' s account t h a t 
a r i t h m e t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s s t a t e e m p i r i c a l f a c t s , and 
a r i t h m e t i c a l laws are i n d u c t i v e i n f e r e n c e s from these f a c t s . 
He a l s o r e j e c t e d Kant's view t h a t t h e t r u t h s o f a r i t h m e t i c 
are s y n t h e t i c a p r i o r i . Frege wanted t o show a r i t h m e t i c a l 
t r u t h s t o be a n a l y t i c , a l t h o u g h i t i s not t h e case t h a t Frege 
saw Kant as a g r e a t r i v a l , Frege w r i t e s i n a v e r y neo-
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Kantian s t y l e and accepts Kant's account of geometry, but 
Frege had h i s own views on the foundations of ar i t h m e t i c which 
were a profound break with anything that had gone b e f o r e . ( I t 
i s a point of s c h o l a r l y debate to what extent Frege's views 
were a n t i c i p a t e d by L e i b n i z ) 
The f i r s t step i n g i v i n g a r i t h m e t i c a mind-independent, 
non-empirical, a n a l y t i c foundation was made i n 1879 when Frege 
published h i s B e g r i f f s s c h r i f t . This short work introduced 
a formal language f o r mathematics, designed to eliminate 
ambiguity and to express a r i t h m e t i c a l statements i n purely 
l o g i c a l terms. Frege hoped to show that a l l a r i t h m e t i c a l 
statements could be expressed i n l o g i c a l terms, and that 
a r i t h m e t i c a l theorems could then be derived from the axioms 
of l o g i c alone; although t h i s task was not f u l l y undertaken 
u n t i l the Grundgesetze of 1893. 
Apart from the in t r o d u c t i o n of a formal language there 
were two other v i t a l elements to the B e g r i f f s s c h r i f t . The 
f i r s t was the idea of multiple g e n e r a l i t y allowing 
q u a n t i f i c a t i o n over s e v e r a l v a r i a b l e s or pred i c a t e s , and many 
placed p r e d i c a t e s to represent l o g i c a l and mathematical 
fun c t i o n s of s e v e r a l v a r i a b l e s . The l o g i c s of A r i s t o t l e and 
Boole could not accommodate these, but they are v i t a l for the 
expression of concepts i n higher mathematics. 
The second was the intr o d u c t i o n of the r e l a t i o n that 
R u s s e l l and Whitehead were to c a l l the a n c e s t r a l . Without 
going i n t o great d e t a i l , Frege showed how to express the 
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statement "x i s an ancestor of y", using only the two place 
p r e d i c a t e Pxy meaning "x i s a parent of y" (the successor 
r e l a t i o n ) . He applied h i s idea to define N = {0,1,2,3...} 
the n a t u r a l numbers ( i e . f i n i t e c a r d i n a l s ) as 0 and the 
c a r d i n a l numbers reachable from i t by f i n i t e l y many steps of 
the successor r e l a t i o n . This meaning that a l l the c a r d i n a l 
numbers possess every property that belongs to 0 and i s 
s u c c e s s o r - h e r e d i t a r y . 
Furthermore t h i s r e l a t i o n enabled Frege to show that the 
p r i n c i p l e of mathematical induction i s a purely l o g i c a l law, 
not based on any s p e c i a l "mathematical i n t u i t i o n " as Kant 
thought. Frege's a n c e s t r a l was independently constructed by 
Peano i n h i s Arithmetices P r i n c i p i a of 1889 and c a l l e d Axiom 
V. 
The mathematical community accepted Frege's new work very 
badly. Frege's symbolism was c r i t i c i s e d as "a monstrous 
waste of space" (C u r r i e p42) and another s a i d that apart from 
Frege's i n t r o d u c t i o n of notation for g e n e r a l i t y , "the new 
l o g i c d i d not go beyond that of Boole", (i b i d . ) Frege 
however was not deterred and i n 1884 he published the 
Grundlagen; which defined n a t u r a l numbers i n purely l o g i c a l 
terms. Also included were other d e t a i l s of how functions 
were to be defined, matters of syntax e t c . and the spadework 
had been done for Frege's l a s t major work: Die Grundgesetze 
der Arithmetik (1893) . Frege begins an e x p l i c i t 
demonstration of l o g i c i s m by using the l o g i c of 
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B e g r i f f s s c h r i f t to show how a r i t h m e t i c could be derived from 
purely l o g i c a l axioms and d e f i n i t i o n s alone. The t e x t was 
hi g h l y symbolic and d i f f i c u l t to follow and went l a r g e l y 
unnoticed u n t i l R u s s e l l read i t i n 1901. R u s s e l l discovered 
a paradox i n Frege's work which he communicated to Frege i n 
a p r i v a t e l e t t e r of 1902, and published i n h i s The P r i n c i p l e s 
of Mathematics i n 1903. 
Frege regarded functions as incomplete or "unsaturated", 
r e q u i r i n g the argument of the function to complete them. But 
consider two functions f (x) and g(x) that have the same values 
fo r the same arguments: Frege could not wr i t e f (x) = g(x) for 
t h i s i s to t r e a t functions as complete obje c t s which they are 
not. So he introduced the idea of the Werthverlauf of a 
function, which i s the "course of val u e s " that the functions 
takes, and i s an object complete i n i t s e l f . He then says 
t h a t i f two functions have the same values for the same 
arguments they have the same Werthverlauf; and t h i s i s 
Frege's axiom V. I t i s t h i s axiom that leads to R u s s e l l ' s 
paradox, f o r i t allows the int r o d u c t i o n of a concept "not 
holding of i t s e l f " To then ask; does t h i s concept hold of 
i t s e l f , leads to paradox. Formally i n Frege's own notation, 
as there i s no modern notation to express Frege's 
Werthverlauf. (expressed here £ ^ ( ( S ) 
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Russell's paradox caused Frege "great surprise ... and 
conste r n a t i o n " (Van Heijenoort p l 2 7 ) , and l e d Frege t o 
introduce a new axiom Vb. This i n t r o d u c t i o n however was 
unacceptably ad hoc; and f u r t h e r l e d t o other s e l f 
r e f e r e n ^ a l paradoxes. 
I n P r i n c i p i a Mathematica Russell and Whitehead introduce 
a theory of types t o avoid the Russellian paradox. 
I n d i v i d u a l s are of type zero, classes of i n d i v i d u a l s type one 
and so on. Then Russell says we can only meaningfully speak 
of classes belonging t o t h i s hierarchy, and i n p a r t i c u l a r 
classes which are members of themselves do not e x i s t i n the 
hierarchy and Russell's paradox cannot be framed. 
With t h i s e x t r a apparatus Russell i s able t o define the 
n a t u r a l numbers i n l o g i c a l terms without running i n t o paradox; 
but because of the theory of types i n d i v i d u a l s of type zero 
form sets of i n d i v i d u a l s of type one and sets of sets of type 
two; which are i d e n t i f i e d as the n a t u r a l numbers. Russell 
i d e n t i f i e s n w i t h the set of a l l sets w i t h n members. But 
t h i s raises a problem, f o r i f the set of n a t u r a l numbers i s 
t o be i n f i n i t e , there have t o be i n f i n i t e l y many sets of type 
one, and hence i n f i n i t e l y many i n d i v i d u a l s . The best Russell 
can do, i s p o s t u l a t e t h i s as the axiom of i n f i n i t y . (Similar 
axioms had p r e v i o u s l y been employed by Zermelo, asser t i n g the 
existence of an i n f i n i t e c o l l e c t i o n of sets.) but Russell's 
axiom sign a l s a departure from a purely l o g i c a l foundation. 
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Further, the so c a l l e d simple theory of types i s found 
t o lead t o c e r t a i n semantic paradoxes; stemming from the f a c t 
t h a t Russell, i n drawing up h i s simple theory had t o speak of 
the meaning of signs. To obviate these d i f f i c u l t i e s Russell 
developed the r a m i f i e d theory of types'; but i n doing so he 
had t o introduce two f u r t h e r axioms. The Axiom of Choice and 
the Axiom of R e d u c i b i l i t y . 
The l a t t e r i s more c o n t r o v e r s i a l and states t h a t f o r 
every non-elementary f u n c t i o n , there i s an equivalent 
elementary or p r e d i c a t i v e f u n c t i o n . The d e t a i l s of t h i s are 
unimportant, but t h i s axiom i s c e r t a i n l y not an axiom of 
l o g i c , and as Ramsey says: i t would be "a happy accident" i f 
i t were t r u e ! Hence many of the theorems of P r i n c i p i a 
Mathematica are st a t e d : " i f Ax. I n f . and/or Ax. Red. then 
theorem", but many see these proofs, which r e s t on such 
dubious c o n d i t i o n a l s , not t o be proofs at a l l . 
I n the Tractatus I t h i n k four d i s t i n c t c r i t i c i s m s of 
l o g i c i s m can be s i n g l e d out. The f i r s t at 4.1273 attacks 
Frege's and Russell's d e f i n i t i o n of successor and ancestral 
as c i r c u l a r . For i n order t o express the general 
p r o p o s i t i o n : "b i s a successor of a" W i t t g t e n s t e i n says we 
have t o give the general term i n the ser i e s : 
a R b 
Q x ) a R x . x R b . 
(3x,y) a R x . x R y . y R b etc. 
and t h i s requires the use of a v a r i a b l e which i s the symbol 
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f o r a formal concept. But e a r l i e r i n 4.1272 Wittgenstein 
says numbers themselves are formal concepts not functions or 
classes; and so t h i s use of the v a r i a b l e i n the d e f i n i t i o n 
of successor introduces both the p r i m i t i v e concept of number, 
and p a r t i c u l a r numbers, which i s v i c i o u s l y c i r c u l a r . 
This argument seems t o hold so long as numbers are not 
i d e n t i f i e d w i t h f u n c t i o n s or classes; and Wittgenstein's own 
understanding of "there are two objects which ..." as " G 
x , y ) . . . " i s accepted. But i s d o u b t f u l t h a t the expression 
"there are two objects which ..." when used i n any other way 
i s "nonsensical", and i t i s hard t o asses whether t h i s 
o b j e c t i o n i s r e a l l y f a t a l . 
The next two c r i t i c i s m s r e s t on Russell's axioms of 
r e d u c i b i l i t y and i n f i n i t y t h a t I have already mentioned; and 
are perhaps c l e a r e r . To v a l i d a t e the l o g i c i s t t h e s i s the 
axiom of r e d u c i b i l i t y must be a l o g i c a l l y t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n . 
W i t t g e n s t e i n denies t h i s , although not d i r e c t l y or 
s p e c i f i c a l l y . He c i t e s i t as an alleged example, when he 
attacks Russell's n o t i o n of l o g i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s i n general. 
Russell held p r o p o s i t i o n s t o be l o g i c a l l y t r u e i n v i r t u e 
of t h e i r g e n e r a l i t y . I n P r i n c i p i a Mathematica he wrote: 
l o g i c " i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from various s p e c i a l branches of 
mathematics mainly by i t s g e n e r a l i t y . " And again i n Our 
Knowledge of the External World he spoke of: "s e l f - e v i d e n t 
general p r o p o s i t i o n s " (p66). Hence f o r Russell the problem 
of whether t o accept the axiom of r e d u c i b i l i t y b o i l s down t o 
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a question of i t s g e n e r a l i t y . 
W i t t g e n s t e i n r e j e c t e d t h i s whole notion of g e n e r a l i t y . 
He said a l o g i c a l l y t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n has no content or 
subject matter, but i s t r u e i n v i r t u e of i t s form. This can 
be c l a r i f i e d by Wittgenstein's d i s t i n c t i o n between accidental 
and e s s e n t i a l v a l i d i t y at 3.34: "Accidental features are 
those t h a t r e s u l t from the p a r t i c u l a r way i n which the 
p r o p o s i t i o n i s produced. Essential features are those 
without which the p r o p o s i t i o n could not express i t s sense." 
(TLP 3.34) 
So l o g i c a l l y t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n s must be tautologous , and 
as ( f o r example) the axiom of r e d u c i b i l i t y i s not tautologous 
i t cannot be a l o g i c a l t r u t h . "The general v a l i d i t y of l o g i c 
might be c a l l e d e s s e n t i a l , i n contrast w i t h the accidental 
v a l i d i t y of such p r o p o s i t i o n s as ' a l l men are mortal'. 
Propositions l i k e Russell's axiom of r e d u c i b i l i t y are not 
l o g i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s , and t h i s explains our f e e l i n g t h a t even 
i f they were t r u e , t h e i r t r u t h could only be the r e s u l t of a 
f o r t u n a t e accident." (TLP 6.1232) 
The axiom of i n f i n i t y i s an assumption which may be 
st a t e d : i f n i s any i n d u c t i v e c a r d i n a l number, there i s at 
l e a s t one class of i n d i v i d u a l s having n terms. Russell 
considered t h i s t o be t r u e i n some possible worlds and f a l s e 
i n others. Whether i t i s t r u e of our actual world we cannot 
t e l l . W i t t g e n s t e i n seemed t o share t h i s view at some time 
saying i t was an e m p i r i c a l question ("Sache der Physik") t o 
determine the number of extant t h i n g s . 
However l a t e r i n the Tractatus t h i s opinion had been 
abandoned i n favour of the view t h a t the axiom must be e i t h e r 
a l o g i c a l t a u t o l o g y or a c o n t r a d i c t i o n . I f the axiom i s not 
an e m p i r i c a l t r u t h or falsehood, i t must derive i t s t r u t h 
value from i t s l o g i c a l form. Wittgenstein does not say 
whether he t h i n k s the axiom a tautology or a c o n t r a d i c t i o n , 
but e i t h e r way the d i f f i c u l t i e s involved and the apparently 
b l i n d acceptance of the axiom which i s required marks "the 
d e c i s i v e lacuna i n the Frege-Russell d e r i v a t i o n of a r i t h m e t i c 
from l o g i c " (A. Church. Review of Schmidt ) . 
I t i s worth n o t i n g t h a t at the time of the Tractatus. 
W i t t g e n s t e i n was not t r o u b l e d by the concept of i n f i n i t y or 
the use of the expression, "an i n f i n i t e number of names." (TLP 
5.535) I n l a t e r works he was g r e a t l y t r o u b l e d by the use of 
the concept of i n f i n i t y , and r e j e c t e d the above expression as 
meaningless. 
A l a s t o b j e c t i o n found i n the Tractatus i s t o Frege and 
Russell's concept of proof. "What i s a proof?" and "how are 
proofs t o be recognized?," are questions t h a t recur 
throughout Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics and w i l l 
be d e a l t w i t h i n d e t a i l i n chapter f i v e . At t h i s p o i n t i t 
i s s u f f i c i e n t t o note t h a t the T r a c t a r i a n view of proof i s 
t h a t i t i s "merely a mechanical expedient t o f a c i l i t a t e the 
r e c o g n i t i o n of t a u t o l o g i e s i n complicated cases," (TLP 
6.1262) . W i t t g e n s t e i n w r i t e s t h a t the ancient conception of 
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d e r i v i n g theorems from axioms by l o g i c a l proofs i s wrong; f o r 
every theorem i s a tautology, and i n no need of proof. 
"Every p r o p o s i t i o n i s i t s own proof." (TLP 6.1265) 
I t i s important t o d i s t i n g u i s h proofs w i t h i n l o g i c : 
manipulation of symbols t o y i e l d l o g i c a l t r u t h s ; and proofs 
by l o g i c t h a t e s t a b l i s h contingent t r u t h s from contingent 
premises. W i t t g e n s t e i n only disagrees w i t h the t r a d i t i o n a l 
conception of the former, as there i s not i n f e r e n t i a l order 
or precedence i n l o g i c . A l l t a u t o l o g i e s are at the same 
l e v e l . 
I do not see t h i s as a head on c r i t i c i s m of Frege, who 
I t h i n k would have probably accepted t h i s view. There i s 
more a d i f f e r e n c e of emphasis between the two, and Frege may 
w e l l have agreed t a u t o l o g i e s have no need of proof 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y speaking, but i n p r a c t i c e have t o be r e -
expressed i n terms of simpler t a u t o l o g i e s . Indeed t h i s i s 
the very idea of the l o g i c i s t programme. 
Whereas the c r i t i q u e of logi c i s m t o be found i n the 
Tractatus and e a r l y w r i t i n g s considers the t e c h n i c a l i t i e s of 
l o g i c i s m and argues against p a r t i c u l a r d e t a i l s , or methods'; 
the c r i t i q u e i n the l a t e r w r i t i n g s i s from a much broader 
perspective. Untroubled by d e t a i l s , the whole p r o j e c t i s 
attacked as r e s t i n g on a "ramifying series of 
misunderstandings" (Baker and Hacker 1976 p282). Two main 
p o i n t s can be s i n g l e d out. The f i r s t concerns the whole idea 
of a reduction of mathematics t o l o g i c , and the second 
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c o n c e r n s t h e n a t u r e of p r o o f and w i l l be d e a l t w i t h here, only 
b r i e f l y . I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o note t h a t t h e l a t e r c r i t i c i s m s 
a r e e n t i r e l y independent of t h e e a r l i e r ones, and the 
e p i s t e m i c s t a t u s of R u s s e l l ' s axioms i s i r r e l e v a n t . 
W i t t g e n s t e i n a t t a c k s t h e d i r e c t i o n of f i t of t h e 
r e d u c t i o n of mathematics t o l o g i c . Our r e d u c t i o n of 
a r i t h m e t i c a l f o r m ulae t o l o g i c depends on a r i t h m e t i c , not 
e x p l a i n s i t ! C o n s i d e r W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s f r e q u e n t example. I n 
R u s s e l l ' s n o t a t i o n 5 + 7 = 12 i s w r i t t e n as : 
R u s s e l l c l a i m s t h i s t a u t o l o g y e x p l a i n s t h e c o r r e c t use 
of t h e f o r m u l a 5 + 7 = 12, but i n c o n t r a s t W i t t g e n s t e i n d e n i e s 
t h i s , b e c a u s e i t i s o n l y my a b i l i t y t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e 
a r i t h m e t i c f o r m u l a , t h a t a l l o w s me t o w r i t e t h e R u s s e l l i a n 
p r o o f . The p r o o f c o r r e l a t e s w i t h t h e formula, but does not 
e x p l a i n i t . W i t t g e n s t e i n s a y s : 
" I n o r d e r t o be a b l e t o w r i t e down t h e p r o p o s i t i o n 
(the R u s s e l l i a n p r o o f ) I have t o know t h a t 5 + 7 = 
12 ... b e c a u s e a r i t h m e t i c i s use d i n c o n s t r u c t i n g 
t h e p r o p o s i t i o n . " 
(WWK p35) 
"T a u t o l o g y i s an a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e c a l c u l u s not i t s 
e x p r e s s i o n . " (WWK p l 0 6 ) 
i . e . The new R u s s e l l i a n p r o o f i s redundant, and adds 
n o t h i n g t o what we a l r e a d y know. 
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C r i s p i n Wright considers an example of the reduction of 
a m u l t i p l i c a t i o n t a b l e t o l o g i c - " I t i s not what happens 
i n such a l o g i c t h a t j u s t i f i e s the m u l t i p l i c a t i o n t a b l e ; i t 
i s what happens i n the m u l t i p l i c a t i o n t a b l e which determines 
whether a p a r t i c u l a r proof i n such a l o g i c has been c a r r i e d 
out p r o p e r l y . " (Wright 1980 pl32) 
So Wit t g e n s t e i n claims t h a t any reduction of a r i t h m e t i c 
t o l o g i c presupposes a r i t h m e t i c and i s thus redundant. 
Further t o t h i s , the not i o n of any reduction at a l l i s 
questioned. Wittg e n s t ein i s suspicious of the alleged 
fundamentality of l o g i c , and does not regard the t r a n s l a t i o n 
of a r i t h m e t i c a l formulae i n t o l o g i c a l t a u t o l o g i e s as pro v i d i n g 
anything more fundamental or basic. Russell's calculus i s 
an a u x i l i a r y or a l t e r n a t i v e calculus f o r expressing a r i t h m e t i c 
w i t h " i f s " and "thens"; and t h a t i s a l l . "The Russellian 
method i s j u s t one method l i k e any."(LFM p2 62) For i f we 
were t o do a c a l c u l a t i o n by P r i n c i p i a , and the same 
c a l c u l a t i o n by the ordinary method, and obtain a d i f f e r e n t 
r e s u l t ; there i s nothing t o say which answer i s c o r r e c t . 
Turing s a i d t o Wittgenstein " I t i s j u s t l i k e any other p a i r s 
of ways of counting" (LFM p261) and the p o i n t i s t h a t n e i t h e r 
i s more basic or fundamental. 
Wittgenstein's second major o b j e c t i o n t o logicism i s t o 
the l o g i c i s t n o t i o n of proof. I do not intend t o go i n t o 
d e t a i l s here, but two po i n t s can be made. Whereas Frege and 
Russell regarded proof as a p a r t i c u l a r concept, l i k e a f i x e d 
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set of r u l e s ; Wittgenstein regarded proof as a grammatical 
category, a f a m i l y concept. A Merkmal d e f i n i t i o n of proof, 
as Frege and Russell conceived i s not adequate: as there i s 
a v a r i e t y of mathematical p r a c t i c e , and a v a r i e t y of 
techniques f o r proving and d e r i v i n g . For Wittgenstein 
mathematics i s a "motley". 
Secondly Wittgenstein argues t h a t Russell's proofs are 
not surveyable. This w i l l be dealt w i t h l a t e r , but loosely, 
Wittgensyein means t h a t Russell's proofs cannot be 
c o n v i n c i n g l y checked. Any doubt about the v a l i d i t y of the 
R u s s e l l i a n proof t h a t three m i l l i o n plus four m i l l i o n i s seven 
m i l l i o n opens the question as t o whether such a proof can be 
given at a l l . 
To summarize: Wittgenstein o f f e r s two d i s t i n c t c r i t i q u e s 
of l o g i c i s m : the e a r l i e r dealing w i t h the e x p l i c i t d e t a i l s 
of the programme, the l a t e r as p a r t of a more general 
conception of the nature of mathematics. Both seem f a i r l y 
f a t a l t o the o r i g i n a l l o g i c i s t programme, and indeed the l a t e r 
c onsiderations, i f accepted, undermine the whole l o g i c i s t 
ideology and make any attempted r e b u i l d i n g of logicism (such 
as the one at the end of Wright's book: Frege's Conception 
of Numbers as Objects) impossible. 
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I I I n t u i t i o n i s m 
Both l o g i c i s m and formalism developed from the worry t h a t 
mathematics has no f i r m epistemic foundation. Both schools 
looked f o r some ki n d of j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r mathematics. Frege 
and the l o g i c i s t s t r i e d t o reduce mathematics t o l o g i c ; t h a t 
i s t o derive theorems from d e f i n i t i o n s and l o g i c a l l y obvious 
axioms. H i l b e r t and the f o r m a l i s t s t r i e d t o give 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n terms of consistency proofs. 
Through the work of Russell, Gddel, Church and others, 
both of these p r o j e c t s were shown t o have serious flaws. In 
the l i g h t of these d i f f i c u l t i e s the i n t u i t i o n i s t s , rather than 
seek an a l t e r n a t e foundation, declared mathematics not i n need 
of j u s t i f i c a t i o n or foundation at a l l . 
For the i n t u i t i o n i s t , there i s no need of foundation, f o r 
mathematics i s a wholly mental a c t i v i t y ; the subject matter 
of which i s i n t u i t e d , non-perceptual mental objects and 
c o n s t r u c t i o n s . Heyting said of Brouwer's 1907 programme: 
" I t consisted i n the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of mental mathematical 
c o n s t r u c t i o n as such, without reference t o questions regarding 
the nature of the constructed objects, such as whether these 
objects e x i s t independently of our knowledge of them." For 
i n the realm of mental mathematics, t o e x i s t i s synonymous 
w i t h t o be constructed. 
So i f the need f o r foundations has been disposed of, and 
mathematics can be known by an i n t u i t i n g of mental objects; 
then i t f o l l o w s t h a t mathematics i s a languageless a c t i v i t y . 
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A n y t h i n g w r i t t e n or spoken of mathematics s i m p l y s e r v e s t o 
communicate a d e s c r i p t i o n or r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of mental e n t i t i e s 
and i s e n t i r e l y s e p a r a t e from t h e s e e n t i t i e s . 
These i n i t i a l s t e p s of r e a s o n i n g have v e r y f a r r e a c h i n g 
c o n s e q u e n c e s , and i n t u i t i o n i s t mathematics i s , i n i m p o r t a n t 
r e s p e c t s , v e r y d i f f e r e n t from c l a s s i c a l mathematics. The 
most i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e s a r e about l o g i c , and t h e n o t i o n of 
i n f i n i t y . Au fond, t h e s e two d i s p u t e s a r e one, but 
c o n s i d e r i n g them s e p a r a t e l y sheds l i g h t on t h e c r u c i a l a s p e c t s 
of i n t u i t i o n i s m , and t h e a s p e c t s upon which W i t t g e n s t e i n makes 
most of h i s comments. 
E v e r y i n t u i t i o n i s t p r o p o s i t i o n p, i s a r e p o r t of a mental 
c o n s t r u c t i o n . As H e y t i n g put i t : " I have e f f e c t e d a 
c o n s t r u c t i o n A i n my mind." S i m i l a r l y an i n t u i t i o n i s t 
n e g a t i o n not-p e f f e c t i v e l y s a y s " I have e f f e c t e d a 
c o n s t r u c t i o n B which deduces a c o n t r a d i c t i o n from t h e 
s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t c o n s t r u c t i o n A where brought t o an end." 
F u r t h e r m o r e • "1 have not e f f e c t e d a c o n s t r u c t i o n . . . i s of no 
w orth or i n t e r e s t and t h e r e i s a c o n s t r u c t i o n t h a t nobody has 
been a b l e t o e f f e c t , i s no more tha n an empty promise from 
t h e i n t u i t i o n i s t s t a n d p o i n t . 
Hence i t f o l l o w s t h a t a p r o o f i n i n t u i t i o n i s t i c l o g i c of 
(p & q) i s a p r o o f of p, t o g e t h e r w i t h a p r o o f of q. A p r o o f 
o f (p V q) i s a p r o o f of p or a p r o o f of q. And " a p r o o f 
o f (p^q) i s a c o n s t r u c t i o n of which we can r e c o g n i z e t h a t , 
a p p l i e d t o any p r o o f of p, i t y i e l d s a p r o o f of q." (Dummett 
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(1) 1977 p 12) That i s , the i n t u i t i o n i s t i m p l i c a t i o n i s 
not t r u t h f u n c t i o n a l . I n other words the i n t u i t i o n i s t 
i m p l i c a t i o n i s not a t r u t h f u n c t i o n a l mapping from t r u t h 
values t o t r u t h values, but a mapping from proofs t o proofs. 
I n c l a s s i c a l l o g i c we may suppose p and ask i f q f o l l o w s , but 
i n i n t u i t i o n i s t l o g i c t h i s i s nonsensical f o r a proof of the 
i m p l i c a t i o n must begin w i t h a proof of p. There can be no 
doubt about the status of p! 
But there i s an o b j e c t i o n , f i r s t c i t e d by Menger i n 1930, 
t h a t t h i s r e j e c t i o n of t r u t h f u n c t i o n a l l o g i c leads t o a 
tensed concept of " t r u e " . For example define: 
k i s the greatest prime f o r which (k-2) i s also prime or 
k = 1 i f such a number does not e x i s t . 
Now i t i s not known whether the sequence of t w i n primes 
terminates, so i n t u i t i o n i s t s r e j e c t t h i s d e f i n i t i o n of k, as 
i t i s not w e l l - d e f i n e d . But suppose the problem i s solved 
at time t , and suppose there are i n f i n i t e l y many t w i n primes. 
Then k = 1. Was k = 1 before t , or not? 
The i n t u i t i o n i s t s r e j e c t the query as misconceived, as 
before t there was no k, i t had not been constructed, so we 
cannot ask of i t s value. Hence the statement " k = l " does not 
become t r u e at a p a r t i c u l a r time t , a f t e r being something else 
before; because before, i t was meaningless. I t i s only 
p o s s i b l e t o ask of k once i t has been constructed and Menger's 
o b j e c t i o n i s avoided. 
I n t u i t i o n i s t s also r e j e c t the law of the excluded middle. 
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For the c l a s s i c a l mathematician (p v ~ p) i s a t r u t h of 
l o g i c , but f o r the i n t u i t i o n i s t t h i s means I have constructed 
a proof of p, or I have a proof t h a t a c o n t r a d i c t i o n arises 
from supposing p. 
But i n many cases we do not have a proof of e i t h e r , so 
the i n t u i t i o n i s t w i l l not assert (p v ~ p) as a general law. 
In the above example, the c l a s s i c a l mathematician would 
assert k = 1 or k + 1 ; but without a proof e i t h e r way the 
i n t u i t i o n i s t w i l l not assert t h i s . 
The r e j e c t i o n of the law of the excluded middle i s very 
c l o s e l y connected w i t h the i n t u i t i o n i s t concept of i n f i n i t y . 
C l a s s i c a l l y the e x i s t e n t i a l and u n i v e r s a l q u a n t i f i e r s are 
seen as an extension of d i s j u n c t i o n and conjunction 
r e s p e c t i v e l y , and i t i s l e g i t i m a t e t o q u a n t i f y over an 
i n f i n i t e t o t a l i t y . A q u a n t i f i e d statement has a t r u t h value 
independently of there being any a v a i l a b l e method f o r 
ev a l u a t i n g i t . 
This i s q u i t e contrary t o the i n t u i t i o n i s t p o s i t i o n , 
which only assents t o u n i v e r s a l l y q u a n t i f i e d statements i f 
there i s an e f f e c t i v e method f o r checking (proving) the t r u t h 
value of each c o n s t i t u e n t statement. Methods i n v o l v i n g 
u n l i m i t e d time or energy are not e f f e c t i v e ; but, f o r example, 
proofs derived from the p r i n c i p l e of mathematical i n d u c t i o n 
are accepted. 
To summarize, the i n t u i t i o n i s t c r i t i c i s e s the c l a s s i c a l 
mathematician as having f a i l e d t o accept or r e a l i z e t h a t h i s 
27 
a c c o u n t of q u a n t i f i c a t i o n o ver f i n i t e domains, cannot be 
e x t e n d e d t o domains over which t h e r e i s no e f f e c t i v e d e c i s i o n 
p r o c e d u r e . The c e n t r a l m i s t a k e i s one of o m i s s i o n : a 
f a i l u r e t o r e a l i s e t h a t i n f i n i t e q u a n t i f i c a t i o n needs a 
d i f f e r e n t a c c o u n t ; and t h a t m a t h e m a t i c a l o b j e c t s e x i s t o n l y 
i n v i r t u e o f some s p e c i f i c c o n s t r u c t i o n , and do not e x i s t 
u n s p e c i f i e d i n some P l a t o n i c r e a l m . 
The p h i l o s o p h y u n d e r l y i n g t h e s e t e c h n i c a l i t i e s i s t h a t : 
u n l e s s one r e j e c t s t h e c l a s s i c a l t h e o r y of t r u t h , i t i s 
i n c o r r e c t t o r e g a r d t h e meaning of a p r o p o s i t i o n as r e s i d i n g 
i n i t s t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s . F o r Brouwer; m a t h e m a t i c a l 
s t a t e m e n t s have s e n s e and t r u t h v a l u e i n v i r t u e of mental 
a c t i v i t y ( c o n s t r u c t i o n s ) . F o r Dummett t h e t h e o r y of meaning 
r e s i d i n g i n t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s i s r e p l a c e d by a t h e o r y based 
upon a s s e r t a b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n s , W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s i d e a of meaning 
as use, and an a b i l i t y t o d e t e r m i n e or r e c o g n i z e t h e v a l i d i t y 
o f a g i v e n p r o o f . 
Brouwer's c l a i m i s a r e l a t i v e l y weak one, amounting t o 
l i t t l e more t h a n t h e c e n t r a l c l a i m of i n t u i t i o n i s m t h a t 
m a t h e m a t i c a l e n t i t i e s a r e mental e n t i t i e s , and t h e t r u t h or 
f a l s i t y of r e l a t i o n s between them depends on whether such 
r e l a t i o n s have been c o n s t r u c t e d . 
Dummett's c l a i m i s much s t r o n g e r f o r i t u r g e s a move away 
from F r e g e / T r a c t a r i a n t y p e e x a p l a n a t i o n s b a s e d upon t r u t h 
c o n d i t i o n s , and s u g g e s t s t h a t a g e n e r a l a c c o u n t of meaning and 
t h e l o g i c a l o p e r a t o r s must be b a s e d on a s s e r t a b i l i t y 
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c o n d i t i o n s . 
The correspondance theory of t r u t h which gives t h a t 
a p r o p o s i t i o n p i s t r u e i f i t corresponds w i t h the relevant 
f a c t s i n an appropriate way, i s replaced by the redundancy 
theory of t r u t h which claims t h a t a s s e r t i n g "p i s t r u e " simply 
equates t o a s s e r t i n g "p". That i s , Dummett questions the 
l e g i t i m a c y of a n o t i o n of t r u t h t h a t i s not e p i s t e m i c a l l y 
constrained. 
Furthermore Dummett claims t h a t "the strongest arguments 
f o r i n t u i t i o n i s m seem t o be q u i t e independent of the 
o b j e c t i v i t y of mathematical proof...The strongest arguments 
come from the i n s i s t e n c e t h a t the general form of explanation 
of meaning,and hence of the l o g i c a l operators i n p a r t i c u l a r , 
i s a statement not of the t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n s but of the 
a s s e r t a b i l i t y - c o n d i t i o n s . " (Dummett (3) 1978 pl84 ) 
Cl e a r l y the issues r a i s e d here are complex and 
contentious, but a thorough exanination i s beyond the scope 
of t h i s t h e s i s and i t i s s u f f i c i e n t t o bear them i n mind as 
we proceed t o examine the views of Wittgenstein. 
As w e l l as d i f f e r e n c e s , there are many broad s i m i l a r i t i e s 
between the i n t u i t i o n i s t school and Wittgenstein's p o s i t i o n ; 
although i t i s f r e q u e n t l y the case t h a t Wittgenstein shares 
a view w i t h the i n t u i t i o n i s t s f o r wholly d i f f e r e n t reasons or 
t o a w i l d l y d i f f e r e n t degree. Hence what f o l l o w s i s an 
examination of the mo t i v a t i o n f o r and the extent of c e r t a i n 
views common t o both, r a t h e r than the assessment of a head-
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on debate. 
F i r s t l y , W i t t g e n s t e i n agrees w i t h t h e i n t u i t i o n i s t s t h a t 
mathematics has no need o f f o u n d a t i o n . For W i t t g e n s t e i n 
mathematics has a f o u n d a t i o n i n o r d i n a r y human p r a c t i c e and 
needs; t h a t people use mathematics and p e r f o r m c a l c u l a t i o n s 
t h e way t h e y do, i s ample f o u n d a t i o n . I t i s t h e s u c c e s s f u l 
a p p l i c a t i o n o f mathematics t h a t u l t i m a t e l y j u s t i f i e s i t . 
"What does mathematics need a f o u n d a t i o n f o r ? I t no more 
needs one, I b e l i e v e , t h a n p r o p o s i t i o n s about p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s 
. .. what i s c a l l e d f o u n d a t i o n s are no more t h e f o u n d a t i o n s o f 
mathematics f o r us t h a n t h e p a i n t e d rock i n t h e support of a 
p a i n t e d t o w e r " (RFM V 13) Here W i t t g e n s t e i n agrees w i t h t h e 
i n t u i t i o n i s t s about t h e l a c k o f need f o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n ; b u t 
n o t because o f a c l a i m t h a t mathematics i s a mental a c t i v i t y , 
b u t because i t i s a l r e a d y r o o t e d i n d a i l y p r a c t i c e . 
Secondly, W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s remarks on t h e law o f t h e 
e x c l u d e d m i d d l e are a m b i v a l e n t . I n t h e P h i l o s o p h i c a l Grammar 
W i t t g e n s t e i n argues a g a i n s t Brouwer's view as muddled and 
m i s c o n c e i v e d , b u t i n t h e Remarks W i t t g e n s t e i n expresses 
w o r r i e s about t h e u n r e s t r i c t e d use o f law o f t h e excluded 
m i d d l e , and seems t o accept t h e i n t u i t i o n i s t r e j e c t i o n o f t h e 
law, b u t f o r reasons o f h i s own. 
I n t h e T r a c t a t u s t h e r e i s a t h e o r y o f meaning based upon 
t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s and c o n j u n c t i o n s o f atomic p r o p o s i t i o n s . 
I n l a t e r works, p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , 
t h i s view i s r e j e c t e d i n f a v o u r o f t h e view t h a t an e x p r e s s i o n 
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d e r i v e s i t s meaning from i t s a p p l i c a t i o n or use w i t h i n a 
p a r t i c u l a r language game. Having s a i d t h i s , W i t t g e n s t e i n 
r e g a r d e d m a t h e m a t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s as a s p e c i a l case and 
argued t h a t f o r them t h e r e c o u l d be no d i s t i n c t i o n between 
sense and t r u t h v a l u e . Mathematical p r o p o s i t i o n s are 
v e r i f i e d i n a d i f f e r e n t way t o non-mathematical p r o p o s i t i o n s , 
and so "The v e r i f i c a t i o n i s not a mere t o k e n o f t r u t h , but 
d e t e r m i n e s t h e sense o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n . " (PG p459) 
Two c r i t i c i s m s o f i n t u i t i o n i s m are consequent upon t h i s . 
The f i r s t i s t h a t t h e i n t u i t i o n i s t s are muddled or under a 
m i s c o n c e p t i o n t o t r y t o ground mathematics i n t h e experience 
o f m ental c o n s t r u c t i o n . For mathematical p r o p o s i t i o n s are 
t r u e i n v i r t u e o f t h e i r g rammatical form, not i n v i r t u e o f any 
m e n t a l or m a t e r i a l o b s e r v a t i o n or c o n s t r u c t i o n . I n h i s 
e l e v e n t h l e c t u r e on t h e f o u n d a t i o n s o f mathematics 
W i t t g e n s t e i n i s a t p a i n s t o d i s t i n g u i s h between t h e r e s u l t s 
o f a m a t h e m a t i c a l c a l c u l a t i o n , and t h e r e s u l t s o f an 
e x p e r i m e n t . The way we t r e a t t h e two i s e s s e n t i a l l y 
d i f f e r e n t and r e i n f o r c e s t h e p o i n t t h a t i n t r y i n g t o reduce 
mathematics t o r e p o r t s o f mental a c t i v i t y (experiments w i t h 
m e n t a l e n t i t i e s ) t h e i n t u i t i o n i s t s are f u n d a m e n t a l l y wrong. 
The second consequence i s a r e j e c t i o n o f Brouwer's 
account o f t h e law o f t h e excluded m i d d l e . The p r o p o s i t i o n s 
t h a t Brouwer sees w i t h o u t t r u t h v a l u e are seen by W i t t g e n s t e i n 
as nonsense. For example d e f i n e TT' as equal t o TT / except 
t h a t t h r e e c o n s e c u t i v e zeros r e p l a c e t h e f i r s t t h r e e 
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c o n s e c u t i v e sevens i n t h e decimal expansion o f "TT • Brouwer 
m a i n t a i n e d n e i t h e r = Tf^ nor T f 4 ~vr' . ( I t i s not known 
whether t h e d e c i m a l expansion o f c o n t a i n s t h r e e c o n s e c u t i v e 
sevens.) 
W i t t g e n s t e i n on t h e o t h e r hand saw a p r o p o s i t i o n such as 
-Tr=^"TT'as n o n s e n s i c a l , s i n c e "TT^  i s a d i f f e r e n t grammatical 
s t r u c t u r e from t h e r e a l number TT . TT' i s not even a number 
i n t h e same sense as T]" / ^or 1 cannot compare t h e two, and 
c o m p a r a b i l i t y i s a fundamental c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f number. 
A l t h o u g h t h e r u l e f o r t h e expansion o f T]'' i s unambiguous, i t 
s t i l l l e a v e s I T ^  f u n d a m e n t a l l y d i f f e r e n t from T f or -^2, and 
t h e r e i s no sense t o p r o p o s i t i o n s l i k e t h e above. ( c f PG 
p476) 
T h i s example i s not d i f f e r e n t from t h e o t h e r t ypes of 
case where Brouwer c l a i m s t h e law o f t h e excluded middle does 
not h o l d , and so W i t t g e n s t e i n i s unable t o agree w i t h 
Brouwer's account o f t h e m a t t e r . 
The P h i l o s o p h i c a l Granmmar was w r i t t e n between 1931 and 
1934 and t h e Remarks on t h e Foundations o f Mathematics between 
1937 and 1944, and i n t h e l a t e r work W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s views on 
t h e e x c l u d e d m i d d l e have changed; and t h e r e i s a deep 
q u e s t i o n i n g o f t h e c o m p l e t e l y u n r e s t r i c t e d use o f t h e law. 
F o l l o w i n g W i t t g e n s t e i n , c o n s i d e r whether t h e sequence 777 
appears i n t h e decimal expansion o f T f • This q u e s t i o n i s 
e q u i v a l e n t t o a s k i n g whether a person t r a i n e d t o w r i t e down 
numbers i n accordance w i t h an expansion r u l e f o r TT / would 
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ever w r i t e t h e sequence 777. 
W i t t g e n s t e i n does not r e j e c t t h e q u e s t i o n as nonsense, 
b u t he w i l l n o t a s s e r t t h a t t h e person w i l l or w i l l not w r i t e 
t h e sequence, because t o c l a i m t h i s i s an e x t r a r u l e or 
premise. For t h e r e i s n o t h i n g i n t h e expansion r u l e i t s e l f , 
p r e s c r i b i n g or p r o s c r i b i n g t h e sequence. 
W i t t g e n s t e i n compares t h i s t o t h e poet who i s asked 
"whether t h e hero o f h i s poem has a s i s t e r or not - when, t h a t 
i s he has not d e c i d e d a n y t h i n g about i t " . (RFM IV 9) F u r t h e r , 
even t h e c l a i m t h a t an o m n i s c i e n t God would know i s r e j e c t e d , 
f o r t h e r e i s n o t h i n g f o r God t o know. The expansion r u l e 
l i m i t s God as i t l i m i t s us, and W i t t g e n s t e i n c l a i m s even God 
can o n l y d e t e r m i n e mathematical q u e s t i o n s by mathematics. 
The c r u c i a l p o i n t i s t h a t i t i s not c l e a r how a person 
expanding " T T w i l l o r ought t o i n t e r p r e t t h e expansion r u l e . 
At any stage t h e r e i s a c h o i c e how t o i n t e r p r e t t h e r u l e . 
I n r e p l y t o t h e o b j e c t o r who says: " i f you want t o remain i n 
a c c o r d w i t h t h e r u l e s you must go t h i s way", W i t t g e n s t e i n 
r e p l i e s "Not a t a l l , I c a l l t h i s 'accord' or t h e meaning of 
t h e r u l e " . When f u r t h e r pressed t h a t t h i s i n v o l v e s a change 
o f meaning o f accord, W i t t g e n s t e i n says: "No - who says what 
change and remain t h e same mean here?" (RFM I 113) 
And a l s o t h e remark t h a t : "However queer i t sounds, t h e 
f u r t h e r expansion o f an i r r a t i o n a l number i s a f u r t h e r 
expansion o f mathematics." That i s , i n expanding an 
i r r a t i o n a l number we are not d i s c o v e r i n g or r e v e a l i n g some 
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e x t e r n a l m a t h e m a t i c a l r e a l i t y , but we a r e a c t u a l l y i n v e n t i n g 
: f u r t h e r expanding mathematics. T h i s sounds queer f o r i t 
i s not t h e way we a r e accustomed t o t h i n k , we t e n d t o t h i n k 
of m athematics as e x t e r n a l and t o be d i s c o v e r e d , but 
W i t t g e n s t e i n a r g u e s t h a t t h i s i s wrong. 
W i t t g e n s t e i n p r o v i d e s f u r t h e r e l u c i d a t i o n by e x p l a i n i n g 
t h a t t o t h i n k o f t h e e x p a n s i o n as a row of numbers g i v e s a 
f a l s e p i c t u r e . A p p l y i n g t h e law of t h e e x c l u d e d middle 
f o r c e s us t o p i c t u r e t h e e x p a n s i o n as one of two p o s s i b l e 
rows, but W i t t g e n s t e i n s a y s t h e s e p i c t u r e s cannot be a p p l i e d 
h e r e - t h e y a r e u n s u r v e y a b l e . "We use t h e f a l s e p i c t u r e of 
a c o m p l e t e d e x p a n s i o n , and t h i s f o r c e s us t o ask unanswerable 
q u e s t i o n . " (RFM I V 9) 
I t i s i l l e g i t i m a t e t o t h i n k of i n f i n i t e s e r i e s l i k e 
f i n i t e ones. F o r a f i n i t e s e r i e s t h e n e g a t i o n of " i t must 
not o c c u r " , i s " i t must o c c u r " ; but f o r an i n f i n i t e sequence 
t h e n e g a t i o n o f " i t must not o c c u r " i s " i t can o c c u r " . (RFM 
I V 18) There i s a b a s i c d i s a n a l o g y between our u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
and h a n d l i n g of f i n i t e and i n f i n i t e s e q u e n c e s . 
I t i s i n v i e w s s u c h as t h e s e t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n s t a n d s 
f i r m l y opposed t o t h e P l a t o n i s t and b r o a d l y i n a c c o r d w i t h the 
i n t u i t i o n i s t , o v e r t h e law of t h e e x c l u d e d middle. However 
f o r t h e i n t u i t i o n i s t problems about t h e e x p a n s i o n of TT d e r i v e 
from t h e non e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h e e x p a n s i o n ; and f o r 
W i t t g e n s t e i n t h e y d e r i v e from t h e i n d e t e r m i n a c y of r u l e 
a p p l i c a t i o n and t h e consequent n o n - o b j e c t i v i t y of the 
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expansion o f IT . 
I s h a l l now t u r n t o t h e s u b j e c t o f p r o o f , and make a few 
remarks about W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s view as r e l a t e d t o t h e 
i n t u i t i o n i s t s , a l t h o u g h a d e t a i l e d e x a m i n a t i o n o f p r o o f w i l l 
be d e a l t w i t h l a t e r . W i t t g e n s t e i n shares w i t h t h e 
i n t u i t i o n i s t s a d i s t r u s t o f n o n - c o n s t r u c t i v e p r o o f s . That 
i s , he r e j e c t s t h e r e a l i s t account o f mathematics and p r o o f s 
dependent on p r e - e x i s t e n t e n t i t i e s . However W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s 
c o n s t r u c t i o n i s m i s more extreme t h a n t h e i n t u i t i o n i s t s , and 
t h i s - as we s h a l l see - d e r i v e s from h i s view o f p r o o f as a 
m o d i f y i n g concept, (see l a t e r ) changing t h e s t a t u s o f a 
s t a t e m e n t proved. That i s changing i t s sense as d i s t i n c t 
f r o m i t s t r u t h v a l u e . 
For a s s o c i a t e d reasons W i t t g e n s t e i n a l s o r e j e c t e d the 
n o t i o n o f t h e o b j e c t i v i t y o f p r o o f . I n t u i t i o n i s t s q u e s t i o n 
c l a s s i c a l p r o o f s , b u t t h e y accept a p r o o f as o b j e c t i v e i f i t 
i s i n a c c o r d w i t h i n t u i t i o n i s t l o g i c . However W i t t g e n s t e i n 
r e j e c t s n o t o n l y t h e i d e a o f o b j e c t i v e mathematical t r u t h , but 
a l s o t h e i d e a o f o b j e c t i v e p r o o f ; because he holds a p r o o f 
does n o t compel acceptance. We are f r e e t o accept or r e j e c t 
a p r o o f a t any s t a g e . 
F i n a l l y W i t t g e n s t e i n a t t a c k s Brouwer's psychologism and 
h i s d o c t r i n e o f t h e p a r a l l e l i s m o f t h e w i l l . These are 
d e v i c e s i n t r o d u c e d t o t r y t o a v o i d t h e c r i t i c i s m s t h a t i f 
mathematics i s based upon i n t u i t i n g one's own mental s t a t e s , 
t h e n f i r s t l y i t cannot be o b j e c t i v e f o r t h e r e i s no way t o 
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i n t u i t a n o t h e r ' s mental s t a t e s . At b e s t mathematics i s 
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e , a t worst no more t h a n a s o l i t a i r e . Secondly 
i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o e x p l a i n o r r e s o l v e mathematical d i s p u t e . 
I f a person can o n l y i n t u i t and r e p o r t h i s own mental 
c o n t e n t s , t h e r e can be no scope f o r disagreement or d i s p u t e . 
T h i s i s n o t o n l y absurd, b u t i s c o n t r a r y t o everyday 
e x p e r i e n c e ! 
H e y t i n g r e p l i e s t o these d i f f i c u l t i e s by a c c e p t i n g them, 
bu t a r g u i n g t h e y do not i n f a c t cause a problem. "We are 
g e n e r a l l y c o n v i n c e d t h a t o t h e r people have t h o u g h t s s i m i l a r 
t o our own ... i n t h i s r e s p e c t mathematics does not 
e s s e n t i a l l y d i f f e r from o t h e r s u b j e c t s " . And " s l i g h t 
d i v e r g e n c e s o f o p i n i o n can be expected ... [ b u t ] t h e y are i n 
no way a l a r m i n g " . ( H e y t i n g : " D i s p u t a t i o n " i n Benacerraf and 
Putnam p 6 1 ) . 
I n o t h e r words H e y t i n g argues t h a t s o l i p s i s t i c doubts are 
as much a problem f o r any d i s c i p l i n e as t h e y are f o r 
i n t u i t i o n i s t mathematics. And he f u r t h e r c l a i m s t h a t t h e r e 
i s no r e a l problem. 
T h i s seems inadequate f o r i n t u i t i o n i s t mathematics i s 
about mental e n t i t i e s r a t h e r t h a n t h e m a t e r i a l e n t i t i e s o f 
most d i s c o u r s e . F u r t h e r , H e y t i n g ' s l i n e "We are g e n e r a l l y 
c o n v i n c e d ..." r i n g s h o l l o w i n t h e ears o f t h e c r i t i c . But 
Brouwer's approach i s t o argue f o r i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y on 
account o f t h e p a r a l l e l i s m o f t h e w i l l . That i s t o say he 
argues t h a t everybody i n t u i t s s e l f - e v i d e n t mental 
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c o n s t r u c t i o n s i n t h e same way; and hence t h e r e can be no 
fundamental d i s p u t e s . The d i s p u t e s t h a t t h e r e are, amount 
t o no more t h a n m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g and breakdown o f 
communication. 
The e s s e n t i a l debate here i s over t h e C a r t e s i a n account 
o f e p i s t e m o l o g y and t h e o r y o f t r u t h , and i t s development by 
Brentano. L a r g e l y d i s c r e d i t e d now, t h e r e i s no doubt t h a t 
t h e burden o f p r o o f l i e s w i t h t h e i n t u i t i o n i s t . 
W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s r e a c t i o n t o a l l o f t h i s i s c l e a r and 
s u c c i n c t : "When t h e i n t u i t i o n i s t s speak o f 'basic i n t u i t i o n ' 
i s t h i s a p s y c h o l o g i c a l process? I f so how does i t come i n t o 
mathematics?" (PG p322). For W i t t g e n s t e i n , mathematics i s 
u l t i m a t e l y a language game governed by l i n g u i s t i c r u l e s ; and 
any appeal t o p s y c h o l o g i c a l o r mental c r i t e r i a i s misplaced 
and m i s c o n c e i v e d . 
To conclude : W i t t g e n s t e i n concurs w i t h t h e 
i n t u i t i o n i s t s i n o n l y t h e broadest o f senses, and a c l o s e r 
e x a m i n a t i o n r e v e a l s n o t o n l y ( r e l a t i v e l y minor) d i f f e r e n c e s 
o f o p i n i o n , b u t a l s o a p r o f o u n d l y d i f f e r e n t method o f approach 
and u n d e r l y i n g p h i l o s o p h y . The d i s c u s s i o n here i s not 
e x h a u s t i v e , b u t c h a p t e r s t o f o l l o w on p r o o f and s t r i c t 
f i n i t i s m p a r t i c u l a r l y w i l l serve t o e l a b o r a t e and c l a r i f y 
W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s p o s i t i o n r e l a t i v e t o i n t u i t i o n i s m . 
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I l l F o r m a l i s m . 
Both i n t u i t i o n i s m and f o r m a l i s m have t h e i r r o o t s i n t h e 
K a n t i a n n o t i o n t h a t theorems of mathematics f o l l o w from axioms 
i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e laws of l o g i c , but a r e not a c t u a l l y 
p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e l o g i c t h e m s e l v e s . I t i s t h i s common 
f o u n d a t i o n i n Kant, t h a t a c c o u n t s f o r t h e s i m i l a r i t i e s between 
t h e two s c h o o l s ; and t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e a t t i t u d e s towards 
t r a n s f i n i t e mathematics t h a t a c c o u n t s f o r t h e d i f f e r e n c e s . 
To e l a b o r a t e a l i t t l e , both i n t u i t i o n i s m and f o r m a l i s m 
r e j e c t t h e r e a l i s t or P l a t o n i c i d e a t h a t m a t h e m a t i c a l 
e n t i t i e s e x i s t , or t h a t m a t h e m a t i c a l theorems a r e t r u e 
i n d e p e n d e n t l y of human thought. Both a r e committed t o t he 
v i e w s t h a t m a t h e m a t i c a l e n t i t i e s e x i s t i n v i r t u e of some human 
a c t i o n , and theorems a r e t r u e i n v i r t u e of h a v i n g been proved. 
F u r t h e r m o r e , b o t h s c h o o l s u n d e r s t a n d " p r o o f " as a f i n i t e 
p r o o f . That i s , t h e w e l l - f o r m e d - f o r m u l a e of t h e system must 
be e x p r e s s i b l e i n terms of a f i n i t e a l p h a b e t ; and i t must be 
p o s s i b l e t o e f f e c t i v e l y d e t e r m i n e whether a f i n i t e sequence 
of f o r m u l a e i s a p r o o f of i t s l a s t member. Hence, i n t h e o r y 
a t l e a s t , mathematics i s m e c h a n i c a l l y c h e c k a b l e , and t h e r e a r e 
no t a c i t a s s u m p t i o n s about q u a n t i f i c a t i o n o ver i n f i n i t e 
domains. 
As a r e s u l t of t h i s n o n - r e a l i s t approach t o ontology and 
f i n i t i s t a p proach t o proof, both s c h o o l s s ee t h e so c a l l e d 
f o u n d a t i o n problems i n mathematics t o have been removed. As 
a f i n i t e a c t i v i t y w i t h c o n s t r u c t e d e n t i t i e s t h e r e i s no 
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f u r t h e r need f o r f o u n d a t i o n . 
However d i s p u t e a r i s e s over t h e p r e c i s e n a t u r e of 
m a t h e m a t i c a l e n t i t i e s , and t h e v a l i d i t y or o t h e r w i s e o f 
c l a s s i c a l mathematics. I n t u i t i o n i s t s r e g a r d mathematical 
e n t i t i e s as mental c o n s t r u c t i o n s , and mathematical statements 
as d e s c r i p t i o n s or r e p o r t s o f these c o n s t r u c t i o n s . 
F o r m a l i s t s on t h e o t h e r hand see these e n t i t i e s as s i m p l y 
symbols (on p a p e r ) ; and theorems do n o t h i n g more tha n 
s t i p u l a t e how t h e symbols may be combined, s u b s t i t u t e d e t c . . 
F o r m a l i s t s deny t h a t g e o m e t r i c a l p o i n t s , l i n e s and t h e l i k e 
can be m e n t a l l y v i s u a l i z e d ( c o n s t r u c t e d ) and hence t h e y o n l y 
have t h e p r o p e r t i e s t h e y do i n v i r t u e o f d e f i n i t i o n s . This 
view s t r i p s mathematics o f any semantic c o n t e n t , and regards 
i t as no more t h a n mechanical o p e r a t i o n s w i t h s i g n s t h a t are 
e s s e n t i a l l y meaningless. 
Such a view i s h i g h l y p r o b l e m a t i c , s i n c e a gap between 
s y n t a x and semantics r a i s e s t h e q u e s t i o n o f what makes a 
system w i t h axioms and r u l e s mathematics? ( I s snakes and 
l a d d e r s mathematical?) And f u r t h e r how i s a p p l i e d 
mathematics t o be e x p l a i n e d ? Having r a i s e d these q u e s t i o n s 
I s h a l l n o t a t t e m p t t o answer them, as t h e r e are more p o w e r f u l 
arguments f o r r e j e c t i n g f o r m a l i s m ; and such a d i s c u s s i o n 
would t a k e us t o o f a r from t h e W i t t g e n s t e i n theme. 
The major d i s p u t e i s over t h e s t a t u s o f c l a s s i c a l , non-
f i n i t e mathematics. I n t u i t i o n i s t s r e j e c t t h i s as b e i n g 
founded upon i l l e g i t i m a t e assumptions about i n f i n i t e domains, 
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but f o r m a l i s t s w i s h t o r e t a i n c l a s s i c a l n o n - f i n i t e 
m a t h e m a t i c s . I n H i l b e r t ' s famous words: "No one w i l l e v e r 
be a b l e t o e x p e l us from t h e p a r a d i s e t h a t C a n t o r has c r e a t e d 
f o r u s . " I t i s t h i s d i v e r g e n c e of o p i n i o n over t h e i n f i n i t e 
t h a t a c c o u n t f o r t h e d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e two s c h o o l s . 
H i l b e r t ' s programme att e m p t e d t o f o r m a l i s e m a t h e m a t i c a l 
s y s t e m s , and t h e n by a p p l y i n g f i n i t e methods of a n a l y s i s t o 
t h e s y s t e m s show them t o be c o n s i s t e n t . That i s t o v a l i d a t e 
c l a s s i c a l mathematics by showing i t t o be c o n s i s t e n t . 
The f o r m a l i s a t i o n of t h e system c o n s i s t s i n l i s t i n g a l l 
t h e u n d e f i n e d c o n c e p t s i n t h e system, l i s t i n g t h e assumptions 
of t h e s y s t e m (axioms) and l i s t i n g t h e i n f e r e n c e r u l e s of t he 
s y s t e m . T h i s i s c e r t a i n l y not an e a s y t a s k , but once i t has 
been a c h i e v e d t h e s y s t e m i s g i v e n f i x e d b o u n d a r i e s and can be 
s u r v e y e d by a p p e a l t o t h e f o r m a l i s a t i o n a l o n e . 
Once a f o r m a l i s a t i o n i s complete, i t i t s e l f can be 
i n v e s t i g a t e d , and t h i s g i v e s r i s e t o a metatheory. I n 
p a r t i c u l a r metamathematics i s t h e s t u d y of f o r m a l i s a t i o n s of 
m a t h e m a t i c a l s y s t e m s . An example of t h i s c r u c i a l d i s t i n c t i o n 
i s t h a t whereas "2 + 3 = 5" i s an o r d i n a r y statement of 
mathematics ( a r i t h m e t i c ) , t h e s t a t e m e n t " " 2 + 3 = 5 " i s an 
a r i t h m e t i c a l f o r m u l a " does not e x p r e s s an a r i t h m e t i c a l f a c t , 
b u t b e l o n g s t o t h e metatheory. 
T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s so i m p o r t a n t , because p r o v i d e d t h a t 
t h e f o r m a l i s a t i o n of t h e system i s f i n i t e , t h e metatheory w i l l 
be a n a l y s a b l e by f i n i t e methods - i e i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h 
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i n t u i t i o n i s t p r i n c i p l e s . Hence t h e problems of t r a n s f i n i t e 
m a t h ematics a r e r e d u c e d t o f i n i t e problems i n metamathematics, 
v i a t h e f o r m a l i s a t i o n of t h e system. 
The l a s t s t a g e of H i l b e r t ' s programme was t o show t h a t 
t h e f o r m a l i s a t i o n s were both complete and c o n s i s t e n t . These 
a r e p r o o f s i n t h e metatheory. Completeness demonstrates t h a t 
e v e r y p r o p o s i t i o n p r o v a b l e i n t h e t h e o r y i s t r u e , and t h a t 
e v e r y t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n i s p r o v a b l e i n t h e t h e o r y . 
C o n s i s t e n c y shows t h a t a system cannot c o n t a i n as theorems two 
p r o p o s i t i o n s , one of which i s t h e f o r m a l n e g a t i o n of the 
o t h e r . 
The methods of p r o v i n g c o n s i s t e n c y a r e v a r i e d , but they 
have t h e common f e a t u r e of f i n i t i s m ; and hence t h e y can be 
grounded i n p e r c e p t u a l o b j e c t s and t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of 
i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s removed. So t h e f o r m a l i s t s can r e t a i n 
t r a n s f i n i t e mathematics, w h i l s t o n l y u s i n g f i n i t a r y 
( i n t u i t i v e ) methods i n t h e i r p r o o f s and c a l c u l a t i o n s . 
H i l b e r t p u b l i s h e d h i s r e s u l t s i n a s e r i e s of p a p e r s . I n 
1900 he o f f e r e d an a x i o m a t i s a t i o n of t h e s e t of r e a l numbers, 
and i n 1904 he p u b l i s h e d an attempt t o prove t h e c o n s i s t e n c y 
o f a r i t h m e t i c . ( " O n t h e f o u n d a t i o n s of l o g i c and a r i t h e m i t i c " 
r e p r i n t e d i n B e n a c e r r a f and Putnam ppl29-138) F u r t h e r p a p e r s 
i n 1917 and t h e t w e n t i e s r e f l e c t e d t h e development of 
f o r m a l i s t - f o u n d a t i o n a l s t u d i e s . 
I n 1931 a young m a t h e m a t i c i a n a t V i e n n a u n i v e r s i t y 
p u b l i s h e d a p a p er e n t i t l e d "On f o r m a l l y u n d e c i d a b l e 
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p r o p o s i t i o n s o f P r i n c i p i a Mathematica and r e l a t e d systems." 
A l t h o u g h K u r t Godel's paper was l a r g e l y u n i n t e l l i g i b l e t o 
most mathematicians and p h i l o s o p h e r s o f t h e day, i t has come 
t o be r e g a r d e d as one o f t h e most i m p o r t a n t advances i n l o g i c 
i n modern t i m e s ; and i n p a r t i c u l a r c o m p l e t e l y undermining t h e 
f o r m a l i s t programme as i t was o r i g i n a l l y conceived. 
Gb'del showed how t o map t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s and p r o o f s of 
a g i v e n system i n t o t h e n a t u r a l numbers, so t h a t each 
p r o p o s i t i o n had i t s own l a b e l or Godel number. Then Gbdel 
showed t h a t metamathematical statements can be c o n s t r u e d as 
r e l a t i o n s between Godel numbers, and hence t h e metatheory i s 
" a r i t h m e t i z e d " . I t i s i n f a c t m i r r o r e d w i t h i n t h e t h e o r y 
i t s e l f . 
Then f o l l o w i n g t h e i d e a o f t h e l i a r paradox, and 
R i c h a r d ' s paradox b u t a v o i d i n g t h e i r e r r o r s , Gbdel was able 
t o c o n s t r u c t a f o r m u l a G r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e metastatement "The 
f o r m u l a G i s n o t demonstrable". 
As a r e s u l t o f t h i s Gbdel was able t o show t h a t 
c o n s i s t e n c y c o u l d not be e s t a b l i s h e d by r e a s o n i n g i n t h e 
m e t a t h e o r y t h a t was m i r r o r e d i n t h e t h e o r y i t s e l f . That i s 
t h e p r o o f o f c o n s i s t e n c y o f a r i t h m e t i c and a l l h i g h e r 
mathematics cannot be achieved by f i n i t e methods; f o r t h e r e 
w i l l always be a G-statement which i s t r u e b u t not p r o v a b l e 
i n t h e system, and t h u s a l l ( f i n i t e ) f o r m a l i s a t i o n s are 
e s s e n t i a l l y i n c o m p l e t e . 
Note t h a t t h e t h e o r y does not say t h a t p r o o f s o f 
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c o n s i s t e n c y , or Godel statements are i n a m y s t i c a l realm, 
f o r e v e r beyond our reach. I t o n l y says such p r o o f s are 
i m p o s s i b l e by f i n i t i s t i c methods. (Gentzen p r o v i d e d a p r o o f 
o f t h e c o n s i s t e n c y o f a r i t h m e t i c i n 1936, b u t h i s p r o o f i s not 
f i n i t i s t i c , and cannot be mapped onto t h e f o r m a l i s a t i o n o f 
a r i t h m e t i c . ) 
I t i s c l e a r from Godel's theorem t h a t t h e f o r m a l i s t 
programme as i t was o r i g i n a l l y conceived i s i m p o s s i b l e , and 
cannot be a c a n d i d a t e f o r any s e r i o u s f o u n d a t i o n a l account o f 
mathematics. 
I n c o n s i d e r i n g W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s c r i t i c i s m o f f o r m a l i s m , I 
s h a l l examine f o u r main p o i n t s o f disagreement; and a l s o 
comment upon W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s anomalous and perhaps even b i z a r r e 
remarks about Gbdel's theorem, which have provoked so much 
d i s c u s s i o n amongst W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s commentators and c r i t i c s . 
F i r s t l y W i t t g e n s t e i n o b j e c t s t o t h e idea t h a t 
m a t h e m a t i c a l s i g n s are meaningless s i g n s , and t h a t mathematics 
i s no more t h a n a game o f s i g n - m a n i p u l a t i o n . I t i s sim p l y 
n o t t h e case t h a t t h e b a s i c s i g n s o f l o g i c and mathematics are 
meaningless. "~", "v", "and" e t c . possess a meaning, and i n 
o r d e r t o f u n c t i o n w i t h i n a p r o o f t h e y must have a meaning 
o u t s i d e t h e a x i o m a t i c system. "The " c o n s t a n t s " must a l r e a d y 
have meaning i n t h e language. I n t h i s way i t i s e s s e n t i a l 
t h a t "v" and a l r e a d y possess a f a m i l i a r a p p l i c a t i o n , and 
t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a p r o o f i n P r i n c i p i a Mathematica gets i t s 
i m p o r t a n c e , i t s sense from t h i s . " (RFM. I I 34) 
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F u r t h e r m o r e , as I have a l r e a d y h i n t e d , i f mathematics i s 
a game p l a y e d w i t h meaningless symbols, t h e r e i s a l a r g e 
p roblem o f how t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e i t from o t h e r games, and t o 
g i v e i t i t s p a r t i c u l a r importance and s i g n i f i c a n c e . For 
W i t t g e n s t e i n , t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f mathematics i s d e r i v e d from 
i t s a p p l i c a t i o n . " I want t o say i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o 
mathematics t h a t i t s s i g n s are a l s o employed i n m u f t i . I t 
i s t h e use o u t s i d e mathematics, and so t h e meaning o f t h e 
s i g n s t h a t makes t h e s i g n game i n t o mathematics." (RFM IV 
2) That i s t h e s i g n s must have semantic c o n t e n t , or 
mathematics ceases t o be mathematics. 
Secondly, W i t t g e n s t e i n was opposed t o t h e narrow and 
r i g i d concept o f p r o o f i n t h e f o r m a l i s t system. For t h e 
f o r m a l i s t , a p r o o f i s j u s t a mechanical sequence l e a d i n g from 
axioms t o theorem; b u t f o r W i t t g e n s t e i n a p r o o f i s a r u l e o f 
language or grammar: an i n s t a n c e o f a f a m i l y resemblance 
concept. There i s no s i n g l e concept o f p r o o f . 
T h i s o b j e c t i o n i s p a r t o f a more g e n e r a l c o m p l a i n t t h a t 
t h e r e i s no sc i e n c e o f p r o o f and no metamathematics. On t h e 
one hand f o r m a l i s m c o n s t r u c t s a t h e o r y where t h e r e i s no need 
f o r one - mathematics a l r e a d y has a f o u n d a t i o n i n t h e way t h a t 
i t i s used. H i l b e r t ' s metatheory g i v e s no i n f o r m a t i o n about 
f o u n d a t i o n a l problems. A metatheory "cannot g i v e us 
i n f o r m a t i o n about t h e f o u n d a t i o n s o f mathematics." (PG p 
296) 
On t h e o t h e r hand t h e n o t i o n o f metamathematics i s 
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m i s p l a c e d . H i l b e r t ' s metatheory i s not a h i g h e r t h e o r y , but 
s i m p l y a d i f f e r e n t s o r t of t h e o r y . I n t h e o r i z i n g about 
axioms and f o r m a l i s a t i o n s we o p e r a t e i n a d i f f e r e n t c a l c u l u s 
not a m e t a c a l c u l u s . "What H i l b e r t does i s mathematics and not 
metamathematics. I t i s a n o t h e r c a l c u l u s j u s t l i k e any o t h e r 
one". (WWK p 121) There i s no h i e r a r c h y of c a l c u l i , j u s t 
s e p a r a t e i n d i v i d u a l ones. 
W i t t g e n s t e i n g i v e s a c h e s s example. " I can p l a y w i t h 
t h e chessmen a c c o r d i n g t o c e r t a i n r u l e s . But I can a l s o 
i n v e n t a game i n which I p l a y w i t h t h e r u l e s t h e m s e l v e s . The 
p i e c e s i n my game a r e now t h e r u l e s of c h e s s , and t h e r u l e s 
o f t h i s game a r e , say, t h e laws of l o g i c . I n t h a t c a s e I 
have y e t a n o t h e r game and not a metagame." (PR p 319) 
Waismann o b j e c t e d t o this.(WWK p l 3 3 ) F o r by c o n s i d e r i n g 
t h e r u l e s o f c h e s s I can f i n d whether I can f o r c e mate i n s i x 
moves from a g i v e n p o s i t i o n ( s a y ) . S i m i l a r l y by c o n s i d e r i n g 
t h e r u l e s o f a r i t h m e t i c I can o b t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n about 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s w i t h i n a r i t h m e t i c . T h i s t h e o r y i s H i l b e r t ' s 
m e t a t h e o r y . 
W i t t g e n s t e i n r e p l i e d t h a t t h e analogy was i n v a l i d , f o r 
a p r o o f t h a t I can mate i n s i x c o n s i s t s i n a c t u a l l y doing i t 
i n symbolism, or on a c h e s s b o a r d . The p r o o f of t h e 
p o s s i b i l i t y c o n s i s t s of moves w i t h i n t h e game. I t i s not a 
metagame and hence Waismann's o b j e c t i o n does not h o l d . The 
a l l e g e d metagame i s e i t h e r a s e p a r a t e game, or j u s t t h e game 
i t s e l f . ( c f PR p 326-7) 
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L a s t l y W i t t g e n s t e i n c o n s i d e r s t h e q u e s t i o n of c o n s i s t e n c y 
and c o n s i s t e n c y p r o o f s . H i s view i s summed up: 
"M a t h e m a t i c i a n s nowadays make so much f u s s about p r o o f s of 
c o n s i s t e n c y of axioms. I have t h e f e e l i n g t h a t i f t h e r e were 
a c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n t h e axioms of a system i t wouldn't be such 
a g r e a t m i s f o r t u n e . " (PG p 303) 
I n s h o r t W i t t g e n s t e i n c o n s i d e r s t h e s e a r c h f o r 
c o n s i s t e n c y p r o o f s as p o i n t l e s s , and he p a r t i c u l a r l y wants t o 
d i s p e l t h e i d e a s t h a t : (a) a c a l c u l u s w i t h a c o n t r a d i c t i o n 
i s i n some way e s s e n t i a l l y d e f e c t i v e . (b) C o n s i s t e n c y p r o o f s 
a r e needed f o r a system, and a system w i t h o u t them i s somehow 
i n s e c u r e . (c) A sy s t e m w i t h a hidden c o n t r a d i c t i o n i s j u s t 
as bad a s a s y s t e m w i t h a r e v e a l e d one; and (d) t h e 
d i s c o v e r y of a c o n t r a d i c t i o n f o r c e s some k i n d of r e p a r a t i o n -
i t cannot be c o h e r e n t l y i g n o r e d . 
These i d e a s which most m a t h e m a t i c i a n s a c c e p t w i t h o u t 
q u e s t i o n , stem from t h e f a c t t h a t t r u t h v a l u e s a r e only 
p r e s e r v e d i n c o n s i s t e n t s y s t e m s . I n an i n c o n s i s t e n t system 
f a l s e theorems can be d e r i v e d from t r u e p r e m i s e s . T h i s would 
be a d i s a s t e r , f o r t h e i n c o n s i s t e n t system would not t r u l y 
d e s c r i b e t h e i n t e n d e d s t r u c t u r e , and i n f a c t would not t r u l y 
d e s c r i b e a n y t h i n g a t a l l . But t h i s does not worry 
W i t t g e n s t e i n a s he r e g a r d s i t as a m i s t a k e t o c o n s i d e r 
m a t hematics as a d e s c r i p t i v e a c t i v i t y . R a t h e r i t i s a 
c o l l e c t i o n of r u l e s and c o n v e n t i o n s . But what i f t h e s e a r e 
i n c o n s i s t e n t or c o n t r a d i c t o r y ? W e l l , t h a t doesn't m a t t e r 
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e i t h e r . 
W i t t g e n s t e i n draws an analogy w i t h games. C o n s i d e r 
noughts and c r o s s e s as an example. The second p l a y e r can 
a l w a y s f o r c e a t l e a s t a draw, so t h e f i r s t p l a y e r can n e v e r 
win. However t h i s does not s p o i l t h e game f o r c h i l d r e n who 
do not know t h i s , or do not know how t o do i t . ( f o r c e a 
draw) A h i d d e n c o n t r a d i c t i o n does not m a t t e r . 
Even i f an i n c o n s i s t e n c y comes t o l i g h t t h i s need not 
r u i n t h e game, i t j u s t makes i t r a t h e r t e d i o u s . Wright 
i m a g i n e s a s o c i e t y who p l a y an i n c o n s i s t e n t game, but a r e 
a l w a y s a b l e t o a g r e e when i n c o n s i s t e n t r u l e s a r e a p p e a l e d t o . 
A p l a y e r might concede t h e i n c o n s i s t e n c y and might say, "Yes, 
p l a y i n g t h e game i s a m a t t e r of good s e n s e : you have t o be 
c a r e f u l who you p l a y w i t h " (Wright 1980 p 300) 
Note, p e o p l e who p l a y such a game a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y 
i r r a t i o n a l , nor i s t h e game i n some way d e f e c t i v e . F u r t h e r 
t h e r e i s no o b l i g a t i o n t o change or amend t h e r u l e s of the 
game. I t i s not i n c o h e r e n t t o l e a v e them u n a l t e r e d . 
The a n a l o g y seems t o support W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s p o i n t , but 
does i t r e a l l y work? To me i t does not seem c o n v i n c i n g . 
F i r s t l y i t can be argued t h a t mathematics i s a d e s c r i p t i v e , 
r e a l i s t a c t i v i t y ; and so must be t r u t h p r e s e r v i n g and hence 
c o n s i s t e n t . T h i s u n d e r c u t s t h e whole p o s i t i o n . 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y i f we a c c e p t a n t i - r e a l i s m , t h e analogy s t i l l 
seems weak f o r mathematics has o t h e r g o a l s t h a n amusement. 
I f t h e end p r o d u c t i s t o v a l i d a t e c e r t a i n i n f e r e n c e s , and i f 
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t h e s e i n f e r e n c e s a r e i m p o r t a n t (say i n e n g i n e e r i n g e t c . ) the 
a n a l o g y w i t h games b r e a k s down. I t i s c r u c i a l t h a t i n f e r e n c e 
p a t t e r n s of a p p l i e d mathematics a r e t r u t h p r e s e r v i n g , and i t 
i s not p o s s i b l e t o t h i n k of theorems as s i m p l y moves or 
p o s i t i o n s i n a game. An i n c o n s i s t e n t system i s i n grave 
danger of b e i n g u s e l e s s . 
T h i s danger i s o n l y r e a l i s e d i f t h e i n c o n s i s t e n c y cannot 
be c o n t a i n e d , and W i t t g e n s t e i n t r i e s t o show ways i n which an 
i n c o n s i s t e n c y might be c o n t a i n e d . He d e v e l o p s d i s c u s s i o n s 
o f a r i t h m e t i c a l l o w i n g d i v i s i o n by z e r o , and systems of 
measurement w i t h e l a s t i c ("dough") r u l e r s . Such systems may 
be u n u s a b l e f o r " o r d i n a r y " p u r p o s e s , but "perhaps u s a b l e f o r 
o t h e r ones." (RFM I I 78) U n f o r t u n a t e l y W i t t g e n s t e i n g i v e s 
no examples of u s e f u l i n c o n s i s t e n t systems, and no g e n e r a l 
d i s c u s s i o n of how i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s might be i d e n t i f i e d and 
c o n t a i n e d . H i s d i s c u s s i o n i s f a r from c o n v i n c i n g and i t 
r e m a i n s t h e c a s e t h a t i n c o n s i s t e n t systems a r e more than 
l i k e l y t o y i e l d s p u r i o u s r e s u l t s . 
The d i s c u s s i o n above c o u l d be much developed, f o r t h e 
W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n can c l a i m h i s opponent makes i l l i c i t 
a s s u m p t i o n s about o b j e c t i v i t y of mathematics and r u l e 
f o l l o w i n g . Such a d i s c u s s i o n i s not a p p r o p r i a t e here, and 
I c o n c l u d e by r e m a r k i n g t h a t i t i s u n f o r t u n a t e t h a t much of 
W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s c r i t i q u e of f o r m a l i s m i s by analogy, and hence 
so d i f f i c u l t t o e v a l u a t e . However, as t h e o r i g i n a l 
c o n c e p t i o n o f f o r m a l i s m has been undermined by Godel's 
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theorem, t h e degree of s u c c e s s of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s c r i t i q u e i s 
not o f p a r t i c u l a r p h i l o s o p h i c a l i m p o r t a n c e . I t i s more a 
q u e s t i o n of a s s e s s i n g W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s a b i l i t y t o a n a l y s e and 
comment; and t h i s i s a q u e s t i o n t h a t does not c o n c e r n me 
h e r e . 
T u r n i n g t o W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s remarks on Godel's theorem we 
f i n d a f r a g m e n t a r y a c c o u n t i n t h e Remarks on t h e F o u n d a t i o n s 
o f Mathematics and i n t h e Notebooks. W i t t g e n s t e i n does not 
f o l l o w c a r e f u l l y t h r o u g h t h e s t e p s of Gbdel's proof, and he 
has been a c c u s e d o f muddling s t a t e m e n t s i n t h e system, w i t h 
m e t a s t a t e m e n t s and c o r r e l a t i n g s t a t e m e n t s . H i s remarks on 
t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e theorem appear t o be t r i v i a l or 
u n i n t e r e s t i n g m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ; and t h e comment: "My t a s k 
i s not t o t a l k about (e.g.) Godel's proof, but t o by-pass i t " 
(RFM V 16) has c o n f i r m e d W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s c r i t i c s i n t h e i r view 
t h a t he d i d not know what he was t a l k i n g about, and proved 
a c u t e l y e m b a r r a s s i n g f o r W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s d i s c i p l e s . 
Ross Anderson c o m p l a i n e d t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n m i s u n d e r s t o o d 
t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of Gbdel's theorem, p a r t i c u l a r l y as 
W i t t g e n s t e i n r e j e c t e d Godel as an a l l y i n t h e argument a g a i n s t 
f o r m a l i s m . F o r i f W i t t g e n s t e i n had f u l l y u n d e r s t o o d Godel, 
he c o u l d not have done o t h e r t h a n welcome h i s theorem. Gbdel 
h i m s e l f wrote t o Abraham Robinson t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n 
" a d v a n c e [ d ] a c o m p l e t e l y t r i v i a l and u n i n t e r e s t i n g 
m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " of t h e r e s u l t s . (Shanker p89) 
The drawback of s u c h a s s e s s m e n t i s t w o f o l d . F i r s t l y i t 
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i s a g r e a t i n s u l t t o W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s i n t e l l e c t and mastery of 
h i s s u b j e c t , and s e c o n d l y i t i g n o r e s W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s more 
g e n e r a l c r i t i c i s m s of f o r m a l i s m examined above. 
With t h e s e i n mind W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s remarks can be 
i n t e r p r e t e d not as q u e s t i o n i n g t h e v a l i d i t y or o r i g i n a l i t y of 
G o d e l ' s p r o o f , but as q u e s t i o n i n g i t ' s p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
s i g n i f i c a n c e . F o r W i t t g e n s t e i n , p h i l o s o p h y and mathematics 
a r e w h o l l y s e p a r a t e d i s c i p l i n e s which have n o t h i n g t o say t o 
e a c h o t h e r ; and s i n c e t h e v a l i d i t y of f o r m a l i s m i s a 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n and Godel's theorem i s a m a t h e m a t i c a l 
theorem t h e two c o u l d not be r e l a t e d . " I t might j u s t l y be 
a s k e d what i m p o r t a n c e Godel's p r o o f has f o r our work. F o r 
a p i e c e of mathematics cannot s o l v e a problem of t h e s o r t t h a t 
t r o u b l e s u s . " (RFM V 19) 
Seen i n t h i s l i g h t , W i t t g e n s t e i n i s not c r i t i c a l of 
G o d e l ' s theorem as such, but of t h e way i t has been used i n 
p h i l o s o p h y . As a work of mathematics, Godel's theorem i s of 
no consequence t o W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c e r n s ; and 
t h i s h e l p s t o e x p l a i n why W i t t g e n s t e i n does not i n t e r p r e t or 
e l a b o r a t e G o d e l ' s r e s u l t s . 
T h ere a r e a l s o o t h e r r e a s o n ' s why W i t t g e n s t e i n would have 
not embraced G o d e l ' s theorem. F i r s t l y W i t t g e n s t e i n does not 
want t o s a y t h a t H i l b e r t ' s programme i s i m p o s s i b l e (Gbdel's 
theorem) , but t h a t i t i s u n i n t e l l i g i b l e i n t h a t i t a r i s e s from 
a s p u r i o u s demand f o r f o u n d a t i o n s , where no such demand 
e x i s t s . I n o t h e r words, f o r m a l i s m i s a s c h o o l t o be 
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d i s s o l v e d not r e f u t e d ; and i n as much as Gbdel f a i l e d t o see 
t h i s , W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s l a c k of e n t h u s i a s m can be understood. 
F u r t h e r m o r e , a l t h o u g h Gbdel's theorem r u i n e d H i l b e r t ' s 
o r i g i n a l programme, i t d i d n o t h i n g t o h a l t t h e development of 
metamathematics and n o n - f i n i t a r y c o n s i s t e n c y p r o o f s . F o r 
W i t t g e n s t e i n t h i s was a h o p e l e s s m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t he 
p h i l o s o p h y of mathematics, c a t a l y s e d by Godel's r e s u l t s , and 
hence t h e theorem can o n l y be seen as a s t e p backwards and not 
a g r e a t advance. 
L a s t l y W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s a t t a c k on t h e theorem can be 
u n d e r s t o o d i n terms of t h e P l a t o n i s m which i t provoked. 
G b d e l ' s d e m o n s t r a t i o n of t h e e x i s t e n c e of t r u e but f o r m a l l y 
u n d e c i d a b l e p r o p o s i t i o n s , can be r e g a r d e d as one of the 
m o t i v a t i n g f o r c e s b e h i n d t h e modern r e v i v a l of m a t h e m a t i c a l 
P l a t o n i s m . The e l i m i n a t i o n of such m e t a p h y s i c a l c o n f u s i o n 
was one of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s main t a s k s i n h i s work, and h i s 
o p p o s i t i o n t o a n y t h i n g t h a t undermined t h a t i s of no g r e a t 
s u r p r i s e . 
To c o n c l u d e , I have t r i e d t o show t h a t t h e c r i t i c a l 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s remarks about Gbdel's theorem 
i s not t h e o n l y p o s s i b l e one; and f u r t h e r i t i s o n l y when the 
remarks a r e c o n s i d e r e d w i t h i n t h e wide r framework of 
W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s p h i l o s o p h y of mathematics, t h a t t h e y can be 
p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d . 
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I V s t r i c t F i n i t i s m . 
The t h r e e t r a d i t i o n a l s c h o o l s i n t h e p h i l o s o p h y of 
m a t hematics can e a c h be a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r 
o n t o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n , and some i n t e r p r e t e r s have thought t h a t 
t h e e s s e n t i a l d i s a g r e e m e n t between t h e s c h o o l s i s an 
o n t o l o g i c a l one. However s u c h an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r a i s e s two 
d i f f i c u l t i e s : I t p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t m a t h e m a t i c a l p r o c e d u r e s can 
be d e c i d e d by p r i o r o n t o l o g i c a l i s s u e s . (even when t h e r e i s 
no c l e a r way t o r e s o l v e t h e s e i s s u e s . ) And i t a v o i d s the 
more fundamental q u e s t i o n about t h e o b j e c t i v i t y of 
m a t h e m a t i c a l t h o u g h t . 
W i t t g e n s t e i n p a r t i c u l a r l y c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h i s second 
q u e s t i o n . I n t h e Remarks on t h e F o u n d a t i o n s of Mathematics, 
P l a t o n i s m s t a n d s opposed t o v a r i o u s degrees of 
c o n s t r u c t i v i s m ; as a s s o c i a t e d w i t h i n t u i t i o n i s m and 
f o r m a l i s m . W i t t g e n s t e i n r e j e c t s a l l of t h e s e f o r r e a s o n s we 
have seen, but he r e j e c t s them p r i n c i p a l l y because t h e y a r e 
a l l a t t e m p t s t o g i v e mathematics an o b j e c t i v e e x t e r n a l 
f o u n d a t i o n . P l a t o n i s m does t h i s by grounding t h e s e n s e of 
m a t hematics i n t h e t r u t h of s t a t e m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g r e l a t i o n s 
between a b s t r a c t o b j e c t s . I n t u i t i o n i s m and f o r m a l i s m do t h i s 
by d e v e l o p i n g o b j e c t i v e n o t i o n s of p r o o f : e i t h e r by i n t u i t e d 
l o g i c a l p r o c e d u r e s , (to which a l l m a t h e m a t i c i a n s s h o u l d agree) 
or by d e v e l o p i n g i n t e r n a l c o n s i s t e n c y p r o o f s of f o r m a l i s e d 
s y s t e m s . 
As an a l t e r n a t i v e , W i t t g e n s t e i n i s a l l e g e d t o adopt an 
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extreme form of c o n s t r u c t i v i s m , which has been c a l l e d 
a n t h r o p o l o g i s m by Hao Wang and s t r i c t f i n i t i s m by Georg 
K r e i s e l . However s u c h an a l l e g a t i o n i s h i g h l y c o n t e n t i o u s 
and t h e r e i s d i s p u t e as t o whether W i t t g e n s t e i n can r e a l l y be 
i d e n t i f i e d as a s t r i c t f i n i t i s t . I n t h i s c h a p t e r I s h a l l 
examine t h e s t r i c t f i n i t i s t p o s i t i o n , and c o n s i d e r t o what 
e x t e n t i t i s c o i n c i d e n t w i t h W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s own v i e w s : 
a r g u i n g towards a c o n c l u s i o n t h a t on a s e l e c t i v e r e a d i n g of 
W i t t g e n s t e i n he does i n d e e d appear t o h o l d a s t r i c t f i n i t i s t 
p o s i t i o n , but on a w i d e r r e a d i n g which c o n s i d e r s 
W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s more g e n e r a l p o s i t i o n t h i s i s not i n f a c t t h e 
c a s e . 
Dummett c l a i m s t h a t P a u l B e r n a y s foreshadowed t h e s t r i c t 
f i n i t i s t p o s i t i o n i n h i s paper 'On P l a t o n i s m i n Mathematics' 
of 1935. B e r n a y s r e j e c t s P l a t o n i s m "which has been shown 
u n t e n a b l e by t h e a n t i n o m i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h o s e s u r r o u n d i n g 
t h e R u s s e l l - Z e r m e l o paradox" ( B e n a c e r r a f and Putnam p 277) . 
He goes on t o s u g g e s t a new approach t o q u e s t i o n s of 
m a t h e m a t i c a l methodology, and a r g u e s t h a t t h e way mathematics 
i s a c t u a l l y done s h o u l d p r o v i d e t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l f o u n d a t i o n s 
o f m a t h e m a t i c s . 
A n a l y s i n g t h e way mathematics i s a c t u a l l y done, i s 
e q u i v a l e n t t o a n a l y s i n g t h e way t h a t language i s used by 
m a t h e m a t i c i a n s . The s t r i c t f i n i t i s t h o l d s t h a t t h e answers 
t o our p h i l o s o p h i c a l w o r r i e s l i e i n a c o r r e c t a n a l y s i s of 
language, and t h e way we use i t . The b e l i e f s we h o l d about 
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mathematics a r e , or s h o u l d be, e x p l i c a b l e i n terms of t h e way 
we u s e l a n g u a g e . T h i s c o i n c i d e s w i t h W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s view 
t h a t "Grammar t e l l s us what k i n d of o b j e c t a n y t h i n g i s . " (PI 
373) R a t h e r t h a n e x p l a i n our p r a c t i c e s i n terms of them 
r e l a t i n g t o , or d e s c r i b i n g some u n d e r l y i n g r e a l i t y ; t h e b e s t 
we can do i s t o " i n v e s t i g a t e how t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of the 
p i c t u r e goes." (PI 374) 
At t h e h e a r t of t h e s t r i c t f i n i t i s t p o s i t i o n i s t h e view 
t h a t m a t h e m a t i c a l s t a t e m e n t s a s s e r t n e c e s s a r y t r u t h s , but a r e 
not s t a t e m e n t s of f a c t . Hence a p r o o f of p i s a 
d e m o n s t r a t i o n t h a t p i s n e c e s s a r i l y t r u e , or a l t e r n a t i v e l y 
must be t r u e ; and an e x p l a n a t i o n or u n d e r s t a n d i n g of why t h i s 
i s t h e c a s e comes (and can o n l y come) from an a n a l y s i s of how 
m a t h e m a t i c a l t r u t h s a r e a c t u a l l y proved. 
The s t r i c t f i n i t i s t t a k e s t h e paradigm m a t h e m a t i c a l 
s t a t e m e n t t o be "the X of Y i s Z", where t h e " i s " h e r e i s r e a d 
as t h e " i s " of i d e n t i t y . I t i s assumed t h a t v i r t u a l l y a l l 
m a t h e m a t i c a l s t a t e m e n t s can be e x p r e s s e d i n t h i s form, so i t 
i s o n l y a m a t t e r of e x p l a i n i n g how n e c e s s a r y t r u t h i s 
d e m o n s t r a t e d f o r t h e paradigm c a s e . 
C a l l t h e s t a t e m e n t "the X of Y i s Z" S. The f i r s t s t e p 
of t h e p r o o f i s t o show S i s t r u e , and t h i s i s done by 
o r d i n a r y s t a n d a r d means. A t r i v i a l example i s the 
d e m o n s t r a t i o n t h a t t h e number of l e t t e r s i n t h e word 
" B i s m a r c k " i s e i g h t . That i s , t o show t h a t t h e l e t t e r s of t he 
word ( s t r i c t l y a t y p i c a l t o k e n of t h e word) can be put i n t o 
54 
one-one c o r r e s p o n d e n c e w i t h t h e f i r s t e i g h t n u m e r a l s . 
S e c o n d l y , t h e n e c e s s i t y of S i s argued from t h e 
i n c o n c e i v a b i l i t y of doing t h e f i r s t p a r t wrongly. By showing 
S t o be t r u e , a new conc e p t i s e s t a b l i s h e d and t h i s e l i m i n a t e s 
t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t S be f a l s e . W i t t g e n s t e i n s a y s : "Yes, 
t h i s i s how i t has t o be; I must f i x t h e use of my language 
i n t h i s way". (RFM I I 30) Again "The m a t h e m a t i c a l Must i s 
o n l y a n o t h e r e x p r e s s i o n of t h e f a c t t h a t mathematics forms 
c o n c e p t s " (RFM V 4 6 ) ; where" "to g i v e a new concept", can 
o n l y mean t o i n t r o d u c e a new employment of a concept, a new 
p r a c t i c e . " (RFM V 49) 
I n o t h e r words, e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e t r u t h of S, f i x e s a new 
r u l e o f language, and t h e n e c e s s i t y of S i s d e r i v e d from 
c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e new r u l e . As an example examine t h e 
s t r i c t f i n i t i s t p r o o f o f : "the o p p o s i t e of OVER i s REVO" ( c f 
RFM I I I 51) The f i r s t s t a g e a f t e r t h i s p r o o f i s t o examine 
a p e r s p i c u o u s t o k e n of OVER. (For a f u l l d i s c u s s i o n of 
p e r s p i c u i t y s e e t h e next c h a p t e r ) so t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e t o 
" r e a d - o f f " , a s W i t t g e n s t e i n p u t s i t , t h e o p p o s i t e of OVER. 
Se c o n d l y we pe r f o r m t h e experiment of r e v e r s i n g t h e 
l e t t e r s o f OVER, by p u t t i n g t h e f i r s t l a s t , t h e l a s t f i r s t 
e t c . , and t h e n t h i r d l y we r e a d - o f f t h e o p p o s i t e of OVER as 
REVO e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e t r u t h of t h e c l a i m . 
The f o u r t h s t a g e i s t o argue from "the o p p o s i t e of OVER 
i s REVO" t o " t h e o p p o s i t e of OVER must be REVO". T h i s i s 
done by a p p e a l t o t h e p e r s p i c u i t y and s u r v e y a b i l i t y of s t a g e 
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t h r e e . I n o t h e r words s i n c e we can see and e x p l a i n how we 
r e a d of t h e o p p o s i t e of OVER w i t h f u l l c l a r i t y , i t i s 
i m p o s s i b l e t o c o n c e i v e t h a t t h i s c o u l d be done i n any o t h e r 
way. "When we s a y i n a p r o o f : " T h i s must come out" - then 
t h i s i s not f o r r e a s o n s t h a t we do not s e e " (RFM I I 39) 
F i n a l l y , t h e s t r i c t f i n i t i s t a p p e a l s t o p e r s p i c u i t y a g a i n 
i n o r d e r t o move from t h e p a r t i c u l a r t o t h e g e n e r a l c a s e . 
To move from a p r o o f about a token of OVER t o a g e n e r a l p r o o f 
about t h e sequence OVER. T h i s i s not done by i n d u c t i v e 
r e a s o n i n g , but by p e r s p i c u i t y : t h e p a r t i c u l a r OVER must have 
a l l t h e e s s e n t i a l p r o p e r t i e s of t h e g e n e r a l OVER i n o r d e r t h a t 
t h e y b o t h be i d e n t i f i e d a s OVERs, and hence what i s 
a t t r i b u t a b l e t o t h e p a r t i c u l a r i s a t t r i b u t a b l e t o t h e g e n e r a l . 
B e r k e l i a n w o r r i e s about a b s t r a c t g e n e r a l i d e a s such as 
whether a p a r t i c u l a r OVER i s w r i t t e n i n r e d or b l u e i n k , or 
how l a r g e i t i s ; and how t h i s can be r e l a t e d t o an u n i v e r s a l 
OVER a r e not r e l e v a n t . F o r p e r s p i c u i t y i s o n l y concerned 
w i t h t h e e s s e n t i a l p r o p e r t i e s of OVER, t h o s e p r o p e r t i e s 
w i t h o u t which i t would not be r e c o g n i z a b l e as an OVER. When 
we p e r c e i v e a s i n g l e p e r s p i c u o u s OVER, we see something 
g e n e r a l or u n i v e r s a l , b e c a u s e our c r i t e r i o n f o r i d e n t i f y i n g 
OVERS i s u n i v e r s a l , i n t h a t i t must be common t o a l l OVERs. 
"We must be s u r e we can e x a c t l y reproduce what i s 
e s s e n t i a l t o t h e p r o o f . I t may f o r example be w r i t t e n i n two 
d i f f e r e n t h a n d w r i t i n g s or c o l o u r s . What goes t o make the 
r e p r o d u c t i o n o f a p r o o f i s not a n y t h i n g l i k e an e x a c t 
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r e p r o d u c t i o n o f a shade of c o l o u r or a h a n d - w r i t i n g . " (RFM 
I I 1) 
Two e x t r a n o t i o n s need t o be e x p l i c a t e d h e r e . The f i r s t 
i s t h e co n c e p t of m e m o r a b i l i t y . T h i s e n t e r s t h e s t r i c t 
f i n i t i s t p r o o f a t t h e second e x p e r i m e n t a l s t a g e . We have t o 
t e l l t h a t t h e r e s u l t s of t h e experiment a r e t h e ones we 
e x p e c t e d ; and when s u b s e q u e n t l y r e f e r r i n g t o t h e r e s u l t s we 
have t o be a b l e t o s e e how or why t h e y a r e r e l e v a n t . I n 
o t h e r words t h e y have t o be r e p r o d u c i b l e . T h i s i s v e r y 
c l o s e l y l i n k e d t o s u r v e y a b i l i t y and w i l l be r e t u r n e d t o . 
The s e c o n d n o t i o n i s t h a t of va g u e n e s s . T h i s i d e a i s 
d e v e l o p e d by Dummett i n h i s paper: "Wang's Paradox", where 
he a r g u e s t h a t i f t h e s t r i c t f i n i t i s t i s goin g t o i n t r o d u c e 
t e r m s s u c h as p e r s p i c u o u s and s u r v e y a b l e ; he must a c c e p t t h a t 
t h e s e p r e d i c a t e s have a c e r t a i n v a g u e n e s s . Because a l t h o u g h 
i t i s g e n e r a l l y p o s s i b l e t o d i s t i n g u i s h between a p e r s p i c u o u s 
p r o o f and a n o n - p e r s p i c u o u s one; i t i s g e n e r a l l y i m p o s s i b l e 
t o g i v e a n o n - a r b i t r a r y boundary. The p o i n t i s i l l u s t r a t e d 
by Wang's Paradox: 
0 i s s m a l l . 
I f n i s s m a l l , (n + 1) i s s m a l l 
t h e r e f o r e E v e r y number i s s m a l l . 
An i n d u c t i v e argument w i t h a r i d i c u l o u s c o n c l u s i o n . Dummett 
a r g u e s t h a t t h e s t r i c t f i n i t i s t r e j e c t s t h e r e p e a t e d 
a p p l i c a t i o n of modus ponens i n t h e p r e s e n c e of a vague 
p r e d i c a t e , and so f o r t h e s t r i c t f i n i t i s t t h e paradox cannot 
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a r i s e , but t h e r e i s no boundary s u c h t h a t k i s s m a l l and (k 
+ 1) i s n o t . 
I n t r y i n g t o e l u c i d a t e t h e i d e a of s t r i c t f i n i t i s m I have 
quoted from W i t t g e n s t e i n , and i t would seem as though 
W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s p o s i t i o n can be l a r g e l y i d e n t i f i e d w i t h t h a t 
of t h e s t r i c t f i n i t i s t . But c a r e i s r e q u i r e d f o r b r i e f 
q u o t a t i o n s from a c o l l e c t i o n of remarks a r e not c o n c l u s i v e ! 
What o t h e r arguments a r e t h e r e i n f a v o u r o f i n t e r p r e t i n g 
W i t t g e n s t e i n as a s t r i c t f i n i t i s t ? 
T h ere a r e s e v e r a l key p o i n t s where t h e f i n i t i s t s and 
W i t t g e n s t e i n a g r e e . F i r s t l y t h e r e i s g e n e r a l agreement on 
p r o o f p r o c e d u r e . Without going i n t o d e t a i l s , both 
W i t t g e n s t e i n and t h e s t r i c t f i n i t i s t s thought t h a t a pro o f 
gave a m a t h e m a t i c a l s t a t e m e n t a new s e n s e . I t c o u l d be used 
i n s i t u a t i o n s where f o r m e r l y i t was not a p p l i c a b l e . F u r t h e r 
t h e two a g r e e d t h a t any s t a t e m e n t o n l y has one proof, or more 
a c c u r a t e l y , one t y p e of p r o o f p a t t e r n . "The p r o o f must be 
our model, our p i c t u r e , of how t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s have a r e s u l t " 
(RFM I I 24) and "eg. : t h i s p r o o f i s a m a t h e m a t i c a l e n t i t y 
t h a t cannot be r e p l a c e d by any o t h e r . " (RFM I I 59) 
S e c o n d l y both W i t t g e n s t e i n and t h e s t r i c t f i n i t i s t s saw 
t h e l a w s o f l o g i c a s laws of thought. The laws of l o g i c 
c o r r e s p o n d t o c o n v e n t i o n s i n language, but do not c o r r e s p o n d 
t o any f a c t s . "The p r o p o s i t i o n s of l o g i c a r e 'laws of 
tho u g h t ' b e c a u s e t h e y b r i n g out t h e e s s e n c e of human 
t h i n k i n g . . . t h e t e c h n i q u e of t h i n k i n g . They show what 
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t h i n k i n g i s . " (RFM I 133) T h i s i s c l o s e l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h the 
v i e w t h a t mathematics i s c r e a t e d not d i s c o v e r e d ; and as such 
has no e x t e r n a l o b j e c t i v e f o u n d a t i o n s . 
T h i r d l y W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s v i e w s on t h e law of t h e e x c l u d e d 
m i d d l e a r e c o i n c i d e n t w i t h t h e s t r i c t f i n i t i s t ' s . I have 
a l r e a d y e x p l a i n e d how W i t t g e n s t e i n thought "(pv-p) i s t r u e " 
t o be n o n s e n s i c a l b e c a u s e i t i s b a s e d on a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
o f grammar. S i m i l a r l y f o r t h e s t r i c t f i n i t i s t s , a p r o o f of 
p (a d e m o n s t r a t i o n t h a t p i s n e c e s s a r i l y t r u e ) e n t a i l s or i s 
c a u s a l l y dependant upon ~p b e i n g u n t h i n k a b l e . Not f a l s e but 
n o n s e n s i c a l . Hence t h e whole d i s j u n c t i o n i s nonsense. 
W i t t g e n s t e i n and t h e s t r i c t f i n i t i s t s a g r e e on t h e r o l e 
of c o n s i s t e n c y p r o o f s as examined i n c h a p t e r t h r e e . L i k e 
W i t t g e n s t e i n , s t r i c t f i n i t i s t s do not f a v o u r c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , 
f o r t h e y a r e not c o n v e n i e n t f o r p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n ; but 
t h e y do not h o l d t h a t a s y s t e m c o n t a i n i n g a c o n t r a d i c t i o n i s 
e s s e n t i a l l y d i s o r d e r e d . The s t r i c t f i n i t i s t does not h o l d 
t h a t a c o n t r a d i c t i o n n e c e s s a r i l y i n d i c a t e s any e r r o r i n the 
p r o o f of a p r o p o s i t i o n . J u s t as e x p e r i m e n t s can have 
d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t s , so two p e o p l e c o u l d h o l d c o n t r a d i c t o r y 
s t a t e m e n t s a s n e c e s s a r i l y t r u e . The p i c t u r e i n RFM I 136 
w h i c h l e a d s t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t 4 x 3 + 2 = 10, does not 
d e s t r o y p r o o f p a t t e r n s of 4 x 3 + 2 = 14. 
A l a s t , and more g e n e r a l p o i n t i s t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n and 
t h e s t r i c t f i n i t i s t s s h a r e t h e same methodology. They both 
have t h e i n t e n t i o n t o d e s c r i b e mathematics as i t i s , and not 
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t o p r e s c r i b e how i t s h o u l d be; and both c l a i m t h e 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n s s u r r o u n d i n g mathematics have t h e i r 
s o l u t i o n s i n t h e way t h a t mathematics i s a c t u a l l y done. 
But t h e r e i s a d i f f i c u l t y h e r e , f o r d e s p i t e t h e common 
c l a i m t o d e s c r i b e mathematics, t h e r e i s o n l y l i m i t e d agreement 
about t h a t d e s c r i p t i o n . W i t t g e n s t e i n does not c o n s i d e r t h e 
paradigm m a t h e m a t i c a l s t a t e m e n t t o be: "The X of Y i s Z"; 
nor does he speak of t h e f i v e s t a g e p r o o f p r o c e d u r e t h a t t h e 
s t r i c t f i n i t i s t s employ. Everywhere W i t t g e n s t e i n t a l k s of 
a motley, a f a m i l y of p r a c t i c e s and t e c h n i q u e s , and r e j e c t s 
any a t t e m p t t o demarcate mathematics from non-mathematics. 
C e r t a i n l y W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s remarks can be used t o support 
a s t r i c t f i n i t i s t p o s i t i o n , but he adopts a broader 
p e r s p e c t i v e i m a g i n i n g "a l a n d s c a p e g a r d e n e r d e s i g n i n g p a t h s 
f o r t h e l a y o u t o f a garden" (RFM I 166) I t h i n k W i t t g e n s t e i n 
would f u r t h e r s u g g e s t t h a t t h e s t r i c t f i n i t i s t s do not 
d e s c r i b e mathematics f u l l y , as t h e y do not a l l o w f o r the 
e n d l e s s p o s s i b i l i t y of new p a t h s , and new forms of 
d e s c r i p t i o n . 
O t h e r p o i n t s of d i s a g r e e m e n t between t h e s t r i c t f i n i t i s t s 
and W i t t g e n s t e i n a r e over meaning. The s t r i c t f i n i t i s t s h e l d 
t h a t m a t h e m a t i c a l s t a t e m e n t s have meaning, i n v i r t u e of a 
f i x e d u s e and p r o o f p a t t e r n of t h e paradigm: "the X of Y i s 
Z". But W i t t g e n s t e i n h e l d t h a t m a t h e m a t i c a l s t a t e m e n t s were 
m e a n i n g l e s s - s e n s e l e s s . A m a t h e m a t i c a l s t a t e m e n t i s j u s t an 
a l g o r i t h m , a p i e c e i n a game, a l o n g 
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w i t h a l l t h e o t h e r p i e c e s , and has no meaning and cannot be 
s a i d t o be t r u e or f a l s e . E s s e n t i a l l y mathematics i s not 
about a n y t h i n g , and t h i s i s t h e p o i n t of disagreement, f o r t h e 
s t r i c t f i n i t i s t s h o l d m a t h e m a t i c a l s t a t e m e n t s t o be about 
something, and p r o o f s of s u c h s t a t e m e n t s show them t o be 
n e c e s s a r i l y t r u e . 
L a s t l y t h o s e w i s h i n g t o i n t e r p r e t W i t t g e n s t e i n as a 
s t r i c t f i n i t i s t , p a r t i c u l a r l y K i e l k o p f , have argued t h a t 
W i t t g e n s t e i n o n l y a c c e p t s f i n i t e or e l e m e n t a r y mathematics. 
He d e f e n d s h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w i t h a p a s s a g e from t h e B l u e 
Book: " I f I w i s h e d t o f i n d out what s o r t of a t h i n g 
m a t hematics i s , I s h o u l d be v e r y c o n t e n t i n d e e d t o have 
i n v e s t i g a t e d t h e c a s e of f i n i t e c a r d i n a l a r i t h m e t i c . F o r 
(a) t h i s would l e a d me t o a l l t h e more c o m p l i c a t e d 
c a s e s 
(b) a f i n i t e c a r d i n a l a r i t h m e t i c i s not i n c o m p l e t e , i t 
has no gaps which a r e t h e n f i l l e d by t h e r e s t of a r i t h m e t i c . " 
(BB p 20. K i e l k o p f p 177) 
The p o i n t i s meant t o be t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n i s t o be 
i n t e r p r e t e d a s a s t r i c t f i n i t i s t as h i s main m a t h e m a t i c a l 
d i s c u s s i o n s a r e of e l e m e n t a r y f i n i t e m athematics. He i s 
" v e r y c o n t e n t " t o have i n v e s t i g a t e d f i n i t e a r i t h m e t i c ; and 
h i s d i s c u s s i o n s of h i g h e r mathematics (Cantor, Dedekind, Godel 
e t c . ) a r e n o t o r i o u s l y poor. He i s s u p p o s e d l y l e s s c o n c e r n e d 
about h i g h e r m a t h e m a t i c s . 
But t h i s i s a t r a v e s t y ! F i r s t l y W i t t g e n s t e i n i s not 
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u n c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e r e s u l t s of h i g h e r mathematics. 
A d m i t t e d l y he does not q u e s t i o n them m a t h e m a t i c a l l y , but he 
q u e s t i o n s t h e i r p h i l o s o p h i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . Many of the 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o i n t s t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n wants t o e l u c i d a t e can 
be d e r i v e d from f i n i t e a r i t h m e t i c j u s t as w e l l as from h i g h e r 
m a t h e m a t i c s ; and as W i t t g e n s t e i n has no i n t e n t i o n of 
d i s c u s s i n g m athematics but p h i l o s o p h y , he i s c o n t e n t w i t h the 
s i m p l e r s y s t e m s . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e s i m p l e s t examples r e v e a l more c l e a r l y 
t h e b a s i c f o u n d a t i o n a l problems of i n f e r e n c e , r u l e f o l l o w i n g 
e t c . , t h a t a r e W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s p r i m a r y c o n c e r n . H i s 
p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h e l e m e n t a r y mathematics i n no way s u g g e s t s 
he thought o n l y f i n i t e mathematics i s r e a l l y c l e a r . (as 
K r e i s e l s u g g e s t s ) I n d e e d W i t t g e n s t e i n a c c e p t s C a n t o r ' s 
theorem and t h e c o n c e p t of i n f i n i t y , p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e concept 
i s u n d e r s t o o d and u s e d i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h unending 
t e c h n i q u e s ; "The concept of i n f i n i t e d e c i m a l s i n m a t h e m a t i c a l 
p r o p o s i t i o n s a r e not c o n c e p t s of s e r i e s , but of t h e u n l i m i t e d 
t e c h n i q u e of e x p a n s i o n of s e r i e s . " (RFM I V 19) And a g a i n : 
"The l i c e n c e t o p l a y language-games w i t h c a r d i n a l numbers does 
not t e r m i n a t e . " (RFM A I I 5) 
To c o n c l u d e t h e n , I t h i n k t h a t t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
W i t t g e n s t e i n as a s t r i c t f i n i t i s t i s m i s t a k e n , f o r i t r e l i e s 
on a s e l e c t i v e r e a d i n g of W i t t g e n s t e i n , and f a i l s t o 
u n d e r s t a n d W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s c o n c e p t i o n of mathematics as a 
motley, or f a m i l y of p r a c t i c e s . To a l e s s e r degree, i t f a i l s 
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t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e m o t i v a t i o n b e h i n d W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s 
p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h e l e m e n t a r y r e s u l t s . I n f a c t t h e v e r y 
i d e a t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n would endorse any a l l - e m b r a c i n g t h e o r y 
of mathematics, or t h a t he would even s u g g e s t t h e r e c o u l d be 
s u c h a t h e o r y i s a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of what W i t t g e n s t e i n 
t h o u g h t f o u n d a t i o n a l s t u d i e s t o be. 
"We may not advance any k i n d of t h e o r y ... We must do 
away w i t h a l l e x p l a n a t i o n , and d e s c r i p t i o n a l o n e must t a k e i t s 
p l a c e . " ( PI 109) There can be no " p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h e o r y " 
o f mathematics, f o r p h i l o s o p h y j u s t d e s c r i b e s mathematics; 
and as mathematics i s a l w a y s b e i n g expanded and i n v e n t e d , so 
t h e p h i l o s o p h y ( d e s c r i p t i o n s ) t h e r e o f must grow and expand. 
As a p o s t s c r i p t i t i s w o r t h w h i l e t o o b s e r v e t h a t K i e l k o p f 
t r i e s t o d e v e l o p a c r i t i q u e of W i t t g e n s t e i n by a t t r i b u t i n g 
s t r i c t f i n i t i s m t o him, and t h e n c r i t i c i s i n g t h e m e t a p h y s i c s 
u n d e r l y i n g s t r i c t f i n i t i s m . K i e l k o p f s u g g e s t s t h a t the 
a c c e p t a n c e o f n e c e s s a r y t r u t h s l e a d s t o u n d e s i r a b l e 
e p i s t e m o l o g y and o n t o l o g y ; and t h a t t h e r e a r e important 
m a t h e m a t i c a l s t a t e m e n t s (eg t h e p r i n c i p l e of m a t h e m a t i c a l 
i n d u c t i o n ) t h a t cannot be r e p h r a s e d as "the X of Y i s Z". 
The d e t a i l s a r e not i m p o r t a n t , f o r i t i s s u f f i c i e n t t o 
n o t e t h a t i f W i t t g e n s t e i n i s not i n t e r p r e t e d as a s t r i c t 
f i n i t i s t , K i e l k o p f ' s c r i t i q u e , as i t s t a n d s , does not a p p l y . 
That i s not t o s a y t h a t c r i t i c i s m s of s t r i c t f i n i t i s m a r e not 
c r i t i c i s m s of W i t t g e n s t e i n , ( i n d e e d my c h a p t e r on p r o o f w i l l 
e x p l o r e some of t h e s e ) but t h a t t h e y a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y so, 
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and need t o be examined i n d i v i d u a l l y , 
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V P r o o f . 
The purpose of t h i s s e c t i o n i s t w o f o l d . F i r s t l y t o 
c o n c l u d e t h e p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n s , and i n p a r t i c u l a r t o make 
p r e c i s e t h e many r e f e r e n c e s t o p r o o f . S e c o n d l y t o i n t r o d u c e 
t h e s e c o n d s t r a n d of t h i s t h e s i s , which w i l l aim t o l o c a t e 
W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s p h i l o s o p h y of mathematics w i t h i n h i s g e n e r a l 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n . My d i s c u s s i o n of p r o o f w i l l draw on 
W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s v i e w s on language and r u l e f o l l o w i n g , and t h i s 
w i l l be groundwork f o r a more thorough e x a m i n a t i o n of the 
c o n t i n u i t y of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s l a t e r thought, 
(a) P e r s p i c u i t y and S u r v e y a b i l i t y . 
"A m a t h e m a t i c a l p r o o f must be p e r s p i c u o u s " (RFM I I 1) i s 
t h e b o l d opening of s e c t i o n two of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s Remarks on 
t h e F o u n d a t i o n s of Mathematics, and an unambiguous statement 
of h i s p o s i t i o n . But what does i t mean? A p e r s p i c u o u s 
p r o o f i s one t h a t can be t a k e n i n , comprehended as a whole, 
c l e a r l y v i e w e d i n i t s e n t i r e t y . As opposed t o p r o o f s t h a t a r e 
too long, complex or t o r t u o u s t o be t a k e n i n . These a r e not 
p e r s p i c u o u s and do not count as p r o o f s a t a l l . 
An a l t e r n a t i v e way of e x p l a i n i n g t h i s i s t o say a p r o o f 
must be r e p r o d u c i b l e . G i v e n a p r o o f and a copy, " i t must be 
p o s s i b l e t o d e c i d e w i t h c e r t a i n t y whether we r e a l l y have t h e 
same p r o o f t w i c e o v e r " . (RFM I I 1) Again a p r o o f t h a t i s too 
l o n g , complex or u n w i e l d y t o be r e p r o d u c e d w i t h c e r t a i n t y 
cannot count as a p r o o f . 
R a t h e r t h a n g i v e examples of p e r s p i c u o u s p r o o f s , 
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W i t t g e n s t e i n o f f e r s c o u n t e r - e x a m p l e s from R u s s e l l ' s P r i n c i p i a 
M a thematica. R u s s e l l ' s n o t a t i o n i s c e r t a i n l y adequate f o r 
e l e m e n t a r y p r o o f s of c a l c u l a t i o n s s u c h as 2 + 3 = 5, or 2 x 
4 = 8; but W i t t g e n s t e i n a s k s : what of "7034174 + 6594321 
= 13628495". (RFM I I 3) There i s no R u s s e l l i a n p r o o f of 
t h i s , f o r s u c h an a l l e g e d p r o o f would not be s u r v e y a b l e , ( i t 
would be too l o n g t o read) and c o u l d not be repr o d u c e d w i t h 
any degree o f c e r t a i n t y . 
A g a i n W i t t g e n s t e i n a s k s how s h o u l d we r e g a r d a R u s s e l l i a n 
p r o o f of 10^° + 1 = 10^°? Because of t h e l e n g t h and 
c o m p l e x i t y of s u c h an a l l e g e d p r o o f i t s h o u l d be d i s r e g a r d e d 
as a p r o o f , and no attempt s h o u l d be made t o show t h a t a 
p e r s o n p r o d u c i n g s u c h an a l l e g e d p r o o f must have 
m i s c a l c u l a t e d . I t would, i n f a c t , not be p o s s i b l e t o show 
t h i s . 
W i t t g e n s t e i n c o n s i d e r s a counter-argument t o t h i s : t h a t 
by i n t r o d u c i n g a r a b l e numerals and d e c i m a l n o t a t i o n , 
R u s s e l l i a n p r o o f s can be hu g e l y a b b r e v i a t e d , and o t h e r w i s e 
u n s u r v e y a b l e p r o o f s can be made a c c e s s i b l e . 
The r e p l y t o t h i s i s t h a t t h e new p r o o f i s a w h o l l y new 
e n t i t y , and not "a p a l e shadow of t h e u n s h o r t e n e d one". (RFM 
V 19) . The s h o r t e n e d p r o o f t e l l s what ought t o come out of 
t h e u n s h o r t e n e d p r o o f ; but t h i s i s a t odds w i t h t h e f a c t t h a t 
t h e R u s s e l l i a n s i g n s a r e pr i m a r y , and t h e a b b r e v i a t i o n s a r e 
d e f i n e d i n terms o f them. Hence t h e p o i n t remains t h a t l a r g e 
c a l c u l a t i o n s cannot be proved by an a p p e a l t o R u s s e l l i a n 
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symbolism, as i t i s u n s u r v e y a b l e . 
So f a r t h e n W i t t g e n s t e i n has c i t e d s u r v e y a b i l i t y or 
p e r s p i c u i t y and r e p r o d u c i b i l i t y a s c r i t e r i a f o r v a l i d p r o o f . 
A s u r v e y a b l e p r o o f can be u n d e r s t o o d as cogent i n i t s 
e n t i r e t y ; a r e p r o d u c i b l e p r o o f can be f o l l o w e d s t e p by s t e p , 
i n o r d e r t o e n s u r e t h a t two a l l e g e d l y i d e n t i c a l p r o o f s a r e i n 
f a c t s o . 
But i s t h e r e a gap h e r e ? I t would seem q u i t e p o s s i b l e 
t o be a b l e t o u n d e r s t a n d and reproduce e a c h s t a g e i n a proof, 
t o comprehend e a c h s t e p , but not t o be a b l e t o g r a s p t h e 
whole. I n o r d e r t o c l o s e t h i s gap, and t o e n a b l e d e c i s i o n s 
t o be made about whether a p r o o f i s s u r v e y a b l e , W i t t g e n s t e i n 
i n t r o d u c e s t h e n o t i o n t h a t c a u s a l i t y p l a y s no p a r t i n p r o o f . 
That i s t o s a y t h a t i t i s not enough t o s i m p l y u n d e r s t a n d t h e 
s t e p s i n a p r o o f , and t o a c c e p t t h e r e s u l t a s c a u s a l l y 
dependent on t h e s e ; we must be a b l e t o repr o d u c e " e v e r y s t e p 
and t h e r e s u l t . " (RFM I I 55) We must have a concept of how 
a c e r t a i n p r o c e d u r e ought t o r e s u l t , not j u s t how i t w i l l 
r e s u l t . 
Hence our n a i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of r e p r o d u c i b i l i t y i s 
e n l a r g e d so t h a t we know why and how a c e r t a i n p r o c e d u r e 
y i e l d s r e s u l t s r a t h e r t h a n i t s i m p l y does! The gap between 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n d i v i d u a l s t e p s i n a p r o o f and u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
t h e whole p r o o f i s c l o s e d . 
As a r e s u l t of t h i s t h e r e i s no d i f f e r e n c e between 
c h e c k i n g t h e r e a s o n i n g of a p r o o f and c h e c k i n g t h a t i t has 
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been c a r r i e d out p r o p e r l y . Because t h e "how" of t h e p r o o f 
i s known, t h e former c o l l a p s e s i n t o t h e l a t t e r , f o r t h e r e i s 
no doubt t h a t t h e p r o o f w i l l be c a r r i e d out p r o p e r l y , 
(b) As a m o d i f y i n g c o n c e p t . 
W i t t g e n s t e i n saw a p r o o f as m o d i f y i n g our u n d e r s t a n d i n g : 
a s e s t a b l i s h i n g new c o n n e c t i o n s between c o n c e p t s where 
f o r m e r l y t h e r e were none. The r e a s o n f o r t h i s , W i t t g e n s t e i n 
a r g u e s , i s t h a t u n l e s s a p r o o f p r o v i d e s new c o n n e c t i o n s , 
e n a b l e s us t o r e c o g n i z e new r e l e v a n c e of p a r t i c u l a r 
s t a t e m e n t s , t h e n a p r o o f has done n o t h i n g . As a r e s u l t of 
a p r o o f our u n d e r s t a n d i n g must develop, and t h e s e n s e or 
s i g n i f i c a n c e a t t a c h e d t o c e r t a i n s t a t e m e n t s must change. 
P r o o f m o d i f i e s our u n d e r s t a n d i n g of c o n c e p t s . 
T h i s i s h i g h l y c o u n t e r - i n t u i t i v e , f o r we t e n d t o t h i n k 
o f a p r o o f a s c o m p e l l i n g , " b u n d l i n g us a l o n g " from assumptions 
t o c o n c l u s i o n s . I n a v a l i d p r o o f we have no o p t i o n but t o 
move from s t a g e t o s t a g e , and we cannot choose t o s i m p l y 
r e j e c t a s t a g e i n a p r o o f as f a n c y t a k e s us! But 
W i t t g e n s t e i n i s s u g g e s t i n g j u s t t h i s . At any s t a g e i n a 
p r o o f we have t h e o p t i o n whether t o a c c e p t t h e next s t a g e ; 
or even t o a c c e p t a l l t h e s t a g e s i n a p r o o f and r e j e c t t h e 
c o n c l u s i o n . T h i s o p t i o n d e r i v e s from our c h o i c e whether t o 
e s t a b l i s h new c o n c e p t s , new c o n n e c t i o n s , new meanings and 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g s a t any s t a g e . 
W i t t g e n s t e i n e x p r e s s e s t h i s i n s e v e r a l ways. "When I 
s a y a p r o o f i n t r o d u c e s a new concept, I meant something l i k e : 
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a p r o o f p u t s a new paradigm among t h e paradigms of language; 
l i k e when someone mixes a s p e c i a l r e d d i s h - b l u e , somehow 
s e t t l e s t h e s p e c i a l m i x t u r e of c o l o u r s and g i v e s i t a name." 
(RFM I I 31) And a g a i n : "Do not look on a p r o o f as a 
p r o c e d u r e w h i c h compels you, but as one which g u i d e s you - and 
what i t g u i d e s i s your c o n c e p t i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n " . 
(RFM I I I 30) And many o t h e r s . 
But t h e r e i s a d i f f i c u l t y w i t h a l l t h i s . I f a p r o o f 
a l t e r s a p r o p o s i t i o n ' s s e n s e , i t does not prove what t h e 
p r o p o s i t i o n o r i g i n a l l y meant, and the n o t i o n o f m o d i f i c a t i o n 
i s pushed beyond e x p l a n a t i o n . 
W i t t g e n s t e i n i s aware of t h i s . He s a y s : "Of c o u r s e , 
some p e o p l e would oppose t h i s and say 'Then t h e p r o o f of a 
p r o p o s i t i o n cannot e v e r be found, f o r i f i t has been found i t 
i s no l o n g e r t h e p r o o f of t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n . " . (RFM V 7) 
C r i s p i n Wright e l a b o r a t e s t h e p o i n t . ( W r i g h t 1980 pp44-
46) Suppose a s e n t e n c e S i s prov e d and i t s s e n s e i s m o d i f i e d 
by t h e p r o o f . The q u e s t i o n t h e n i s : what d i d S mean b e f o r e 
t h e p r o o f ? Suppose f u r t h e r t h a t t h e r e i s a st a t e m e n t T t h a t 
e x p r e s s e s a f t e r t h e p r o o f what S e x p r e s s e d b e f o r e h a n d . Now 
i s T p r o v e d by t h e p r o o f of S? I f not, i t was a m i s t a k e t o 
a c c e p t t h e p r o o f of S, f o r i f i t proved S i t s h o u l d a l s o prove 
T. On t h e o t h e r hand i f we a c c e p t t h e p r o o f o f S as a 
p r o o f o f T, T must now e x p r e s s what S now e x p r e s s e s , and 
cannot be what S f o r m e r l y meant. That i s , i f T i s proved by 
t h e p r o o f o f S, i t s s e n s e w i l l be m o d i f i e d by t h e p r o o f and 
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w i l l now e x p r e s s what S now e x p r e s s e s . 
T here i s no way t o e x p r e s s what a p r o o f proved, and hence 
i t must be i m p o s s i b l e t o prove a n y t h i n g . W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s 
r e t o r t i s t h a t , " t o s a y t h i s i s so f a r t o say n o t h i n g a t a l l " . 
(RFM V 7) T h i s p o i n t d e r i v e s from W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s c h a l l e n g e 
t o our normal ways of t h i n k i n g , i n p a r t i c u l a r h i s v i e w s on 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g and r u l e f o l l o w i n g . F i r s t l y t h e r e i s no s e n s e 
i n w h i c h our u n d e r s t a n d i n g of a p r o o f and i t s c o n c l u s i o n s 
compel us t o a c c e p t t h e p r o o f . But even a c c e p t i n g t h i s , t h e 
argument above s t i l l h o l d s . I t i s b a s e d on what Wright c a l l s 
t h e synonymy p r i n c i p l e : " t h a t a p r o o f of any statement i s 
eo i p s o a p r o o f o f any synonymous s t a t e m e n t " . (Wright 1980 
p45) and we i n s t i n c t i v e l y b e l i e v e t h i s must be so. 
But W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s second p o i n t i s t h a t a n t i - r e a l i s t r u l e 
f o l l o w i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o b l i g e a new a t t i t u d e t o the 
p r i n c i p l e . Synonymy o n l y d e r i v e s from a r e a d i n e s s t o use two 
d i f f e r e n t e x p r e s s i o n s i n t h e same c o n t e x t t o mean t h e same 
t h i n g - but we a r e f r e e t o choose. W i t t g e n s t e i n can s i m p l y 
s a y t h a t he i s not p r e p a r e d t o a c c e p t W r i g h t ' s statement T as 
e x p r e s s i n g what S u s e d t o mean, or he can r e f u s e t o a c c e p t the 
p r o o f of S as a p r o o f of T. Our a t t i t u d e t o S and T i s a 
f r e e c h o i c e , depending on what we now choose t o be synonymous. 
So i f t h e synonymy p r i n c i p l e f a i l s , W r i g h t ' s r e d u c t i o ad 
absurdum c o n c e r n i n g S and T f a i l s , and as W i t t g e n s t e i n s a y s : 
we have p r o v e d n o t h i n g . Once r e a l i s t o b j e c t i v i t y i s 
r e j e c t e d , t h e way i s paved f o r W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s view of p r o o f 
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as a m o d i f y i n g c o n c e p t . Much more c o u l d be s a i d on t h i s 
i s s u e , but t h a t would t a k e us beyond t h e p r e s e n t scope, and 
I l e t my d i s c u s s i o n s t a n d as i t i s . (See remarks t o f o l l o w on 
r u l e f o l l o w i n g and p h i l o s o p h y of mind.) 
(c) As a r u l e of grammar. 
C l o s e l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e i d e a t h a t a p r o o f m o d i f i e s 
c o n c e p t s i s t h e i d e a t h a t a p r o o f i s a new r u l e of grammar. 
We have s e e n t h a t f o r W i t t g e n s t e i n t h e m a t h e m a t i c i a n " c r e a t e s 
e s s e n c e " ; but not ex N i h i l o . "He d e p o s i t s what belongs t o 
e s s e n c e i n t h e paradigms of language." (RFM I 32) That i s , 
m a t hematics o n l y has s e n s e i n t h e c o n t e x t of language, and i n 
p r o v i n g a p a r t i c u l a r r e s u l t we agree t o use language i n a 
p a r t i c u l a r way. We f i x a r u l e of grammar, or a c o n v e n t i o n 
f o r t h e use o f language. 
C l e a r l y W i t t g e n s t e i n does not see t h i s i n an i n d i v i d u a l , 
but a s a communal a c t i v i t y . I t i s g e n e r a l agreement w i t h a 
p a r t i c u l a r r e s u l t t h a t e s t a b l i s h e s i t as a new r u l e ; and i n 
s o p h i s t i c a t e d s o c i e t i e s where t h e r e a r e s p e c i a l i s t s i n v a r i o u s 
f i e l d s , t h e agreement of t h e s p e c i a l i s t s i s a c o n d i t i o n f o r 
t h e a d o p t i o n of t h e new r u l e . 
W i t t g e n s t e i n i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s i n v a r i o u s ways. I n 
l e c t u r e t w e n t y - s i x he s a y s "'30 x 30 = 90' i s not a statement 
about any r e a l i t y , or about 30, but about our c a l c u l u s . Taken 
by i t s e l f i t has no meaning, but w i t h i n a g r a m m a t i c a l c o n t e x t 
we a r e a b l e t o use i t . Compare how you v e i r i f y ' 30 x 30 = 
900' and ' I have 30 h a n d k e r c h i e f s ' t o see t h e d i f e r e n c e . " 
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(LFM p 250-251) 
A g a i n W i t t g e n s t e i n d i s c u s s e s an example from John Wisdom, 
who when f i r s t t o l d 3 x 0 = 0 d i s a g r e e d ; and wanted t o say 
3 x 0 = 3. F o r t h r e e cows m u l t i p l i e d by z e r o , a r e not 
m u l t i p l i e d a t a l l , and a r e hence s t i l l t h r e e ! W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s 
p o i n t i s t h a t t h e r e i s n o t h i n g i n t r i n s i c a l l y wrong w i t h t h i s , 
and i t c o u l d be adopted. However as i t c o n f l i c t s w i t h a 
p r e v i o u s l y adopted r u l e of grammar (the c o n v e n t i o n f o r 
m u l t i p l y i n g by one) i t i s of l i t t l e use, and t h e community 
does not g a i n by a c c e p t i n g i t . ( c f LFM p 135) 
A more e l a b o r a t e example comes from Dummett. We use 
E r a t o s t h e n e s ' S i e v e t o d e t e r m i n e whether a g i v e n i n t e g e r i s 
prime, by t r y i n g t o d i v i d e a l l s m a l l e r p r i m e s i n t o t h e g i v e n 
i n t e g e r . Suppose a f a n a t i c devoted h i s l i f e t o p r o v i n g t h e 
p r i m a l i t y o f a huge i n t e g e r N, by means of t h e s i e v e . 
Suppose a l s o we have a more p o w e r f u l a l g e b r a i c c r i t e r i o n by 
w h i c h we show N t o be c o m p o s i t e . We abandon t h e f a n a t i c ' s 
r e s u l t as i t i s u n s u r v e y a b l e and u n r e l i a b l e and a c c e p t the 
a l g e b r a i c r e s u l t as c o r r e c t . 
However i n d o i n g t h i s t h e n o t i o n of p r i m a l i t y has been 
changed. The a l g e b r a i c c r i t e r i o n has r e p l a c e d t h e s i e v e 
c r i t e r i o n , and t h e " s i e v e r u l e of grammar" has been r e p l a c e d 
by an " a l g e b r a i c r u l e of grammar." By a d o p t i n g t h e a l g e b r a i c 
p r o o f t h a t N i s composite, we have i m p l i c i t l y a c c e p t e d a new 
c r i t e r i o n , a new r u l e of grammar, and t h e s e n s e of "prime" has 
been changed. 
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S i m i l a r l y f o r p e r f e c t numbers which a r e e q u a l t o the sum 
o f t h e i r f a c t o r s (eg 6 = 1 + 2 + 3 ) . I t i s an unanswered 
q u e s t i o n whether t h e r e a r e any odd p e r f e c t numbers. What i s 
c e r t a i n , i s t h a t i f t h e r e were an odd p e r f e c t number i t would 
be huge, and c o u l d not be shown t o be p e r f e c t by c a l c u l a t i n g 
i t s f a c t o r s and adding them up. A new c r i t e r i o n of 
p e r f e c t i o n , a new r u l e of grammar would have t o be i n t r o d u c e d 
i n t h e p r o o f , and t h e term " p e r f e c t " would be g i v e n a new 
s e n s e . 
Without g o i n g i n t o d e t a i l s , i t i s w o r t h w h i l e t o observe 
t h e c o n n e c t i o n between t h e n o t i o n of p r o o f as a r u l e of 
grammar and t h e i d e a of t h e autonomy of grammar t h a t Baker and 
Hacker a t t r i b u t e t o W i t t g e n s t e i n . I t i s an i d e a m a i n l y 
d e v e l o p e d i n t h e I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , a l t h o u g h remarks i n the 
P h i l o s o p h i c a l Grammar and Z e t t e l a r e c l o s e l y r e l a t e d . 
T h e r e a r e two main e l e m e n t s t o t h e d o c t r i n e . F i r s t l y 
t h a t g r a m m a t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s do not answer t o f a c t s . 
"Grammar i s not a c c o u n t a b l e t o any r e a l i t y . I t i s 
g r a m m a t i c a l r u l e s t h a t d e t e r m i n e meaning ( c o n s t i t u t e i t ) and 
so t h e y t h e m s e l v e s a r e not a n s w e r a b l e t o any meaning and t o 
t h a t e x t e n t a r e a r b i t r a r y " . (PG p l 8 4 ) The e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e 
meaning of a p r o p o s i t i o n i s g i v e n by showing ( e x p l a i n i n g ) by 
example, how i t i s u s e d . P r o o f s , l i k e r u l e s of grammar, 
e s t a b l i s h new l i n k s new r u l e s ; and i t i s t h e 
" i n t r a l i n g u i s t i c " e x p l a n a t i o n - f o r us t h e showing of what a 
p r o o f does and how i t changes our f u t u r e mathematics - t h a t 
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g i v e s i t i t s s e n s e and meaning. 
The s e c o n d s t r a n d of t h e d o c t r i n e i s t h a t g r a m m a t i c a l 
p r o p o s i t i o n s a r e m u t u a l l y independent. We c o n s t r u c t new 
c o n n e c t i o n s as and where we w i s h . We l a y down new r u l e s , as 
a p p l i c a t i o n demands; but t h e a d o p t i o n or r e j e c t i o n of a 
p a r t i c u l a r r u l e has no b e a r i n g on whether a d i f f e r e n t r u l e 
( g r a m m a t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n ) s h o u l d be adopted. T h i s p o i n t i s 
h a r d e r t o g r a s p , but s i n c e we adopt p r o o f s by c o n v e n t i o n : t o 
a c t o r s e r v e as a l i n g u i s t i c or g r a m m a t i c a l norm, then t h e r e 
i s no c o m p u l s i o n of any k i n d on u s ; and hence we (the 
community) a r e f r e e t o adopt r u l e s ( p r o o f s ) as we choose. 
E a c h one i n d i v i d u a l l y , and so r u l e s ( p r o o f s ) a r e m u t u a l l y 
i n d e p e n d e n t . 
(d) The n e c e s s i t y of p r o o f . 
On t h e one hand we have seen t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n c l a i m e d 
we a r e f r e e t o a c c e p t or r e j e c t any p r o o f . "The laws of 
i n f e r e n c e do not compel him t o say or w r i t e such and such l i k e 
r a i l s c o m p e l l i n g a l o c o m o t i v e . " (RFM I 116) But on t h e o t h e r 
hand W i t t g e n s t e i n c l a i m s p r o o f s a r e n e c e s s a r i l y t r u e , and I 
am o b l i g e d t o a c c e p t them. "Don't I have t o f i n d i t (the 
p r o o f ) a c c e p t a b l e ? Why do you say have t o ? Because a t t h e 
end of t h e p r o o f you say eg: Yes I have t o a c c e p t t h i s 
c o n c l u s i o n " (RFM I 33) Again, "A p r o o f l e a d s me t o say t h i s 
must be l i k e t h i s . " (RFM V 30) And combining t h e two: "He 
must admit i t - and a l l t h e time i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t he does 
not admit i t ! " (RFM I 51) 
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These c o n f l i c t i n g v i e w s seem a c l e a r c a s e of paradox. 
The i d e a of b e i n g c o m p e l l e d by proof, and b e i n g a b l e t o choose 
t o a c c e p t a p r o o f , s i d e by s i d e . What i s t o be made of 
W i t t g e n s t e i n h e r e , i s he t a l k i n g nonsense? 
I f we a c c e p t a p o s i t i v i s t / c o n v e n t i o n a l i s t account of t h e 
n e c e s s i t y o f p r o p o s i t i o n s , t h e n i t would seem y e s . I n the 
p r e f a c e t o Language, T r u t h and L o g i c . Ayer w r i t e s . [A p r i o r i 
p r o p o s i t i o n s ] " a r e d i s t i n g u i s h e d a l s o by b e i n g n e c e s s a r y , 
whereas l i n g u i s t i c r u l e s a r e a r b i t r a r y . At t h e same time i f 
t h e y a r e n e c e s s a r y i t i s o n l y b e c a u s e t h e r e l e v a n t l i n g u i s t i c 
r u l e s a r e p r e - s u p p o s e d ... i n R u s s e l l ' s and Whithead's system 
o f l o g i c , i t i s a c o n t i n g e n t , e m p i r i c a l f a c t t h a t the s i g n 
s h o u l d be g i v e n t h e meaning t h a t i t h a s ; . . . but g i v e n t h e s e 
r u l e s , t h e a p r i o r i p r o p o s i t i o n p —5>(q—=>q) i s n e c e s s a r i l y 
t r u e . " (P 23) 
I n o t h e r words, once we have a g r e e d upon t h e meaning of 
our terms, and t h e way t h e y a r e t o be used, we cannot escape 
t h e f a c t t h a t some p r o p o s i t i o n s w i l l be n e c e s s a r i l y t r u e , 
s o l e l y i n v i r t u e of s y n t a x and s e m a n t i c s . Now W i t t g e n s t e i n 
would a g r e e t o f i x i n g meanings, r u l e s f o r b u i l d i n g 
p r o p o s i t i o n s e t c . , but would not agree t h a t we a r e t h e n bound 
t o a c c e p t n e c e s s a r y t r u t h s s o l e l y i n v i r t u e of t h e s e meanings 
and r u l e s . i . e . W i t t g e n s t e i n does not a c c e p t t h e p o s i t i v i s t 
a c c o u n t o f t h e n e c e s s i t y of p r o p o s i t i o n s . 
F o r W i t t g e n s t e i n , n e c e s s i t y d e r i v e s from communal 
p r a c t i c e . I f a p r o p o s i t i o n i s t a k e n as t r u e , and i f 
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f u r t h e r m o r e t h e community agree not t o l e t a n y t h i n g count 
a g a i n s t i t , t h e n i t becomes a n e c e s s a r y t r u t h : i e n e c e s s a r y 
i n v i r t u e of t h e a g r e e d l i n g u i s t i c and g r a m m a t i c a l 
c o n v e n t i o n s . "To a c c e p t a p r o p o s i t i o n as u n s h a k e a b l y c e r t a i n 
- I want t o s a y - means t o use i t as a g r a m m a t i c a l r u l e : t h i s 
removes u n c e r t a i n t y from i t . " (RFM I I 39) 
The " must" o f : I must a c c e p t t h e c o n c l u s i o n , d o e s not 
d e r i v e from meanings or c o n j u n c t i o n s of t h e terms t h e m s e l v e s , 
but d e r i v e s from our c h o i c e of employing axioms, terms, 
c o n j u n c t i o n s i n a p a r t i c u l a r way. I f we choose t o a c c e p t a 
p r o p o s i t i o n p as u n q u e s t i o n a b l y t r u e , t h e n p i s n e c e s s a r i l y 
t r u e , and t h e r e i s n o t h i n g more t o s a y . 
But t h e r e i s an obvious o b j e c t i o n t o a l l t h i s - i f 
n e c e s s i t y j u s t d e r i v e s from c h o i c e , anybody c o u l d choose 
a n y t h i n g , and any p r o p o s i t i o n c o u l d end up n e c e s s a r i l y t r u e ! 
"Then a c c o r d i n g t o you, everybody c o u l d c o n t i n u e as he l i k e s , 
and so i n f e r anyhow." (RFM I 116) S u r e l y W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s 
a c c o u n t of n e c e s s i t y i s not a c c e p t a b l e ? 
W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s r e p l y i s t o be found i n h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
of 'our form of l i f e ' . An i d e a we s h a l l r e t u r n t o , but 
l o o s e l y we o n l y choose c o n v e n t i o n s t h a t y i e l d c o r r e c t 
m a t h e m a t i c s ; and c o r r e c t mathematics i s t h a t which has 
a p p l i c a t i o n and i s shown t o work i n e v e r y d a y l i f e . Our 
p r a c t i c e s , a l t h o u g h chosen, a r e not s i m p l y a r b i t r a r y : they 
a r e t h e ones t h a t prove s u c c e s s f u l i n a p p l i c a t i o n . The 
'must' i n mathematics u l t i m a t e l y d e r i v e s from t h e way we 
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behave. Our s u r r o u n d i n g s , t r a i n i n g , c u l t u r e - our form of 
l i f e - d i c t a t e how we do our mathematics, and t h i s i n t u r n 
d i c t a t e s t h e c o n v e n t i o n s we use and t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s we a c c e p t 
a s n e c e s s a r y , 
(e) P r o o f by i n d u c t i o n . 
To c o n c l u d e t h i s d i s c u s s i o n by d i s c u s s i n g W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s 
comments on p r o o f by i n d u c t i o n i s t o b r e a k away from t h e 
c o u r s e of t h e d i s c u s s i o n so f a r ; but W i t t g e n s t e i n engages i n 
a l o n g d i s c u s s i o n of p r o o f by i n d u c t i o n a t t h e end of t h e 
P h i l o s o p h i c a l Grammar, and some mention of i t must be made. 
D e s p i t e t h e l e n g t h of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s d i s c u s s i o n t h e p o i n t 
he wants t o e s t a b l i s h i s s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . The s e n s e of t h e 
word " p r o o f " i n t h e two e x p r e s s i o n s "proof by i n d u c t i o n " and 
" p r o o f of a f o r m u l a " i s d i f f e r e n t . He s a y s i t i s c r u c i a l t o 
d i s t i n g u i s h between p r o v i n g a formula, where we imagine a 
sequence of a l g e b r a i c m a n i p u l a t i o n s t e r m i n a t i n g i n t h e formula 
t o be p r o v e d . And p r o o f by i n d u c t i o n , where t h e p r o p o s i t i o n 
t o be p r o v e d does not o c c u r i n t h e p r o o f i t s e l f . 
E x a m i n i n g a p r o o f by i n d u c t i o n r e v e a l s t h a t we prove a 
g i v e n f o r m u l a f o r a g i v e n c a s e , n = 1 s a y ; t h e n we prove t h a t 
we can i n f e r from t h e f a c t t h a t t h e f o r m u l a h o l d s f o r an 
a r b i t r a r y n = k, t o t h e f a c t t h a t i t h o l d s f o r n = k + 1 ; 
and we c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e f o r m u l a h o l d s f o r a l l n. (by 
m a t h e m a t i c a l i n d u c t i o n ) The f i r s t two s t a g e s a r e p r o o f s i n 
t h e normal s e n s e of p r o v i n g a formula, but t h e l a s t s t a g e , t h e 
a p p e a l t o i n d u c t i o n , i s a s p u r i o u s use of t h e word "proof". 
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He says there i s no e x t r a step, no concluding stage i n the 
proof. " I n t h i s case here i s no t h e r e f o r e . The proof i s 
a l l t h ere i s , i t i s not a mere v e h i c l e " (WWK p 112) "The 
equations do assert something (they don't prove anything i n 
the sense i n which they are proved)" (PG p 397) "The 
c o n s t r u c t i o n of the i n d u c t i o n i s not a proof, but a c e r t a i n 
arrangement of proofs (a p a t t e r n i n the sense of an ornament)" 
(PG p 399) 
For W i t t g e n s t e i n a proof by i n d u c t i o n j u s t gives us a 
p a r t i c u l a r i n s i g h t , "allows us t o see an i n f i n i t e g e n e r a l i t y " . 
(WWK p 135) "We are not saying t h a t when f ( 1 ) holds and f ( c 
+ 1) f o l l o w s from f ( c ) , the p r o p o s i t i o n f ( x ) i s th e r e f o r e t r u e 
f o r a l l c a r d i n a l numbers; but "the p r o p o s i t i o n holds f o r a l l 
c a r d i n a l numbers" means " i t holds f o r X = 1, and f (c + 1) 
f o l l o w s from f ( c ) " " (PG p 406) 
Perhaps the p o i n t seems pedantic, but i f a proof i s a new 
r u l e of grammar, a new conceptual l i n k , d e r i v i n g i t s necessity 
from agreed communal p r a c t i c e ; then i t cannot also be a type 
of proof p a t t e r n . The proof-of-a-formula sense and proof by 
i n d u c t i o n must be kept separate. The expression "proof by 
i n d u c t i o n " i s no more than a convenient l o c u t i o n t o explain 
what i s meant, and what proof patterns are employed when a 
p a r t i c u l a r k i n d of mathematical formula i s spoken of. 
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VI Language Games and Forms of L i f e . 
Despite the importance of language games i n h i s l a t e r 
philosophy, W i t t g e n s t e i n , c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y , does not give 
any d e f i n i t i o n of language game. I n the Blue Book and ear l y 
i n the Ph i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s he generally associates 
simple languages w i t h language games, and emphasizes the 
process of l e a r n i n g a language. 
"We can also t h i n k of the whole process of using words 
i n (2) as one of these games by means of which c h i l d r e n learn 
t h e i r n a t i v e language. I w i l l c a l l these games "language-
games", and w i l l sometimes speak of a p r i m i t i v e language as 
a language game." (PI 7) I n h i s l a t e r work Wittgenstein uses 
the term i n a much wider sense, and i t i s only through 
Wittgenstein's examples and a p p l i c a t i o n s t h a t we can see what 
he means,i.e. what h i s conception of a language game i s . 
A f i r s t i n s i g h t comes from the theory of language i n the 
Tractatus, and r e a l i z i n g what a language game i s not! In the 
Tractatus we f i n d a formal language system, e x p l a i n i n g the 
c o n s t r u c t i o n of p r o p o s i t i o n s and c l e a r l y d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g sense 
from nonsense. The conception of the language game replaces 
t h i s r i g i d i t y and f o r m a l i t y by a more v a r i a b l e and f l e x i b l e 
understanding of language used i n context. 
I n the Tractatus, language i s a p i c t u r e of the world. 
Atomic p r o p o s i t i o n s p i c t u r e atomic f a c t s , and l o g i c a l 
complexes of atomic p r o p o s i t i o n s represent possible states of 
a f f a i r s . The complex i s a p i c t u r e of r e a l i t y , or of a 
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p o s s i b l e s t a t e of a f f a i r s : t r u e i f t h i s s t a t e obtains, f a l s e 
i f i t does not. Propositions that do not p i c t u r e a po s s i b l e 
s t a t e of a f f a i r s are nonsense. 
The important point i n t h i s b r i e f account i s that the 
Tr a c t a t u s language i s r i g i d , made up from elementary u n i t s 
t h a t can only be conjoined i n c e r t a i n ways. There are no 
a l t e r n a t i v e s , and any propositions not accounted for by the 
so c a l l e d p i c t u r e theory are nonsense. 
There are many reasons why Wittgenstein came to r e j e c t 
t h i s theory, but they do not concern us here. The new idea 
was t h a t language could be understood by analogy with a game, 
the v a r i e t y of games r e f l e c t i n g the v a r i e t y of ways i n which 
language i s used. 
An e a r l y example of t h i s occurs i n a conversation between 
Wittgenstein and Waismann, recorded i n : Wittgenstein and the 
Vienna C i r c l e . From Frege we have the suggestion that 
a r i t h m e t i c i s j u s t about signs, ink marks on paper; or that 
i t i s about something that the signs represent, namely 
numbers. Wittgenstein argues that t h i s i s a f a l s e dichotomy, 
and i l l u s t r a t e s h i s point with a chess analogy. The game 
chess i s not about chess p i e c e s . " I f I say: "Now I w i l l 
make myself a queen with very f r i g h t e n i n g eyes, she w i l l drive 
everyone o f f the board," you w i l l laugh." (WWK p 104). On 
the other hand chess p i e c e s do not symbolize or represent 
anything, they have no Bedeutung. The p i e c e s i n chess take 
on a meaning, only because of the r u l e s of the game as a 
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whole. S i m i l a r l y signs i n a r i t h m e t i c are only meaningful i n 
the context of the ru l e s and conventions of the language game 
a r i t h m e t i c , 
W i t t g e n s t e i n develops h i s idea i n the Philosophical 
Grammar, discussing at some length the comparison between 
a r i t h m e t i c and a game; and he says: "What we do i n games 
must correspond t o what we do i n c a l c u l a t i n g , " (PG p 290) 
There are two important p o i n t s here: F i r s t l y , on 
Wittgenstein's view, both a r i t h m e t i c and games are governed 
by r u l e s which are a r b i t r a r y . I n chess or a r i t h m e t i c there 
i s no compulsion t o adopt a p a r t i c u l a r system, and i n 
p a r t i c u l a r , no j u s t i f i c a t i o n derives from reference t o 
r e a l i t y . The r u l e s are autonomous, and could be d i f f e r e n t , 
but t h i s would change the game. For example i f i t was agreed 
t h a t black should always s t a r t a game of chess, t h a t would be 
p e r f e c t l y s a t i s f a c t o r y , but the game would not be chess. 
Secondly i t i s the a p p l i c a t i o n of a system, a language 
game, t h a t i s a l l important. Our a p p l i c a t i o n of a r i t h m e t i c 
d i c t a t e s which r u l e s we should adopt, and how we should use 
them t o y i e l d u s e f u l r e s u l t s . C r u c i a l l y a game has no 
a p p l i c a t i o n , and so there i s no place f o r a f f i r m a t i o n and 
negation, t r u t h and f a l s i t y . W ittgenstein says t h a t the 
person who has been taught a r i t h m e t i c as a game, and does the 
c a l c u l a t i o n 21 x 8 = 168 as a move i n the game; i s doing 
something very d i f f e r e n t , and has a d i f f e r e n t a t t i t u d e , t o the 
person who wants t o know what 21 x 8 i s , f o r p r a c t i c a l 
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purposes. (cf PG p 290-291) The lack of a p p l i c a t i o n , 
and the absence of t r u t h and f a l s i t y i n a game, leads 
W i t t g e n s t e i n t o say " a r i t h m e t i c i s n ' t a game." (PG p 293) In 
a r i t h m e t i c we are concerned w i t h t r u t h , and i n games we are 
not concerned w i t h abstract t r u t h at a l l . C e r t a i n l y " I t 
would not occur t o anyone t o include a r i t h m e t i c i n a l i s t of 
games played by human beings." ( i b i d ) However, both are 
based on convention, and the nature of a r i t h m e t i c can be 
c l a r i f i e d by drawing out i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o a game. 
Wittgenstein's analogy between a r i t h m e t i c and chess seems 
t o s u c c e s s f u l l y avoid the dichotomy t h a t Frege posed,since i t 
i l l u s t r a t e s t h a t a r i t h m e t i c i s not e s s e n t i a l l y about anything. 
I t i s a mistake t o look f o r the subject matter of a r i t h m e t i c 
j u s t as i t i s c l e a r l y a mistake t o look f o r the subject matter 
of chess. Frege i s mistaken i n asking: what i s a r i t h m e t i c 
about? 
A f i n a l p o i n t made by Wittgenstein and a m p l i f i e d by 
Wi t t g e n s t e i n i s t h a t i t i s not s u f f i c i e n t t o simply win a 
game, but i t must also be possible t o recognize a win. A 
t r u e mathematical statement i s worthless unless i t can be 
shown t o be t r u e , so winning must be akin t o proving a 
statement. This involves recognizing and i n t e r p r e t i n g a 
p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n , and then proceeding by rul e s which 
govern the theory of the game, i n an appropriate way. 
Having sai d t h i s much, we must not be misled, and t h i n k 
of language only i n terms of an agreed calcu l u s . There are 
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p r o p e r t i e s of formal systems (eg chess) t h a t are not t o be 
found i n language, and a broader concept of language-game 
needs t o be developed. The misleading features of the chess-
type model are : 
( i ) i t suggests a system of rul e s t o cover a l l possible 
cases, whereas language does not have clear cut boundaries and 
r u l e s , 
( i i ) i t leads us t o t h i n k of an i d e a l syntax, 'a l o g i c a l 
form' t h a t can be displayed; whereas there i s no such form, 
( i i i ) We cannot adapt the formal system t o explain how 
we use r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t explanations f o r one and the same 
expression, 
( i v ) i t suggests a p o t e n t i a l gap between formal, ' i n t r a -
c a l c u l u s ' explanations of meaning, and everyday, ordinary 
explanations of l i n g u i s t i c p r a c t i c e . That i s : i t provokes 
a tens i o n between a "proper" explanation of language based on 
formal r u l e s e t c . ; and a "casual" explanation, when i n f a c t 
t h i s t e n s i o n does not e x i s t . 
To avoid these misleading features, Wittgenstein 
emphasizes the analogy between the v a r i e t y of l i n g u i s t i c 
p r a c t i c e , and the v a r i e t y of games. Some games have s t r i c t 
r u l e s , some games have loose r u l e s . Some are competitive, 
some are not; some are played by teams, others not e t c . 
Even games governed by rul e s leave some questions open, as f o r 
example there i s no r u l e i n tennis t o say how high one should 
throw the b a l l before serving. Our d i f f e r e n t uses of 
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language r e f l e c t the v a r i e t y of game, and a d i f f e r e n t system 
of language -language game - i s appropriate at d i f f e r e n t 
times. Compare doing a r i t h m e t i c , t e l l i n g jokes, praying 
e t c . . 
To express t h i s more s u c c i n c t l y , Wittgenstein develops 
the n o t i o n of f a m i l y resemblance, i n i t i a l l y f o r games, and f o r 
language ames as a c o r o l l a r y . Wittgenstein asks: what 
defines "game", or what do a l l games have i n common? He 
suggests various answers t o t h i s question, but f o r each one, 
also supplies a counter-example: i e a game t h a t does not f i t 
the Merkmal d e f i n i t i o n , the supposed necessary and s u f f i c i e n t 
c o n d i t i o n s f o r an a c t i v i t y t o be a game. As a r e s u l t he 
concludes t h a t there i s no s i n g l e property common t o them a l l , 
only " s i m i l a r i t i e s , r e l a t i o n s h i p s ... overlapping and c r i s s -
crossing; sometimes o v e r a l l s i m i l a r i t i e s , sometimes 
s i m i l a r i t i e s of d e t a i l " . (PI 66) I t i s these s i m i l a r i t i e s 
t h a t he c a l l s f a m i l y resemblance, and he says: "games form 
a f a m i l y " . ( P I 67) 
He a n t i c i p a t e s an o b j e c t i o n : "Don't say, "there must be 
something common, or they would not be c a l l e d "games"" - but 
look and see whether there i s anything common t o a l l . " (PI 66) 
"What t i e s the ship t o the Wharf i s a rope, and the rope 
con s i s t s of f i b r e s , but i t does not get i t s strength from any 
f i b r e t h a t runs through i t from one end t o the other, but from 
the f a c t t h a t there i s a vast number of f i b r e s 
overlapping."(BB p87) 
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W i t t g e n s t e i n gives a long l i s t of the " m u l t i p l i c i t y of 
language games": 
"Giving orders and obeying them. 
Describing the appearance of an object or g i v i n g i t s 
measurements, 
Constructing an object from a d e s c r i p t i o n (or drawing). 
Reporting an event. 
Speculating about an event." e t c . e t c . . (PI 23) 
In a d d i t i o n t o fa m i l y resemblance p r o p e r t i e s , the other 
c r u c i a l s i m i l a r i t y between language and games i s t h a t both 
r e l y on r u l e s . I n as much as games are bounded by r u l e s , 
but not everywhere; ( i t does not matter what colour sweaters 
g o l f players wear) so s i m i l a r l y language i s bounded, but not 
d i c t a t e d by r u l e s . I have, f o r example, a degree of choice 
i n r e p l y i n g t o a given question. Furthermore, r u l e , l i k e 
game, i s a f a m i l y resemblance term; and Wittgenstein does not 
t h i n k of r u l e s as an i n v i o l a t e canon from which there can be 
no d e v i a t i o n . 
Given t h i s new understanding of language, Wittgenstein 
i s able t o give a new c r i t e r i o n t o d i s t i n g u i s h between sense 
and nonsense, Wit t g e n s t e i n says nonsense arises when a word 
or phrase i s used outside a language game t o which i t i s 
appro p r i a t e . Wit t g e n s t e i n t h i n k s t h i s i s the root of many 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s : t h a t questions are asked or 
suggestions made which f a l l outside the given language game, 
and are both misleading and senseless. 
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To c o n c l u d e t h i s d i s c u s s i o n of t h e i n s i g h t s t o be g a i n e d 
from, and t h e m i s l e a d i n g f e a t u r e s of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s analogy 
between language ( i n p a r t i c u l a r a r i t h m e t i c ) and games, a f i n a l 
p o i n t can be made. By comparing language ( a r i t h m e t i c ) t o 
a game, W i t t g e n s t e i n i n no way s u g g e s t s t h a t language i s a 
t r i v i a l a c t i v i t y or a p a s t i m e . R a t h e r he emphasizes t h e 
c o n n e c t i o n s between our l i n g u i s t i c and n o n - l i n g u i s t i c 
a c t i v i t i e s . I n d e e d he s a y s t h e two cannot be s e p a r a t e d ; 
language i s a p a r t of communal a c t i v i t y , a p a r t of "a form of 
l i f e " . ( P I 23) 
A form of l i f e i s a g e n e r a l background, a g a i n s t which our 
l i n g u i s t i c a c t i v i t y makes s e n s e , and of which i t i s a p a r t . 
I n o r d e r t o be a b l e t o f u l l y use language, one has t o master 
s e v e r a l t e c h n i q u e s , t o have an u n d e r s t a n d i n g beyond t h e 
ma c h i n e r y of t h e language, t o p a r t a k e i n a form of l i f e . I n 
o t h e r words language p r e s u p p o s e s broad agreements of 
d e f i n i t i o n , and b a s i c s h a r e d n a t u r a l and l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r ; 
w h i c h W i t t g e n s t e i n c a l l s a form of l i f e . 
I t i s i n t h i s c o n t e x t t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e t o u n d e r s t a n d 
W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s r a t h e r o b s c u r e remark: " I f a l i o n c o u l d t a l k , 
we c o u l d not u n d e r s t a n d him." (PI p 223) W i t t g e n s t e i n i s not 
t a l k i n g o f l i n g u i s t i c or t r a n s l a t i o n a l d i f f i c u l t i e s , but 
s a y i n g t h a t s i n c e we do not s h a r e t h e same b a s i c background; 
we do not s h a r e t h e l i o n ' s form of l i f e , t h e n we cannot s h a r e 
i n h i s language games. We cannot f u l l y communicate w i t h him. 
T h i s r a i s e s t h e d i f f i c u l t y of whether i n d i v i d u a l s p a r t a k e 
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i n one, or many forms of l i f e . I s there one f o r humans and 
a d i f f e r e n t one f o r l i o n s , or one f o r B r i t i s h and perhaps a 
separate one f o r the Chinese, say? Wittgenstein i s 
ambivalent on t h i s issue; but would probably suggest t h a t 
j u s t as c u l t u r a l d i f f e r e n c e s , and c u l t u r a l boundaries are 
vague, then also the term "form of l i f e " i s e s s e n t i a l l y vague. 
The p o i n t i s not important here, but what i s important i s 
t h a t our common background, our form of l i f e i s given. 
Certain features of language are explained by our form 
of l i f e , and as such must be simply accepted, there can be no 
f u r t h e r explanation. "What has t o be accepted, the given, 
i s - so one could say - forms of l i f e . " (PI p 226) " I f I 
have exhausted j u s t i f i c a t i o n s , I have reached bedrock and my 
spade i s turned. Then I am i n c l i n e d t o say: "This i s simply 
what I do,"" (PI 217) 
This i n t r o d u c t i o n of a form of l i f e , as a given and 
necessary background t o l i n g u i s t i c a c t i v i t y ; s t r i k e s an 
immediate p a r a l l e l w i t h Wittgenstein's idea t h a t mathematics 
i s i n no need of foundation. The p r o j e c t s of the l o g i c i s t s , 
i n t u i t i o n i s t s and f o r m a l i s t s were not so much wrong as 
misguided, f o r mathematics has no need of foundation. I t 
already has a foundation i n our form of l i f e . 
This means the way we teach and lear n mathematics, the 
way we a c t u a l l y do mathematics and e s s e n t i a l l y the way t h a t 
we s u c c e s s f u l l y apply mathematics, are a l l the foundations 
t h a t there are, but they are a l l t h a t are needed. Our 
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p r a c t i c e s are embedded i n the way we l i v e , and beyond t h a t 
t here i s nothing t o say. The foundation of our mathematics 
i s human technique, "a technique which i s a f a c t of n a t u r a l 
h i s t o r y " . (RFM V 13) 
The second p o i n t t o be made i s t h a t mathematics l i k e 
language i s a communal a c t i v i t y , which can only f u n c t i o n i f 
there i s broad agreement about what terms are t o be used, how 
they are t o be used, what i s t o count as proof etc. I t i s 
t h i s agreement, which, although i t i s of t e n i n t e n t i o n a l and 
d e l i b e r a t e , i s p a r t of our form of l i f e . I t i s the given 
background, and basic convention without which mathematics, 
and language generally, cannot f u n c t i o n . 
" I f language i s t o be a means of communication there must 
be agreement not only i n d e f i n i t i o n s but also (queer as t h i s 
may sound) i n judgements." (PI 242) Our agreement must go 
beyond how terms and expressions are used, and must include 
b e l i e f s and outlooks which are shared. This i s our form of 
l i f e and the foundation of our mathematics. 
Furthermore, our language and our mathematics have 
su c c e s s f u l l y achieved t h a t f o r which they were designed (or 
evolved) and the thought of changing mathematics or l i n g u i s t i c 
p r a c t i c e s on a large scale i s preposterous. I t would change 
our whole l i v e s , and the p o i n t i s t h a t mathematics and 
language are not somehow ex t e r n a l a c t i v i t i e s t h a t we indulge 
i n , but are a c e n t r a l and v i t a l p a r t of the very l i f e we l i v e . 
So t o conclude, an understanding of Wittgenstein's 
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conception of language games and form of l i f e enhances an 
understanding of some of the main themes i n the philosophy of 
mathematics. The move away from a r i g i d 
A u g u s t i n i a n / T r a c t a r i a n understanding of language t o a looser 
theory based on language games, s t r e s s i n g the d i v e r s i t y of 
common p r a c t i c e ; i s r e f l e c t e d by a move away from an 
o b j e c t i v e foundations of mathematics t o a theory s t r e s s i n g the 
v a r i e t y and motley of mathematical techniques. 
The idea t h a t language i s based upon human agreement and 
a p p l i c a t i o n , governed by communal ru l e s and gaining meaning 
from i t s use i n context i s r e f l e c t e d i n the idea t h a t v a l i d i t y 
or t r u t h i n mathematics only derives from communal a p p l i c a t i o n 
and p r a c t i c e , " I take the c a l c u l a t i o n t o be corre c t because 
i t i s c o r r e c t " (RFM V 4) i s Wittgenstein's way of saying t h a t 
the only c r i t e r i o n f o r mathematical correctness i s t h a t i t i s 
i n accord w i t h the relevant language game, and i s understood 
i n the appropriate context. 
And l a s t l y Wittgenstein's i n s i s t e n c e t h a t f o r language 
t o f u n c t i o n not only must there be l i n g u i s t i c agreement, but 
t h a t there must also be a common form of l i f e underlying the 
l i n g u i s t i c p r a c t i c e i s r e f l e c t e d i n the idea t h a t a common 
form of l i f e i s an e s s e n t i a l foundation f o r mathematics, and 
indeed t h i s i s the only foundation t h a t i s required. Our 
language has no need of j u s t i f i c a t i o n , i t i s j u s t i f i e d by the 
way we a c t u a l l y use i t . S i m i l a r l y mathematics has no need 
f o r foundation, f o r i t i s already founded on our everyday 
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a p p l i c a t i o n , our common p r a c t i c e , our form of l i f e , 
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V I I S c e p t i c i s m and Rule Following. 
Having examined Wittgenstein's d i s c u s s i o n of mathematics 
as a language game, I now turn to examine some of h i s 
s c e p t i c a l concerns which are i n t i m a t e l y connected with r u l e 
f o l l o w i n g . The current debate i n t h i s f i e l d i s very a c t i v e , 
but i t i s not my i n t e n t i o n to d i s c u s s t h i s as such, but rather 
to draw out the connections with the philosophy of mathematics 
i n a minimally c o n t r o v e r s i a l way. As i n the previous chapter 
I s h a l l be drawing p a r a l l e l s and s i m i l a r i t i e s as they seem to 
occur, without suggesting any underlying motivation or 
s t r u c t u r e . This w i l l be l e f t u n t i l the next chapter, when 
I hope to b r i n g the themes together to give a broader 
understanding of Wittgenstein's e s s e n t i a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
outlook. 
F i r s t l y consider the question at the beginning of the 
Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics: "How do I know 
th a t i n working out the s e r i e s + 2 1 must wr i t e "20004, 20006" 
and not "20004, 20008"?" (RFM 1 3 ) . Or as the same question 
appears i n the I n v e s t i g a t i o n s : how can we be sure that a 
p u p i l has grasped the" +2 r u l e " s i n c e the set of h i s answers 
(of h i s continuation of the s e r i e s ) i s f i n i t e . ( c f . PI 185) 
Having r a i s e d t h i s question, Wittgenstein suggests that 
i t i s i n v a l i d . Having mastered the technique of +2; having 
developed the s e r i e s to a reasonable extent; i t i s se n s e l e s s 
to question w i t h i n t h i s language game whether the r u l e has 
been grasped, or why I must wr i t e "20004, 20006" and not 
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"20004, 20008", "Scepticism i s not i r r e f u t a b l e , but 
obviously n o n s e n s i c a l when i t t r i e s to r a i s e doubts where no 
questions can be asked," (TLP 6.51) This sentence from the 
T r a c t a t u s captures Wittgenstein's point p e r f e c t l y , and 
i n d i c a t e s a theme or a worry running throughout Wittgenstein's 
work. 
The point i s the same as the remark that i t i s 
n o n s e n s i c a l to doubt one's own pain, " I can't be i n e r r o r 
here; i t means nothing to doubt whether I am i n pain!" (PI 
188) The two main points that Wittgenstein makes are f i r s t l y 
t h a t doubt has to have grounds, and secondly that doubt 
presupposes the mastery of a (relevant) language game, 
"One doubts on s p e c i f i c grounds" (OC 458) i s not a point 
with which Descartes would have argued, and i t i s c l e a r that 
the e v i l genius of the Meditations i s supposed to provide the 
r e l e v a n t grounds, but Wittgenstein would have regarded t h i s 
as a f r i v o l o u s suggestion. The grounds for doubt must have 
some c r e d u l i t y ; the i m a g i n a b i l i t y of not-p i s not enough i n 
i t s e l f to warrant the doubt of p. 
I f a p u p i l can competently continue the +2 s e r i e s up to 
100 or 500 ( s a y ) , there i s no reason to suppose that anything 
might go wrong a f t e r 20,000 or any other number! There i s no 
genuine ground f o r doubt, j u s t as I myself cannot doubt my own 
a s s e r t i o n " I am i n pain," 
Wittgenstein's second point i s that doubt presupposes the 
mastery of a language game. Again the point comes from 
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Descartes, who despite claiming t o doubt everything t o be 
doubted; does not doubt the meanings of the words he uses. 
I t i s not even the case t h a t the meaning a word has, i s a 
l o g i c a l f a c t ; i t i s only e m p i r i c a l . "And i s n ' t i t an 
e m p i r i c a l f a c t - t h a t t h i s word i s used l i k e t h i s ? " (OC 306) 
However, Cartesian doubt taken t o the extent of doubting the 
meaning of words r e f u t e s i t s e l f . I f I am deceived about the 
meaning of words, I cannot even assert t h i s . " I f t h i s 
deceives me, what does "deceive" mean any more?" (OC 507) 
So i n other words I must be able t o play the +2 language 
game, I must have mastered the technique before I question why 
I w r i t e "20004, 20006" and not "20004, 20008", and then the 
question i s senseless. S i m i l a r l y t o say " I doubt whether I 
am i n pain", shows the speaker has not mastered the 
appropriate language game or i s mad. 
Although not un c o n t r a v e r s i a l , these two considerations 
lead t o Wittgenstein's conclusion t h a t , "When I obey a r u l e , 
I do not choose, I obey the r u l e b l i n d l y . " (PI 219) The 
obedience i s b l i n d because at the lowest l e v e l there are no 
doubts t o be r e f u t e d , and no j u s t i f i c a t i o n s t o be explained. 
The a p p l i c a t i o n of the r u l e i s a l l t h a t i s important. But 
the question s t i l l remains: what i s i t t o f o l l o w a r u l e , or 
what c o n s t i t u t e s f o l l o w i n g a rule? 
Kripke i n t e r p r e t s Wittgenstein as suggesting t h a t there 
i s no f a c t or substantive e n t i t y t h a t shows a person follows 
a r u l e . Rather, a person's r u l e f o l l o w i n g i s t o be explained 
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by conformity t o s o c i a l p r a c t i c e i n the relevant respects. 
That i s , Kripke ascribes t o Wittgenstein a community or s o c i a l 
conception of r u l e f o l l o w i n g , d e r i v i n g i t s normativeness from 
meaning and use gen e r a l l y . As we s h a l l see t h i s i s a 
contentious i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Wittgenstein, and McGinn, i n 
p a r t i c u l a r , r e j e c t s t h i s communitarian i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ; but 
i n i t i a l l y consider Kripke's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
Immediately i t seems at odds w i t h Wittgenstein's 
i n s i s t e n c e t h a t a person i s free t o choose whether, or how t o 
apply a r u l e at any stage of a procedure. "The laws of 
inference do not compel him t o say or w r i t e such and such l i k e 
r a i l s compelling a locomotive." (RFM I 116) But as I 
remarked i n the section on the necessity of proof, the 
important p o i n t i s t h a t the compulsion or lack of choice i s 
not derived from the verbal s t i p u l a t i o n of the r u l e , but from 
the community's a p p l i c a t i o n of i t . 
To c o r r e c t l y f o l l o w a r u l e i s t o act i n accordance w i t h 
the consensus. This i s not a consensus of opinion, but a 
consensus of use and as such i s e s s e n t i a l l y changeable and 
n o n - d i c t a t o r i a l . The thoughts people t h i n k are i r r e l e v a n t . 
They a l l f o l l o w the r u l e i f they make the same use of i t , i f 
they apply i t i n the same way. 
This hangs together w i t h the question of how t o continue 
the se r i e s of c a r d i n a l numbers. I s there a c r i t e r i o n f o r the 
co n t i n u a t i o n - f o r a r i g h t and a wrong way - except t h a t we 
do i n f a c t continue them i n t h a t way, apart from a few cranks 
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who can be neglected' (LFM p 183) Wittgenstein's answer i s 
c l e a r l y no! 
But there i s a d i f f i c u l t y here, of which Wittgenstein was 
aware. I f everything i s grounded i n communal use or 
p r a c t i c e , where does t h i s leave the n o t i o n of t r u t h ? "Then do 
you want t o say t h a t "being t r u e " means being usable (or 
u s e f u l . ) ? " (RFM I 4) Wittgenstein d i d not, and goes on t o 
w r i t e "But i s n ' t there a t r u t h corresponding t o l o g i c a l 
inference? I s n ' t i t t r u e t h a t t h i s f o l l o w s from t h a t ? " (RFM 
I 5) . Both Baker and Hacker, and Wright observe t h i s tension 
between t r u t h derived from use, and l o g i c a l t r u t h ; and Wright 
asks: " I s there indeed a fundamental "disharmony of main 
themes" i n Wittgenstein's l a t e r philosophy of mathematics, as 
suggested by Baker and Hacker?" (Wright 1980 p 329) 
A "fundamental disharmony" seems l i k e an exaggeration t o 
me, W i t t g e n s t e i n r e j e c t s a c o n v e n t i o n a l i s t account of 
meaning and t r u t h , t h a t i s he r e j e c t s the idea t h a t meaning 
and t r u t h derive from something e x t e r n a l t o language or supra-
l i n g u i s t i c . He i s very f i r m t h a t both meaning and t r u t h come 
from our use of language/ and our i n t r a - l i n g u i s t i c 
grammatical agreements. Hence l o g i c a l t r u t h i s no more than 
a grammatical agreement, a r e f l e c t i o n of what we a c t u a l l y do; 
and thus not e s s e n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t t o any of our other 
agreements. Wittgenstein r e j e c t s any e x t e r n a l or formal 
convention and understands meaning and t r u t h t o derive from 
casual, non s t i p u l a t i v e agreements. A suggestion of 
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"fundamental disharmony" seems in a p p r o p r i a t e . 
I n what has been said so f a r , no d i s t i n c t i o n has been 
drawn between what i t i s f o r a p u p i l t o grasp or f o l l o w a 
r u l e , and what i t i s f o r me t o grasp or f o l l o w a r u l e . The 
remarks above are applicable t o the t h i r d person, but i f 
a t t e n t i o n i s focused on the f i r s t person, a new problem 
a r i s e s . " I n my own case at a l l events, I surely know t h a t 
I mean such and such a s e r i e s ; i t doesn't matter how f a r I 
have a c t u a l l y developed i t . " (PI 147) 
The suggestion here t h a t Wittgenstein makes i n order t o 
subsequently r e f u t e ; i s t h a t my mathematical a b i l i t y i s 
e s s e n t i a l l y inner. I can surely know j u s t by inspecting my 
own mental contents t h a t I am c o r r e c t l y continuing the "+2" 
se r i e s , and any doubt of t h i s seems out of place. I can know 
the simplest mathematical t r u t h s by inspection of my own 
mental contents, and as such t h i s i n s p e c t i o n i s i n c o r r i g i b l e . 
This a l l e g e d i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y derives from the supposition 
t h a t I can i n t r o s p e c t d i r e c t l y , without any intermediary, and 
as such there i s no opportunity f o r e r r o r t o be introduced. 
But t h i s suggestion immediately leads t o the question: does 
my a b i l i t y t o do t h i s simple mathematics c o n s t i t u t e a counter-
example t o the so c a l l e d p r i v a t e language argument? 
Now i t i s not my i n t e n t i o n t o assess t h i s major question 
d i r e c t l y ; but t o amplify i t s l i g h t l y t o pave the way f o r a 
discussion of Kripke's very s i m i l a r suggestion t h a t the root 
problem of the philosophy of mathematics i s t h a t posed by the 
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p r i v a t e language argument. 
F i r s t l y , d i s t i n g u i s h two senses of p r i v a t e . A sensation 
can be p r i v a t e i f only I know of i t , but could i n p r i n c i p l e 
t e l l someone else. For example, I may have a f e e l i n g or 
premonition t h a t i t w i l l snow tomorrow, and contingently I 
have not t o l d anybody. Hence my f e e l i n g i s p r i v a t e . 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y I may have some sensation t h a t nobody else has, 
and i t may be impossible f o r me t o communicate i t t o them: 
s t r i c t l y f o r them t o have i t . Kenny c a l l s t h i s type of 
pr i v a c y " i n a l i e n a b l e " (Kenny p 185) and Wittgenstein expresses 
h i s idea, "Another person can't have my pains". (PI 253) I t 
i s the second sense of p r i v a t e t h a t Wittgenstein intends when 
he argues against the p o s s i b i l i t y of p r i v a t e languages. 
The d i s t i n c t i o n can also be drawn by comparing 
o n t o l o g i c a l or epistemological privacy on the one hand, and 
l o g i c a l p r i v a c y on the other. A person may not share an 
o n t o l o g i c a l l y or e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y p r i v a t e sensation, but he 
cannot share a l o g i c a l l y p r i v a t e sensation. I t i s l o g i c a l 
p r i v a c y t h a t i s Wittgenstein's concern. 
The suggestion t h a t mathematical knowledge i s i n some way 
inner or p r i v a t e trades on t h i s d i f f e r e n c e , and does not 
provide any d i r e c t counter-example t o the p r i v a t e language 
argument. Contingently p r i v a t e or secret mathematics i s 
i r r e l e v a n t , and l o g i c a l l y p r i v a t e or i n a l i e n a b l e mathematics 
i s incoherent. 
However i t seems t o be t h i s mistaken l i n e of thought t h a t 
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leads Kripke t o suggest t h a t "Wittgenstein regards the 
fundamental problem of the philosophy of mathematics and of 
the p r i v a t e language argument - the problem of sensation 
language - as at root i d e n t i c a l " (Kripke p 20) Furthermore 
the r o o t problem according t o Kripke i s given by Wittgenstein 
i n paragraph 201 of the I n v e s t i g a t i o n s . "This was our 
paradox, no course of a c t i o n could be determined by a r u l e , 
because every course of a c t i o n can be made out t o accord w i t h 
the r u l e . " (PI 201/Kripke p 7) 
In other words, Kripke suggests Wittgenstein advocates 
a new scepticism about language; t h a t I can never be sure 
t h a t the meaning I inte n d by my present use of a word (current 
employment of the r u l e f o r the word) i s the same meaning I 
intended by my past uses of the same word. (past employment 
of the same r u l e . ) I do not wish t o develop the p o i n t , but 
Kripke claims t h a t the s c e p t i c a l conclusions of the paradox 
seem " s p e c i a l l y unnatural" (Kripke p 79) i n the areas of 
mathematics and inner experience, and t h i s i s why he claims 
the paradox i s at the root of Wittgenstein's concerns i n both 
of these areas. 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o do Kripke j u s t i c e without going t o 
great length, and i t i s only my i n t e n t i o n t o t r y t o understand 
Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics w i t h reference t o h i s 
other p h i l o s o p h i c a l concerns; t h e r e f o r e I have only b r i e f l y 
s t a t e d the connection t h a t Kripke i s t r y i n g t o make, and must 
now e x p l a i n t h a t the m a j o r i t y of opinion i s against Kripke's 
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i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , and t h a t the so c a l l e d "fundamental problem" 
does not e x i s t . 
There are three main p o i n t s t o be made. 
( i ) As McGinn p o i n t s out, Kripke has m i s i n t e r p r e t e d and 
misunderstood W i t t g e n s t e i n . F i r s t l y he has ignored the words 
immediately f o l l o w i n g h i s quotation from I n v e s t i g a t i o n s 
paragraph 201. Wittgenst e in says: " I t can be seen there i s 
a misunderstanding here". (PI 201) I n other words 
Wi t t g e n s t e i n does not endorse the paradox Kripke a t t r i b u t e s 
t o him. Secondly and more imp o r t a n t l y , the s c e p t i c a l doubt 
t h a t Kripke suggests goes outside and beyond a relevant 
language game, and so f o r Wittgenstein i s nonsensical. 
( i i ) Baker and Hacker claim Kripke m i s i n t e r p r e t s 
Wittgenstein's use of " p r i v a t e " . Kripke understands p r i v a t e 
t o mean i n i s o l a t i o n from the community w i t h regard t o 
f o l l o w i n g or responding t o a r u l e . Whereas Wittgenstein 
means t h a t a r u l e followed p r i v a t e l y , i s one t o whose 
expression only I have access. i . e . There i s a ( l o g i c a l l y ) 
p r i v a t e ostensive d e f i n i t i o n of the r u l e . Again Kripke's 
discussion seems t o be based on dubious foundations! 
( i i i ) The reference Kripke makes t o the beginning of the 
Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics does not e s t a b l i s h 
the connection t h a t i t i s supposed t o . Wittgenstein says: 
"How do I know t h a t i n working out the series +2 I must w r i t e 
"20004, 20006" and not 20004, 20008"? -(The question: "How 
do I know t h a t t h i s colour i s 'red'?" i s s i m i l a r . ) " (RFM I 3) 
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But there i s a d i f f e r e n c e between "how do I know t h a t t h i s 
colour i s red?" and "how do I know t h a t t h i s experience i s 
seeing red? Wi t t g e n s t e i n himself emphasises the d i s t i n c t i o n 
i n "Notes f o r Lectures on P r i v a t e Experience and Sense Data," 
discussing the examples "seeing red" and "having a red v i s u a l 
impression". Kripke seems t o confuse the two, understanding 
the f i r s t question as a problem about p r i v a t e languages, when 
i n f a c t only the second r e l a t e s t o p r i v a t e language. 
I n c r i t i c i s i n g Kripke, my p o i n t i s not t o show t h a t there 
i s no connection between the p r i v a t e language argument and 
r u l e f o l l o w i n g , considerations i n the philosophy of 
mathematics; but r a t h e r t o show the connection i s not t o be 
found i n Kripke's paradox. The p o i n t t o be made i s t h a t 
t h e r e i s no i n t e r n a l , p r i v a t e r u l e between the p u b l i c r u l e 
"+2", and saying "20004, 20006"; j u s t as there i s no p r i v a t e 
ostensive d e f i n i t i o n intermediary between seeing red, and 
saying " I see red". ( I have a red v i s u a l experience.) 
Wittgenstein's concern i s not about "the problem of 
sensations" and how I know I am f o l l o w i n g a r u l e , but rather 
t o e s t a b l i s h the non-primacy of the inner, the mental and the 
s u b j e c t i v e . His i n t e n t i o n i s the r e f u t a t i o n of idealism and 
scepticism - a p o i n t t o which I s h a l l r e t u r n . 
To conclude t h i s discussion of Kripke's p o s i t i o n , i t 
should be observed t h a t there are those who w h i l s t admitting 
Kripke has m i s i n t e r p r e t e d Wittgenstein, and wrongly a t t r i b u t e d 
a new form of scepticism t o him: nevertheless suggest t h a t he 
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(Kripke) has i n f a c t developed a new and important form of 
scepticism. Some even suggest t h a t Wittgenstein's w r i t i n g , 
i f p r o p e r l y developed, leads t o Kripke's so c a l l e d paradox. 
This however also seems mistaken f o r Kripke's paradox i s 
the very a n t i t h e s i s of Wittgenstein's p o s i t i o n , f o r i t raises 
doubts and questions where no doubts and questions can be 
meaningfully r a i s e d . Throughout h i s philosophy Wittgenstein 
laboured against spurious forms of scepticism: from the 
Tractatus t o the Remarks and beyond, and the suggestion t h a t 
Kripke's paradox could be consequent upon Wittgenstein i s 
s u r e l y mistaken. 
"The d i f f i c u l t t h i n g here i s not t o d i g down to the 
ground; no, i t i s t o recognize the ground t h a t l i e s before 
us as the ground." (RFM VI 31) I n other words the s o l u t i o n 
t o Kripke's so c a l l e d paradox i s t o r e a l i s e t h a t i t raises 
nonsensical doubts and t h a t some things simply are; and have 
no f u r t h e r explanation. They are a p a r t of our form of l i f e . 
L a s t l y I want t o suggest, again without going i n t o great 
d e t a i l , t h a t there are other views on t h i s issue: p r i n c i p a l l y 
the arguments of McGinn who i s c r i t i c a l of both Kripke and 
W i t t g e n s t e i n , despite have some sympathy w i t h Wittgenstein's 
understanding of language games and forms of l i f e . 
McGinn r e j e c t s Kripke's a t t r i b u t i o n of the s c e p t i c a l 
paradox t o W i t t g e n s t e i n , and r e j e c t s the suggestion t h a t the 
paradox i s d e r i v a t i v e t o Wittgenstein's views. However 
McGinn does not agree t h a t the paradox raises nonsensical 
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questions and considers i t as a genuine d i f f i c u l t y . 
P r i n c i p a l l y McGinn r e j e c t s Kripke's l i s t i n g of the 
s t r a i g h t s o l u t i o n s t o the paradox as exhaustive, he c r i t i c i s e s 
Kripke's s c e p t i c a l s o l u t i o n t o the paradox as inadequate, and 
proposes an a l t e r n a t i v e s t r a i g h t s o l u t i o n t o the paradox 
r e s i s t i n g any reference t o the notion of communal agreement. 
A problem has a s c e p t i c a l s o l u t i o n i f i t concedes the 
sceptic's p o i n t , but shows t h a t ordinary p r a c t i c e i s not i n 
need of the j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n v i t e d by the sceptic. A problem 
has a s t r a i g h t s o l u t i o n i f i t shows the scepticism 
unwarranted, by proving the doubted theses. McGinn o f f e r s 
a s o l u t i o n of the second type: arguing t h a t there i s "no 
compelling reason t o depart from the n a t u r a l idea t h a t which 
concepts a person possesses depends simply upon f a c t s about 
him: we can thus form a conception of someone possessing 
concepts and f o l l o w i n g r u l e s without i n t r o d u c i n g other persons 
i n t o our thought, at l e a s t so f a r as Kripke's arguments are 
concerned." (McGinn p 191) 
This summary i s b r i e f , but without becoming too involved 
i n questions about r u l e f o l l o w i n g , I hope I have suggested 
some p a r a l l e l s between Wittgenstein's philosophy of 
mathematics and h i s conception of r u l e s ; and also i n d i c a t e d 
t h a t f u r t h e r c l a r i f i c a t i o n of Wittgenstein's e s s e n t i a l 
concerns i s a p r e r e q u i s i t e t o a f u l l understanding of h i s 
philosophy of mathematics. 
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V I I I The Philosophy of Mind. 
I n t h i s chapter I am going t o develop the h i n t at the end 
of the previous chapter, t h a t i t i s Wittgenstein's r e j e c t i o n 
of the t r a d i t i o n a l approach t o philosophy, i n p a r t i c u l a r 
s u b j e c t i v i s t egocentricism and s u b j e c t i v i s t philosophy of mind 
t h a t i s c e n t r a l t o the understanding of Wittgenstein's l a t e r 
thought. By s u b j e c t i v i s t , I understand a school of thought 
o r i g i n a t i n g i n Descartes, and developed through Locke and 
Hume, which has come t o dominate western p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
t h i n k i n g ; and t o which Wittgenstein was so s t r o n g l y opposed. 
The main idea t h a t Wittgenstein r e j e c t s i s the egocentric 
approach: t h a t i s the b e l i e f t h a t the "inner" or the mental 
can be apprehended d i r e c t l y and w i t h c e r t a i n t y ; whereas the 
"outer" or e x t e r n a l world can only be apprehended i n d i r e c t l y 
and knowledge of the outer i s open t o the p o s s i b i l i t y of e r r o r 
i n the way t h a t knowledge of the inner i s not. 
This i s e s s e n t i a l l y Descartes' c l a s s i c a l p o s i t i o n , which 
progressed from c e r t a i n knowledge of the s e l f qua t h i n k i n g 
t h i n g , derived from r e f l e c t i o n alone; t o a knowledge of the 
outer world derived from r e f l e c t i o n coupled w i t h observation. 
Furthermore t h i s t h e s i s i n the philosophy of mind, permeates 
epistemology, metaphysics and e t h i c s too, binding together a 
whole system which has proved so p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y durable. 
The general p o s i t i o n o r i g i n a t i n g i n Descartes consists 
of two main t h e o r i e s . A theory of knowledge which does not 
concern us here, and a theory of meaning which can be 
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summarised i n a s i n g l e sentence from Locke, "... words i n 
t h e i r primary or immediate s i g n i f i c a t i o n stand f o r nothing but 
the ideas i n the mind of him t h a t uses them." (Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding I I I i i 2) I n Locke's theory 
objects i n the world are s i g n i f i e d by ideas i n the mind, and 
words s i g n i f y these ideas. For Locke an idea i s an "object 
of the understanding", and t h i s means an object of 
consciousness or apprehension, rather than any special kind 
of mental a c t i v i t y . 
Furthermore, words ( i n Locke's theory) can only s i g n i f y 
ideas, so as a person speaks (or hears) there i s a p a r a l l e l 
mental process where the ideas s i g n i f i e d by the words run 
through the user's consciousness. I n a s i m i l a r way, a person 
understands a sentence u t t e r e d by someone else because the 
words he hears produce a stream of ideas i n h i s mind which are 
immediately ( d i r e c t l y ) perceived. 
Such a theory c e r t a i n l y has d i f f i c u l t i e s ; i n p a r t i c u l a r 
i f words only s i g n i f y mental ideas then the question of 
e x a c t l y how words connect w i t h the world i s n a t u r a l l y posed. 
But these d i f f i c u l t i e s need not concern us here, f o r 
Wi t t g e n s t e i n r e j e c t s the whole approach t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s 
inner mental phenomena and outer ph y s i c a l phenomena: 
regarding the former as primary, and e x p l a i n i n g the l a t t e r i n 
terms of the former. The main reason f o r t h i s r e j e c t i o n i s 
t h a t i t uses the ego as the basic reference p o i n t , without 
f i r s t i d e n t i f y i n g i t . The problem i s t o s i t u a t e the ego. 
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W i t t g e n s t e i n argues t h a t an attempt t o s i t u a t e the ego i n a 
p a r t i c u l a r body leads t o solipsism; an attempt t o 'spread' 
i t among bodies c o l l e c t i v e l y leads t o idealism; and e i t h e r 
way the egocentric approach r e f u t e s i t s e l f f o r i t has t o 
introduce p h y s i c a l bodies before i t can get s t a r t e d . That 
i s t o say the egocentric approach which attempts t o begin w i t h 
the inner, the ego; cannot succeed f o r i t has t o introduce 
the outer, the p h y s i c a l , t o i n d i v i d u a t e the ego! (See NLPESD 
p281) 
S i m i l a r l y W i t t g e n s t e i n thought i t incoherent t o begin by 
i d e n t i f y i n g inner mental sensations, then t o put a boundary 
around them, and argue t h a t sensations apparently beyond the 
boundary must be reducible t o sensations w i t h i n the boundary. 
For i n doing t h i s we have gone beyond experience. I t i s 
only possible t o draw a boundary from i n s i d e , and then i t i s 
incoherent t o t a l k of what i s "outside" or beyond the 
boundary. 
Ign o r i n g these considerations leads t o the use of an 
improperly i n d i v i d u a t e d or un f i x e d ego as a reference p o i n t , 
which Pears c a l l s " s l i d i n g - p e g egocentricism." (Pears 1988 
p233) ( c f . f i x e d peg and s l i d i n g peg monetary exchange 
rates.) But i f the ego i s not pegged down, what 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s there f o r c a l l i n g i t mine? And without an 
i n d i v i d u a t e d f i x e d ego, how can the Cartesian approach be 
adopted? 
Also the p r i v a t e language argument i s supposed t o show 
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t h a t even i f the d i f f i c u l t i e s of the unindividuated ego could 
be resolved, without any e x t e r n a l reference, language would 
be impossible. That i s the necessary p r i v a t e language would 
be impossible; and mental sensations would be 
i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . A progression from the inner t o the outer 
would be impossible. 
W i t t g e n s t e i n i s more celebrated f o r h i s attack on the 
s u b j e c t i v i s t theory of meaning. That i s an attack on the 
theory t h a t any verbal utterance must be accompanied by 
p a r a l l e l mental a c t i v i t y , i f i t i s t o have meaning, or be 
understood. T y p i c a l l y Wittgenstein's attack i s not a c l o s e l y 
argued or formal one, but rather he makes a v a r i e t y of 
separate p o i n t s : "a wide f i e l d of thoughts, criss-cross i n 
every d i r e c t i o n . " (PI p v i i ) 
At the beginning of the Blue Book there i s a discussion 
of what a person does i n obeying the order; pick a red 
f l o w e r . On Locke's account a person compares the colours of 
flowers w i t h h i s mental idea of red, u n t i l he f i n d s one t h a t 
matches, and then he picks i t . But Wittgenstein says t h i s 
cannot be c o r r e c t , f o r how then could a person obey the 
analogous order: imagine a red patch? "You are not tempted 
i n t h i s case t o t h i n k t h a t before obeying you must have 
imagined a red patch t o serve you as a p a t t e r n f o r the red 
patch which you were ordered t o imagine." (BB p 3) Hence our 
understanding of the word "red" i s not derived from having an 
inner patch of red t o serve as a standard. 
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Later i n the Blue Book (p 42) we are i n v i t e d t o perform 
the experiment: say " i t i s hot i n t h i s room" and mean " i t i s 
c o l d i n t h i s room". Can i t be done? Wittgenstein suggests 
a negative r e p l y , but c l e a r l y i f we are being i r o n i c we can 
say "hot" and mean "cold". S i m i l a r l y we can imagine a group 
of people adopting a convention t o transpose hot and cold i n 
t h e i r speech, thus meaning "hot" by "cold" and vice-versa. 
However i n both these cases meaning i s not afforded by mental 
a c t i v i t y (a p a r a l l e l flow of s i g n i f y i n g ideas) but by the 
conventions of the language users. An i r o n i c tone or the 
t r a n s p o s i t i o n convention gives the words t h e i r meaning. 
T h i r d l y d i s t i n g u i s h between the grammatical use of words 
such as pain, excitement, anxiousness and meaning and 
understanding which are a l l a l l e g e d l y mental states, i n the 
s u b j e c t i v i s t theory. The f i r s t group of words can have 
temporal d u r a t i o n and degrees of i n t e n s i t y . I t i s p e r f e c t l y 
reasonable t o say the pain began at noon and went at 3pm, and 
t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r mental s t a t e was present i n between times, 
and not afterwards. But meaning and understanding are not 
l i k e t h i s , f o r I know what the word red means when I am not 
using the word "red", when I have no mental image of "red" and 
even when I am asleep! The remark "When do you know how t o 
play chess? A l l the time? Or j u s t when you are making a 
move?" (PI p 59(b)) i l l u m i n a t e s the same p o i n t , and shows the 
e r r o r of a t t a c h i n g temporal predicates t o pain and 
understanding (etc.) i n the same way. 
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S i m i l a r l y I can speak of an intense pain or a s l i g h t 
f e a r , but I cannot speak of s l i g h t meaning or intense 
understanding i n the same way. The s u b j e c t i v i s t account 
seems mistaken, and i s r e j e c t e d by Wittgenstein. Note 
however t h a t t h i s r e j e c t i o n does not e n t a i l t h a t mental 
a c t i v i t y never accompanies meaning and understanding, but t h a t 
i t need not. "This, of course, does not mean t h a t we have 
shown t h a t p e c u l i a r acts of consciousness do not accompany the 
expressions of our thoughts! Only we no longer say t h a t they 
must accompany them." (BB p 42) Meaning and understanding 
do not con s i s t i n a flow of ideas p a r a l l e l t o a flow of words. 
What then? 
F i r s t l y a d i s t i n c t i o n needs t o be drawn between occurrent 
and d i s p o s i t i o n a l mental states which i s overlooked by those 
who regard meaning and understanding as p a r a l l e l 
accompaniments t o l i n g u i s t i c behaviour. Occurrent mental 
s t a t e s are those immediately before the mind, w i t h a temporal 
beginning and end, and varying i n t e n s i t y i n between. Again 
toothache, or the sensation "seeing red" are good examples. 
D i s p o s i t i o n a l mental states are more akin t o a b i l i t y or 
capacity such as understanding. Wittgenstein r e j e c t s the 
theory t h a t meaning and understanding are occurrent mental 
s t a t e s , but he does not simply s u b s t i t u t e a d i s p o s i t i o n a l 
account f o r t h i s . 
He stresses t h a t meaning and understanding are family 
resemblance terms. Broadly, a person u t t e r s meaningfully, 
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and understands a language i f he can use t h a t language. That 
i s , i f he can make appropriate responses at appropriate times, 
make remarks i n s u i t a b l e context, paraphrase etc.. In 
general he must have mastered the technique of using the 
language: he must have grasped the ru l e s of syntax and 
grammar, and be able t o f u l l y engage i n conversation. 
This mastery i s an a b i l i t y or capacity. An i n d i v i d u a l 
i s o l a t e d act of understanding i s not understanding unless i t 
i s an instance of a general a b i l i t y . "To understand a 
sentence i s t o understand a language, and t o understand a 
language means t o be master of a technique." (P 199) 
However the a b i l i t y t h a t Wittgenstein t a l k s of i s not an 
und e r l y i n g mental s t a t e . To ascribe an a b i l i t y t o a person 
i s t o make a co u n t e r f a c t u a l statement about t h e i r behaviour. 
I n other words my a b i l i t y t o communicate i n language L i s 
grounded i n the co u n t e r f a c t u a l t h a t , i f I am required t o use 
language L I can so do. 
Now whereas d i s p o s i t i o n s t o act e n t a i l counterfactuals 
about behaviour, counterfactuals about behaviour do not e n t a i l 
d i s p o s i t i o n s t o act, or the presence of any p a r t i c u l a r mental 
s t a t e . The ac t u a l mental states t h a t a user of language has 
at any p a r t i c u l a r time, i s f o r Wittgenstein, a s c i e n t i f i c 
question not a p h i l o s o p h i c a l one. 
Now t o re-focus on the philosophy of mathematics! i n 
r e j e c t i n g the egocentric approach, Wittgenstein stresses t h a t 
both language and mathematics are communal a c t i v i t i e s . 
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Language i s s u s t a i n e d by t h e way i t i s used, e v o l v e s a c c o r d i n g 
t o u s e and i s not s i m p l y a v e r b a l e x p r e s s i o n of mental 
a c t i v i t y . Mathematics l i k e w i s e i s not a r e f l e c t i o n of 
e t e r n a l t r u t h s s t o r e d i n a P l a t o n i c heaven, nor i s i t a r e p o r t 
o f m e n t a l i n t u i t i o n . R a t h e r i t i s a s e t of g r a m m a t i c a l 
c o n v e n t i o n s adopted by t h e community on account of t h e i r 
a p p l i c a t i o n . The f o c u s has been r a d i c a l l y changed, and 
r a t h e r t h a n i n v o k e f a n c i f u l t h e o r i e s ( p h i l o s o p h i e s ) t o e x p l a i n 
our language and mathematics, W i t t g e n s t e i n s a y s we must s i m p l y 
s e e them a s t h e y a r e , f o r what t h e y a r e . D e s c r i b e them but 
not e x p l a i n them f o r t h e y have no need of t h e t y p e s of 
e x p l a n a t i o n we a r e prone t o o f f e r , i n d e e d t h e y have no need 
o f e x p l a n a t i o n a t a l l ! 
T h e r e i s a l s o a c l o s e c o n n e c t i o n between t h e Lockean 
t h e o r y of words s t a n d i n g f o r i d e a s , and t h e i n t u i t i o n i s t 
t h e o r y of m a t h e m a t i c a l s t a t e m e n t s as r e p o r t i n g mental 
c o n s t r u c t i o n s , and as we have seen W i t t g e n s t e i n r e j e c t s them 
b o t h . J u s t a s a word does not r e l y on a mental i d e a f o r i t s 
meaning, so n e i t h e r does a m a t h e m a t i c a l s t a t e m e n t r e l y on t h e 
p o s s i b i l i t y of e f f e c t i n g a p a r t i c u l a r mental c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
As words d e r i v e meaning from t h e i r use i n a p a r t i c u l a r 
l anguage game, so m a t h e m a t i c a l s t a t e m e n t s have meaning i n 
v i r t u e o f adopted g r a m m a t i c a l c o n v e n t i o n s and r u l e s . 
S i m i l a r l y a p r o o f p r o g r e s s e s not on account of some 
me n t a l or l o g i c a l c o m p ulsion which o b l i g e s c e r t a i n s t e p s , but 
b e c a u s e a c h o i c e has been made t o adopt a c e r t a i n r u l e and 
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i n c o r p o r a t e i t i n t o t h e system. Once t h i s i s done, t h e r e 
i s t h e n a c o u n t e r f a c t u a l about my b e h a v i o u r , t h a t I w i l l 
f o l l o w t h e r u l e a s c i r c u m s t a n c e s d i c t a t e , and my c a p a c i t y t o 
pr o v e a p r o p o s i t i o n i s analogous t o my c a p a c i t y t o engage i n 
lan g u a g e . 
T h i s i s c l o s e l y c o n n e c t e d t o W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s remarks on 
t h e e x c l u d e d middle, i n t h e c a s e of expanding i n f i n i t e s e r i e s . 
F o r i n t h e i n f i n i t e c a s e t h e r e i s an u n c e r t a i n t y about what 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s w i l l d i c t a t e , which i s not p r e s e n t i n t h e f i n i t e 
c a s e ; so i n t h e i n f i n i t e c a s e i t i s not c l e a r how a r u l e 
s h o u l d be i n t e r p r e t e d and a p p l i e d . "The t o t a l i t y of my 
d i s p o s i t i o n s i s f i n i t e , b e i n g t h e d i s p o s i t i o n s of a f i n i t e 
b e i n g , t h a t e x i s t s f o r a f i n i t e t i m e " (Boghossian p509) so i t 
i s i m p o s s i b l e t o s a y how I might behave i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s not 
a c c o u n t e d f o r by t h e p r e s e n t s e t of d i s p o s i t i o n s about my 
b e h a v i o u r . Whether I would e v e r w r i t e 777 i n t h e d e c i m a l 
e x p a n s i o n of - | r i s a q u e s t i o n not c o v e r e d by my p r e s e n t s e t of 
d i s p o s i t i o n s , so t h e answer i s n e i t h e r y e s , nor no. 
L a s t l y W i t t g e n s t e i n s a y s mathematics i s a motley j u s t as 
meaning and u n d e r s t a n d i n g a r e a motley. R a t h e r t h a n any 
s i n g u l a r e x p e r i e n c e t h a t i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h e r e a r e a whole 
range of e x p e r i e n c e s l i n k e d by f a m i l y r e s e m b l a n c e . 
"Then has " u n d e r s t a n d i n g " two d i f f e r e n t meanings h e r e ? 
I would r a t h e r s a y t h a t t h e s e k i n d s of use of " u n d e r s t a n d i n g " 
make up i t s meaning, make up my concept of u n d e r s t a n d i n g . 
F o r I want t o a p p l y " u n d e r s t a n d i n g " t o a l l t h i s . " (PI 
111 
532) 
S i m i l a r l y we f i n d : 
" I s h o u l d l i k e t o s a y : mathematics i s a motley of 
t e c h n i q u e s of p r o o f " . (RFM I I 48) 
That i s , t h e r e i s no e s s e n t i a l grounds t o mathematics, 
no d e f i n i n g q u a l i t y and i n p a r t i c u l a r , no u n d e r l y i n g c h a r a c t e r 
t h a t i s f u n d a m e n t a l . The l o g i c i s t s thought l o g i c was t h e 
u n d e r l y i n g fundamental/ but W i t t g e n s t e i n saw t h i s as a 
m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , f o r a r i t h m e t i c or t h e c a l c u l u s a r e j u s t as 
fundamental, f o r e a c h i s an autonomous g r a m m a t i c a l system. 
T h e r e i s no s p e c i a l form t h a t a m a t h e m a t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n 
t a k e s , or any s p e c i a l way i n which i t i s v e r i f i e d . 
W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s c o m p l a i n t s a g a i n s t t h e c l a s s i c a l s c h o o l s 
of m athematics a r e not o n l y about p a r t i c u l a r s , but a l s o about 
t h e i r l a c k o f s c o p e : t h e i r l i m i t i n g of m a t h e m a t i c a l 
p r o c e d u r e s . The w i d e s t v a r i e t y of t e c h n i q u e s and g r a m m a t i c a l 
c o n v e n t i o n s go t o make up mathematics, and t h i s i s why 
W i t t g e n s t e i n p r e s e n t s no a n t i - r e a l i s t system. A l l he s a y s 
i s t h a t mathematics i s a f a m i l y of p r o c e d u r e s , i n j u s t t h e 
same way as t h e Lockean t h e o r y of meaning i s r e p l a c e d by no 
more t h a n t h e a s s e r t i o n t h a t meaning and u n d e r s t a n d i n g a r e 
f a m i l y r e s e m b l a n c e t e r m s . 
To c o n c l u d e , I r e t u r n t o my o r i g i n a l s u g g e s t i o n t h a t 
W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s r e j e c t i o n of s u b j e c t i v i s t e g o c e n t r i c i s m , and 
h i s s u bsequent p h i l o s o p h y of mind i s c e n t r a l t o h i s whole 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l o u t l o o k . The s h i f t from t h e e g o c e n t r i c t o the 
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communal, i s p a r a l l e l e d by a s h i f t from t h e t h e o r i z i n g and 
e x p l a i n i n g o b s e s s i o n of s c i e n c e t o t h e d e s c r i b i n g mode of 
W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s l a t e r p h i l o s o p h y . " [ p h i l o s o p h i c a l problems] 
a r e s o l v e d not by g i v i n g new i n f o r m a t i o n , but by a r r a n g i n g 
what we have a l w a y s known. P h i l o s o p h y i s a b a t t l e a g a i n s t 
t h e bewitchment of our i n t e l l i g e n c e by means of language". (PI 
109) 
Once t h i s s h i f t i n approach and method has been made, 
many o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r i d e a s i n t h e p h i l o s o p h y of mathematics 
and e l s e w h e r e a r e no more t h a n d i r e c t consequences of i t . 
The a n t i - r e a l i s t , community ba s e d approach, undercut 
t r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h y and i t was W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s i n t e n t i o n t o 
d e s c r i b e anew t h e a c t i v i t i e s whose " e x p l a n a t i o n " had been 
removed. 
As t h e P l a t o n i c and s u b j e c t i v i s t t h e o r i e s of language 
were r e p l a c e d by t h e i n s i s t e n c e t h a t language i s made up of 
a v a r i e t y of p r o c e d u r e s (language games) forming a f a m i l y ; 
so t h e r e a l i s t s c h o o l s were r e p l a c e d by t h e i n s i s t e n c e t h a t 
m athematics i s a f a m i l y of p r o c e d u r e s , none of which i s most 
b a s i c , i n any r e l e v a n t s e n s e . These v a r i e t i e s of p r o c e d u r e s 
i n b o t h language and mathematics a r e d e r i v e d from human 
communal a c t i v i t y and agreement, and not any independent 
r e a l i t y t h a t v a r i o u s t h e o r i s t s have proposed. 
T h i s a g a i n i s t r u e i n W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s d i s c u s s i o n of r u l e s . 
The e g o c e n t r i c f i x e d r a i l s , t h a t l e a d us t o f o l l o w r u l e s a r e 
a f a n t a s y . There a r e no r a i l s , formulae, images i n t h e mind 
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t h a t g u i d e b e h a v i o u r i n an unambiguous way, f o r t h e e s s e n t i a l 
p a r t o f r u l e f o l l o w i n g i s t h a t i t i s communal. I cannot obey 
a r u l e p r i v a t e l y . 
S i m i l a r l y an i n n e r q u e s t i o n i n g about whether I am i n 
p a i n , or whether I am f o l l o w i n g a r u l e c o r r e c t l y i s 
n o n s e n s i c a l . Without an e x t e r n a l (communal) r e f e r e n c e 
a g a i n s t w h i c h I can c o n f i r m my own e x p e r i e n c e s ; a q u e s t i o n i n g 
of t h e s e e x p e r i e n c e s i s s e n s e l e s s . T h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s a t 
t h e c o r e of t h e p r i v a t e language argument. 
L a s t l y i t i s t h e i n h e r e n t l y communal a s p e c t of r u l e 
f o l l o w i n g t h a t n e c e s s i t a t e s a s h a r p d i s t i n c t i o n between f i n i t e 
and n o n - f i n i t e m a t h e m a t i c s . There i s no j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r 
p i c t u r i n g i n f i n i t e c a s e s i n t h e same way as f i n i t e c a s e s , and 
t h e t e m p t a t i o n t o do so must be purged. 
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I X C o n c l u s i o n : The R e c e p t i o n of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s Work. 
When W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s Remarks on t h e F o u n d a t i o n s of 
M athematics were p u b l i s h e d i n 1956, t h e y were not met w i t h any 
g r e a t e n t h u s i a s m . I n f a c t even t h o s e s y m p a t h e t i c towards the 
g e n e r a l l i n e of thought, c r i t i c i s e d t h e Remarks as muddled, 
c o n f u s e d , m a t h e m a t i c a l l y unsound and a t b e s t i n s i g n i f i c a n t . 
A l a n Anderson c l a i m e d t h a t f o r W i t t g e n s t e i n mathematics 
means c a l c u l a t i n g p r o c e d u r e s , and t h a t " n o t h i n g W i t t g e n s t e i n 
s a y s would l e a d one t o guess t h a t a b s t r a c t a l g e b r a , and the 
t h e o r y of games a r e p a r t of mathematics." (Anderson p 482) 
F u r t h e r he s a y s : " i t i s v e r y d o u b t f u l whether t h i s 
a p p l i c a t i o n of h i s method i n t h e f o u n d a t i o n s of mathematics, 
w i l l c o n t r i b u t e s u b s t a n t i a l l y t o h i s r e p u t a t i o n as a 
p h i l o s o p h e r . " ( i b i d , p 490) 
K r e i s e l c r i t i c i s e s W i t t g e n s t e i n f o r h a v i n g a 
p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h e l e m e n t a r y mathematics, and f o r a v o i d i n g 
t h e d i f f i c u l t and g e n u i n e l y i n t e r e s t i n g q u e s t i o n s i n 
f o u n d a t i o n a l s t u d i e s . He judges t h a t t h e Remarks a r e "the 
s u r p r i s i n g l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t p r o d u c t of a s p a r k l i n g mind." 
( K r e i s e l p 158) 
B e r n a y s makes s i m i l a r o b j e c t i o n s and c o m p l a i n s t h a t 
" W i t t g e n s t e i n a r g u e s as though mathematics e x i s t e d almost 
s o l e l y f o r t h e p u r p o s e s of h o u s e k e e p i n g . " (Bernays p 522) 
A l s o he c r i t i c i s e s W i t t g e n s t e i n f o r h i s n o n - r e a l i s t approach 
and c o m p l a i n s of a tendency t o " d i s p u t e away t h e p r o p e r r o l e 
of t h i n k i n g - r e f l e c t i v e i n t e n d i n g i n a b e h a v i o u r i s t i c 
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manner." ( i b i d , p 511) The c o n v e n t i o n a l i s t account t h a t 
B e r n a y s c l a i m s we a r e l e f t w i t h , cannot account f o r the 
s t a b i l i t y of mathematics, cannot " i n any way e x p l a i n why t h e s e 
c o n c e p t u a l e d i f i c e s a r e not c o n t i n u a l l y c o l l a p s i n g . " ( i b i d , 
p 527) 
The c r i t i c i s m s h e r e f a l l i n t o two c a t e g o r i e s . F i r s t l y 
t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n i s too s i m p l i s t i c , o v e r - c o n c e r n e d w i t h 
e l e m e n t a r y mathematics, and u n a b l e t o d e a l competently w i t h 
t h e r e s u l t s of h i g h e r mathematics (eg C a n t o r ' s theorem, 
G o d e l ' s theorem.) S e c o n d l y t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s r e j e c t i o n of 
any o b j e c t i v e m a t h e m a t i c a l r e a l i t y l e a d s t o an unbounded 
l a i s s e z - f a i r e , a n y t h i n g - g o e s a t t i t u d e , which cannot account 
f o r t h e s t a b i l i t y of mathematics. I s h a l l c o n s i d e r each of 
t h e s e p o i n t s i n t u r n , but b e f o r e doing so I t h i n k i t i s 
i m p o r t a n t t o r e a l i z e we a r e not d e a l i n g w i t h W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s 
d e f i n i t i v e m a n u s c r i p t . The Remarks were not w r i t t e n as a 
book and were n e v e r i n t e n d e d f o r p u b l i c a t i o n . They a r e a 
s e l e c t i o n from f i v e s e p a r a t e notebooks i n which W i t t g e n s t e i n 
r e c o r d e d t h o u g h t s as t h e y o c c u r r e d t o him, and hence i t i s not 
a p p r o p r i a t e t o c r i t i c i s e t h e Remarks as though t h e y form a 
c l o s e l y a r g ued t r e a t i s e . Some p a s s a g e s a r e i n c o n c l u s i v e , some 
c o n t r a d i c t o t h e r s and some may even c o n t a i n e r r o r s : but t h i s 
i s o f l i t t l e consequence i f t h e work i s p r o p e r l y r e g a r d e d . 
I t h i n k t h e s e v e r i t y of some of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s c r i t i c ' s 
r emarks a r i s e , i n p a r t a t l e a s t , from a f a i l u r e t o a p p r e c i a t e 
t h i s . 
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The c r i t i c i s m of W i t t g e n s t e i n b a s e d on t h e a l l e g e d 
s i m p l i c i t y of h i s a c c o u n t has t h r e e main s t r a n d s . F i r s t l y 
W i t t g e n s t e i n d i s c u s s e s s i m p l e mathematics and g i v e s e l e m e n t a r y 
m a t h e m a t i c a l examples i n t h e g r e a t e r p a r t of h i s work. He 
s t r e s s e s t h e a p p l i c a t i o n and p r a c t i c a l s i d e of mathematics and 
seems h o s t i l e t owards r e s u l t s of h i g h e r mathematics. The 
s e c o n d s t r a n d e x t e n d s t h i s c r i t i c i s m t o c l a i m i n g t h a t 
W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s d i s c u s s i o n s of Godel's theorem. C a n t o r ' s 
theorem and Dedekind's p r o o f a r e muddled; and i n d i c a t e t h a t 
W i t t g e n s t e i n s i m p l y d i d not u n d e r s t a n d them, or was unable t o 
d e a l w i t h them m a t h e m a t i c a l l y . 
L a s t l y , on t h e p o i n t of s i m p l i c i t y , W i t t g e n s t e i n has been 
l a b e l l e d as a s t r i c t f i n i t i s t , and K i e l k o p f has c i t e d a 
p a s s a g e from t h e B l u e Book (BB p 20) i n d e f e n c e of h i s c l a i m . 
T h i s l a s t s t r a n d has been d i s c u s s e d and r e b u t t e d i n my 
c h a p t e r on s t r i c t f i n i t i s m , where I argued t h a t a s e l e c t i v e 
r e a d i n g of W i t t g e n s t e i n l e a d s t o such an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ; but 
t h a t a w i d e r r e a d i n g of W i t t g e n s t e i n i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h i s i s 
an o v e r - s i m p l i f i c a t i o n , and t o l a b e l W i t t g e n s t e i n as a s t r i c t 
f i n i t i s t i s a m i s t a k e . 
A g a i n s t t h e o t h e r s t r a n d s of t h e s i m p l i c i t y c r i t i c i s m , 
s e v e r a l p i n t s can be made. F i r s t l y , W i t t g e n s t e i n i s not 
d o i n g mathematics, he i n s i s t s he i s not l o o k i n g f o r new 
r e s u l t s , but t r y i n g t o c l a r i f y mathematics as i t i s now. H i s 
i n t e n t i s t o q u e s t i o n t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of 
c e r t a i n r e s u l t s , r a t h e r t h a n t h e r e s u l t s t h e m s e l v e s ; and t o 
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e l i m i n a t e p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n f u s i o n t h a t sometimes accompanies 
t h e r e s u l t s . I n as much as t h i s can be done by c o n s i d e r i n g 
s i m p l e examples, W i t t g e n s t e i n c o n c e n t r a t e s on t h e s e ; as 
complex mathematics would o n l y c o n f u s e i s s u e s . 
The same i s t r u e when W i t t g e n s t e i n c o n s i d e r s r e s u l t s of 
h i g h e r m a t h e m a t i c s . He does not q u e s t i o n m a t h e m a t i c a l l y , or 
have any i n t e n t i o n of some (ma t h e m a t i c a l ) r e f u t a t i o n ; but he 
q u e s t i o n s t h e i n f e r e n c e s drawn from t h e mathematics. Once 
t h i s i s u n d e r s t o o d i t i s e a s y t o see why he does not d w e l l on 
m a t h e m a t i c a l t e c h n i c a l i t i e s , and t o see t h a t some of t h e 
c r i t i c i s m s of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s l a c k o f m a t h e m a t i c a l a b i l i t y a r e 
out o f p l a c e . 
The b e s t examples of t h i s a r e W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s l a r g e l y 
m i s u n d e r s t o o d remarks on Godel's theorem, which I have 
c o n s i d e r e d a l r e a d y , i n c h a p t e r t h r e e . A v e r y s i m i l a r t y p e 
o f example i s found by c o n s i d e r i n g W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s remarks on 
C a n t o r ' s theorem. 
T r a d i t i o n a l l y i n t e r p r e t e d C a n t o r ' s d i a g o n a l procedure 
shows t h a t t h e s e t of r e a l numbers cannot be put i n t o one-
one c o r r e s p o n d e n c e w i t h t h e s e t of r a t i o n a l numbers, and 
f u r t h e r t h a t t h e s e t of r e a l numbers i s " b i g g e r " , i e . s t r i c t l y 
h a s a h i g h e r c a r d i n a l i t y , t h u s g e n e r a t i n g a whole f a m i l y of 
s e t s of h i g h e r o r d e r s of i n f i n i t y . 
W i t t g e n s t e i n r e j e c t s t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n as i t r e g a r d s 
t h e r e a l numbers as o b j e c t s , r a t h e r t h a n as W i t t g e n s t e i n 
c l a i m s , an unending t e c h n i q u e . "The c o n c e p t s o f i n f i n i t e 
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d e c i m a l s i n m a t h e m a t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s not c o n c e p t s of s e r i e s , 
b u t of t h e u n l i m i t e d t e c h n i q u e of expanding s e r i e s . We l e a r n 
an e n d l e s s t e c h n i q u e . . . " (RFM I V 1 9 ) . I t i s important t o 
r e a l i s e t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n does not o b j e c t t o t h e concept of 
r e a l numbers, or i n f i n i t e l y p r o c e e d i n g d e c i m a l s so long as 
t h e y a r e s e e n f o r what t h e y a r e ; and not r e g a r d e d as 
c o m p l e t e d e n t i t i e s or o b j e c t s . 
W i t t g e n s t e i n a l s o o b j e c t s t o t h e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e 
r e a l numbers can be o r d e r e d . The d i a g o n a l p r o c e d u r e i n v i t e s 
an i l l e g i t i m a t e p i c t u r e of a r e a l number as an e n d l e s s row 
r e a c h i n g i n t o t h e f a r d i s t a n c e . Whereas i t i s l e g i t i m a t e t o 
a s s o c i a t e t h e p i c t u r e //// w i t h t h e numeral 4, t h i s p i c t u r e 
cannot be s i m p l y extended t o t h e i n f i n i t e c a s e . " I s i t 
r e a l l y n e c e s s a r y h e r e t o c o n j u r e up a p i c t u r e of t h e i n f i n i t e 
(of t h e enormously b i g ) ? And how i s t h e p i c t u r e c o nnected 
w i t h t h e c a l c u l u s ? F o r i t s c o n n e c t i o n i s not t h a t of the 
p i c t u r e //// w i t h 4" (RFM A I I 17) 
T h i s p o i n t a g a i n s u g g e s t s t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n does not 
t h i n k C a n t o r ' s p r o o f s h o u l d be d i s c a r d e d , nor as some have 
c l a i m e d , does he d i s c o u n t t h e i n f i n i t e i n mathematics; but 
he i n s i s t s t h a t t h e meaning of such terms be p r o p e r l y 
u n d e r s t o o d . 
We must r e a l i s e we a r e d e a l i n g w i t h c o n c e p t s and 
t e c h n i q u e s of c a l c u l a t i o n , not o b j e c t s - not completed 
e n t i t i e s t h a t can be p i c t u r e d as an e n d l e s s row of numerals. 
The n o t i o n of i n f i n i t y i s i n t r o d u c e d i n t o mathematics, not 
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d e r i v e d from i t . "Ought t h e word " i n f i n i t e " t o be a v o i d e d i n 
m a t h e m a t i c s ? Y e s ; where i t appears t o c o n f e r a meaning upon 
t h e c a l c u l u s , i n s t e a d of g e t t i n g one from i t . " (RFM A I I 17) 
I t i s p e r f e c t l y l e g i t i m a t e t o i n t r o d u c e , use and employ new 
t e c h n i q u e s and c o n c e p t s so l o n g as t h e y a r e seen as an 
i n v e n t i o n , or as an e x t e n s i o n of mathematics, and not a 
m a t h e m a t i c a l d i s c o v e r y . "Such employment i s not: y e t t o be 
d i s c o v e r e d , b u t : y e t t o be i n v e n t e d . " (RFM A I I 9) 
Y e t t h e r e i s an o b j e c t i o n t o t h i s r e a d i n g of W i t t g e n s t e i n 
who c o n s t a n t l y s t r e s s e s t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of mathematics; and 
h i s q u e s t i o n : "What can t h e concept "non-denumerable" be used 
f o r ? " (RFM A I I 2) c a s t s doubt on t h e l e g i t i m a c y of t h e 
c o n c e p t of t h e i n f i n i t e . 
S i m i l a r l y , we can adopt t h e i n e q u a l i t y 2^®/' / "but 
what i f we do s a y i t , what a r e we t o do next, i n what p r a c t i c e 
i s t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a n c h o r e d ? " (RFM A I I 8) As we might say 
lO'^" s o u l s f i t i n t o a c u b i c c e n t i m e t r e , but i n f a c t we do not 
s a y i t "because i t i s of no u s e " ( i b i d ) I s i t t h e n t o be 
i n f e r r e d t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n wants t o l i m i t mathematics t o the 
a p p l i e d and t h e f i n i t e , as some have s u g g e s t e d ; and t o r e j e c t 
p u r e m a t h e m a t i c s . 
I t h i n k not, f o r W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s c o n c e p t i o n of a p p l i c a t i o n 
i s q u i t e b r o a d . He t h i n k s of a p p l i c a t i o n w i t h i n t h e r e l e v a n t 
m a t h e m a t i c a l c o n t e x t r a t h e r t h a n w i t h i n t h e w o r l d . " I s the 
q u e s t i o n not r e a l l y : what can t h i s number be used f o r ? 
True, t h a t sounds queer. - But what i t means i s : what a r e 
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i t s m a t h e m a t i c a l s u r r o u n d i n g s ? " (RFM A l l 1) S i m i l a r l y he 
s u g g e s t s t h a t so l o n g as t h e more a b s t r a c t a r e a s of 
mathematics a r e c o n n e c t e d t o t h o s e w i t h p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n , 
t h e y can be c a l l e d mathematics by e x t e n s i o n . "Don't we c a l l 
i t " m athematics" o n l y b e c a u s e e.g. t h e r e a r e t r a n s i t i o n s , 
b r i d g e s from t h e f a n c i f u l t o n o n - f a n c i f u l a p p l i c a t i o n s ? " (RFM 
V 25) And even i f a new c o n s t r u c t i o n has no obvious 
p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n , i t i s not u n r e a s o n a b l e t o suppose one 
might t u r n up l a t e r . "May I not complete t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
of t h e form... and as i t were p r e p a r e a form of language f o r 
p o s s i b l e employment." (RFM I V 40) Again, mathematics i s a 
motley, and no s t r i c t boundary can be drawn around i t . 
A l a s t d e f e n c e of W i t t g e n s t e i n a g a i n s t t h e s i m p l i c i t y 
c r i t i c i s m , i s t h a t h i s f o u n d a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s a r e t h e v e r y 
b a s i c s of m a t h e m a t i c a l i n f e r e n c e , of p r o c e d u r e s governed by 
r u l e s and a r e j e c t i o n of any r e f e r e n t i a l t h e o r y . These 
p o i n t s can a l l be d i s c u s s e d by r e f e r e n c e t o t h e s i m p l e s t 
examples; and i n d e e d i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n 
f o c u s e s h i s a t t e n t i o n on t h e most e l e m e n t a r y l e v e l where 
ma t h e m a t i c s b e g i n s . T h i s i s not t o say he i s h o s t i l e toward 
advanced mathematics, but t h a t h i s c o n c e r n i s w i t h t h e 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l not t h e m a t h e m a t i c a l . 
The s e c o n d major c r i t i c i s m made a g a i n s t W i t t g e n s t e i n , 
p r i n c i p a l l y by Dummett and B e r n a y s , i s h i s a l l e g e d extreme 
c o n s t r u c t i v i s m , and h i s r e j e c t i o n of t h e o b j e c t i v i t y of 
m a t h e m a t i c s . These two p o i n t s , though d i s t i n c t a r e 
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i n t i m a t e l y r e l a t e d ; and as I s h a l l s u g g e s t , both d e r i v e from 
a s i m i l a r m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of W i t t g e n s t e i n . 
Dummett u n d e r s t a n d s W i t t g e n s t e i n as s u g g e s t i n g t h a t we 
a r e n ot c o m p e l l e d by any r u l e s , and t h a t we a r e f r e e t o choose 
w h i c h s t a t e m e n t s t o i n c l u d e i n , and e x c l u d e from our 
m a t h e m a t i c s . Dummett a s c r i b e s t o W i t t g e n s t e i n t h e view t h a t 
a t e a c h s t a g e o f a p r o o f "we a r e making a new d e c i s i o n , " " a t 
e a c h s t e p we a r e f r e e t o choose t o a c c e p t or r e j e c t he p r o o f " 
and so " t h e r e i s n o t h i n g which f o r c e s us t o a c c e p t t h e p r o o f . " 
(Dummett 195 9.) 
Now t h i s i s c o m p l e t e l y a t odds w i t h W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s view 
t h a t p r o o f compels a c e r t a i n c o n c l u s i o n . "A p r o o f l e a d s me 
t o s a y t h i s must be l i k e t h i s . " (RFM V 3 0 ) ; and i t i s 
p r e c i s e l y t h i s t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s mathematics from e m p i r i c a l 
s c i e n c e s . ( c f my s e c t i o n v ( i v ) ) . Dummett has 
m i s u n d e r s t o o d W i t t g e n s t e i n , who f a r form c l a i m i n g t h a t we may 
i n f e r w h atever we w i s h , i s c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e r e i s no e x t e r n a l 
m a t h e m a t i c a l r e a l i t y or l o g i c a l c ompulsion t h a t d i c t a t e s our 
m a t h e m a t i c a l p r o c e d u r e s . 
Dummett has c o n f u s e d W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s r e j e c t i o n of one 
ac c o u n t of l o g i c a l compulsion, w i t h t h e r e j e c t i o n of 
c o m p u l s i o n i t s e l f . f o r W i t t g e n s t e i n we a r e compelled by 
math e m a t i c s i n v i r t u e of t h e g r a m m a t i c a l c o n v e n t i o n s we adopt, 
and more w i d e l y by our a p p l i c a t i o n of mathematics and form of 
l i f e . 
S i m i l a r l y B e r n a y s a t t a c k s W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s account, as he 
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t h i n k s i t d e n i e s o b j e c t i v i t y i n mathematics by denying the 
e x i s t e n c e of m a t h e m a t i c a l f a c t s , about m a t h e m a t i c a l e n t i t i e s . 
He s a y s W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s t h e o r y "cannot i n any way e x p l a i n why 
t h e s e c o n c e p t u a l e d i f i c e s a r e not c o n t i n u a l l y 
c o l l a p s i n g " . ( B e r n a y s p 527) Again t h e r e i s c o n f u s i o n between 
W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s r e j e c t i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r account of 
o b j e c t i v i t y , and t h e r e j e c t i o n of o b j e c t i v i t y i t s e l f . 
C e r t a i n l y W i t t g e n s t e i n r e j e c t s t h e i d e a t h a t m a t h e m a t i c a l 
p r o p o s i t i o n s a r e about o b j e c t i v e m a t h e m a t i c a l e n t i t i e s , or 
t h a t t h e r e i s any e x t e r n a l c o m pulsion g o v e r n i n g our 
m a t h e m a t i c a l b e h a v i o u r ; but he does s a y t h a t our b e h a v i o u r 
and t h e way we a c t u a l l y do mathematics does compel us t o g i v e 
an unique, and o b j e c t i v e l y c o r r e c t answer t o a g i v e n 
m a t h e m a t i c a l problem. O b j e c t i v i t y i s grounded i n "a 
t e c h n i q u e which i s a f a c t of n a t u r a l h i s t o r y . " (RFM V 13) 
But t h e r e a r e two d i f f i c u l t i e s h e r e ; f i r s t l y i t may w e l l 
be a s k e d why i t i s a f a c t of n a t u r a l h i s t o r y t h a t we a l l do 
m a t hematics i n t h e same way? S u r e l y t h e r e must be a deeper 
e x p l a n a t i o n ? W i t t g e n s t e i n has two r e s p o n s e s t o t h i s . E i t h e r 
he a c c e p t s t h e q u e s t i o n as genuine, but r e g a r d s i t as a 
q u e s t i o n f o r e m p i r i c a l s c i e n c e and not p h i l o s o p h y . The answer 
must r e s i d e i n g e n e t i c make-up, b r a i n s t r u c t u r e e t c . , and so 
i s not a p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i f f i c u l t y . Or he r e j e c t s t h e q u e s t i o n 
a s t h e f a c t s o f n a t u r a l h i s t o r y - of our form of l i f e - a r e 
s i m p l y g i v e n , and s h o u l d not be q u e s t i o n e d . "We must do away 
w i t h a l l e x p l a n a t i o n , and d e s c r i p t i o n a l o n e must t a k e i s 
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p l a c e " . ( P I 109) 
A P l a t o n i s t i s not l i k e l y t o be happy w i t h e i t h e r of 
t h e s e r e s p o n s e s , and may ask why human r e g u l a r i t i e s s h o u l d not 
be e x p l a i n e d i n terms of m a t h e m a t i c a l o b j e c t s . But such a 
s u g g e s t i o n i s f r a u g h t w i t h m e t a p h y s i c a l and e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l 
d i f f i c u l t i e s , and g i v e n some sympathy towards W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of our form of l i f e , h i s answer does not seem 
o u t r a g e o u s . 
The s e c o n d d i f f i c u l t y i n d e f e n d i n g W i t t g e n s t e i n a g a i n s t 
t h e c o m p u l s i o n / o b j e c t i v i t y t y p e d i s t i n c t i o n s of Dummett and 
B e r n a y s i s t h a t t h e r e seems t o be an i n c o n s i s t e n c y i n 
W i t t g e n s t e i n , who emphasizes t h a t i n mathematics we a r e both 
f r e e t o choose, c r e a t i v e , c o n v e n t i o n a l i s t , but a l s o f o r c e d t o 
c o n c l u s i o n s by o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y . How can we be both 
c o m p e l l e d by a p r o o f , and f r e e t o a c c e p t or r e j e c t i t a t any 
s t a g e . S u r e l y W i t t g e n s t e i n c a n ' t have i t both ways? 
A p o s s i b l e answer t o t h i s i s t h a t p a t h s i n mathematics 
a r e not c r e a t e d from n o t h i n g , but a r e , dependent on e x i s t e n t 
p a t h s . " I t forms even new r u l e s : i s al w a y s b u i l d i n g new 
r o a d s f o r t r a f f i c ; by e x t e n d i n g t h e network of t h e o l d ones." 
(RFM I 165) And so our p a s t d e c i s i o n s compel our p r e s e n t 
ones, f o r our b e h a v i o u r must be c o n s i s t e n t . But t h i s i s 
i n a d e q u a t e : f o r W i t t g e n s t e i n s t r e s s e s t h a t i n any p r o o f we 
a r e f r e e t o make new l i n k s , and new c o n c e p t s r e g a r d l e s s of 
what has gone b e f o r e . We a r e not bound t o f i x e d meanings or 
c o n c e p t s , and i n d e e d a p r o o f m o d i f i e s our c o n c e p t s ! We a r e 
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s t i l l f a c e d w i t h t h e dilemma. 
The s o l u t i o n f o r W i t t g e n s t e i n i s t o g r a s p both horns of 
t h e dilemma. At any s t a g e we a r e f r e e t o c r e a t e new l i n k s 
and i n t r o d u c e new c o n c e p t s ; but once t h i s has been done, and 
t h e r e s u l t s have been a c c e p t e d and a g r e e d t o by t h e community, 
t h e n t h e y become b i n d i n g and compel f u t u r e a p p l i c a t i o n . The 
c e n t r a l p o i n t i s agreement, and a f o c u s on t h e f i r s t p e r s o n 
p l u r a l r a t h e r t h a n t h e f i r s t p e r s o n s i n g u l a r . We may choose 
any p r a c t i c e s we l i k e , but once t h e y have been a c c e p t e d , our 
agreement compels us t o do c e r t a i n t h i n g s i n c e r t a i n ways. 
That we a c t u a l l y do t h i s e x p l a i n s t h e o b j e c t i v i t y of our 
mathematics, and f u r t h e r e x p l a n a t i o n , i f i t be r e q u i r e d , l i e s 
beyond t h e scope of p h i l o s o p h y . 
So f a r I have t r i e d t o defend W i t t g e n s t e i n a g a i n s t t h e 
two most common c r i t i c i s m s of h i s p h i l o s o p h y of mathematics, 
and have argued t h a t both stem from c o n f u s i o n and 
m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g . C r u c i a l l y a c o n f u s i o n about W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s 
d i s t i n c t i o n between p h i l o s o p h y and mathematics, and a 
m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g about h i s acco u n t of o b j e c t i v i t y ; which I 
hope I have d i s e n t a n g l e d ! 
But t h e r e a r e s t i l l two f u r t h e r p o i n t s t o be d i s c u s s e d . 
F i r s t l y t h e f a c t t h a t i n t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l l i t e r a t u r e , t h e r e 
has been no c a r e f u l s t u d y of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s L e c t u r e s on t he 
F o u n d a t i o n s o f Mathematics, or of t h e second p a r t of t he 
P h i l o s o p h i c a l Grammar, s u b t i t l e d : "On L o g i c and Mathematics." 
I n f a c t t h e r e has been l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n p a i d t o t h e s e works 
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at a l l . Secondly i t i s clear t h a t Wittgenstein's philosophy 
of mathematics has not been adopted or developed, so much so 
t h a t i n a recent book: New D i r e c t i o n s i n the Philosophy of 
Mathematics which s p e c i f i c a l l y aimed t o move away from 
t r a d i t i o n a l f oundational debates, Wittgenstein hardly gets a 
mention. I n the l i g h t of these f a c t s , how can Wittgenstein 
be seen as having made a s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the 
philosophy of mathematics? 
F i r s t l y the Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics 
(1976) and the Phi l o s o p h i c a l Grammar ( t r a n s l a t e d i n t o English 
1974) are recent works compared t o the Remarks (1964), and i t 
i s p o s s i b l e t h a t they have not yet had time t o sink i n , and 
become a f u l l p a r t of Wittgenstein's accepted opera. I t i s 
f u r t h e r possible t h a t i n the next few years these works w i l l 
be s tudied i n depth. ( C r i s p i n Wright's lengthy book on the 
Remarks, appeared fourteen years a f t e r the Remarks 
themselves) 
Secondly, however, the l i k e l i h o o d of t h i s seems rather 
reduced by the b e l i e f t h a t the content of the Lectures and of 
the Grammar i s not e s s e n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t t o the content of the 
Remarks, and so does not j u s t i f y extensive study. I n the 
case of the Lectures I t h i n k there i s some t r u t h i n t h i s , but 
I also t h i n k the passages i n the Lectures which record 
conversations between Wittgenstein and h i s p u p i l s , help t o 
i l l u m i n a t e Wittgenstein's thoughts. Turing p a r t i c u l a r l y seems 
t o ask many questions which one might have asked oneself, and 
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the subsequent discussions are an important a i d t o 
understanding W i t t g e n s t e i n . 
I n the case of the Philosophical Grammar, I t h i n k there 
i s important m a t e r i a l not t o be found i n the Remarks -
p a r t i c u l a r l y a d e t a i l e d discussion of proof which a m p l i f i e s 
the treatment of proof i n the Remarks; and secondly a f u l l e r 
discussion of the problems which surround r e a l numbers and the 
i n f i n i t e , which i s not t o be found elsewhere. Hence I f e e l 
t h a t both the Lectures and the Grammar deserve greater 
a t t e n t i o n than they c u r r e n t l y receive. 
Considering the lack of development and general adoption 
of Wittgenstein's ideas, again the p o i n t can be made t h a t they 
are s t i l l young, and have not had time t o be f u l l y digested. 
We are s t i l l at a l a r g e l y e x egetical stage, and hopes f o r new 
development are perhaps premature. 
Further i t i s t r u e t h a t at the current time, much work 
i s being done t o understand, develop and c r i t i c i s e 
W ittgenstein's more mainstream concerns, as found i n the 
I n v e s t i g a t i o n s . The recent Kripke/McGinn debate over 
Wittgenstein's discussion of rules has r i g h t l y provoked much 
a t t e n t i o n , and i t i s perhaps too much t o expect great i n t e r e s t 
i n the philosophy of mathematics at the same time. Indeed the 
I n v e s t i g a t i o n s are both temporally and conceptually p r i o r t o 
the Remarks, and i t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t a f u l l understanding of 
the l a t t e r can be gained without a f u l l understanding of the 
former. 
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L a s t l y i t has t o be said t h a t the general tone of 
Wittgenstein's work i s c r i t i c a l and negative, and as such i t 
does not r e a d i l y i n v i t e expansion or development. The 
r e j e c t i o n of mathematics as r e f e r e n t i a l , s t a t i n g f a c t s about 
mathematical e n t i t i e s , whether these e n t i t i e s be Platonic 
( l o g i c i s m ) , mental ( i n t u i t i o n i s m ) or ink marks on paper 
(formalism) ; was the r e j e c t i o n of a very deeply held 
c o n v i c t i o n , and leads t o the v i r t u a l collapse of pre-
Wit t g e n s t e i n foundational studies. But t h i s negative and 
c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i z i n g i s s t i l l an achievement. "Where does 
our i n v e s t i g a t i o n get i t s importance from, since i t seems only 
t o destroy everything i n t e r e s t i n g , t h a t i s , a l l t h a t i s great 
and important? (As i t were a l l the b u i l d i n g s , leaving behind 
only b i t s of stone and rubble.) What we are destroying i s 
nothing but houses of cards, and we are c l e a r i n g up the ground 
of language on which they stand." (PI 118) 
And t h i s i s not a l l . W ittgenstein does o f f e r not an 
explanation, but a d e s c r i p t i o n of how we i n f a c t do 
mathematics, and how our procedures are grounded i n human 
behaviour and the s t r u c t u r e s of the em p i r i c a l world. 
Wittgenstein's account avoids the P l a t o n i s t conception of 
c l a s s i c a l mathematics w i t h i t s huge o n t o l o g i c a l commitment t o 
sets, sets of sets e t c . . And i t also avoids abandoning much 
mathematical p r a c t i c e , which was the cost of o n t o l o g i c a l 
r e s t r a i n t ( c f . i n t u i t i o n i s m ) Wittgenstein e f f e c t i v e l y f i n d s 
a middle way between the two. 
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C e r t a i n l y there are d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h Wittgenstein's 
account, but as I hope I have shown; there are also many 
advantages, and many of Wittgenstein's c r i t i c s have f a i l e d 
f u l l y t o grasp the p o i n t s t h a t Wittgenstein was t r y i n g t o 
make. Admittedly Wittgenstein's w r i t i n g are sometimes 
abstruse and vague, but as Frege said of h i s own unpublished 
w r i t i n g s : they are not a l l gold, but there i s gold i n them. 
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